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Abstract
This paper explores the causes and the consequences of the evolution of family
firms in the growth process. The theory suggests that in early stages of develop-
ment, valuable family specific human capital stimulated the productivity of family
firms and the development process. However, in light of the rise in the importance
of managerial talents for firms’ productivity in later stages, family firms generated
a misallocation of managerial talents, curbing productivity and economic growth.
Evidence supports the dual impact of family firms in the development process and
the role of socio-cultural characteristics in observed variations in the productivity
of family firms.
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that family firms emerged in the early stages of indus-
trialization due to their importance in mitigating information and incentive constraints
for business ventures (Pollak, 1980; Burkart et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the rising im-
portance of managerial talents in the process of development has gradually diminished
the pivotal role of kinship in business organization, as desirable managerial skills have
often been absent in the pool of talents within the family (Chandler, 1990; Bertrand
and Schoar, 2006). Countries where institutional and economic barriers to entry have
permitted family firms to preserve their predominant role, degenerate into cronyism,
producing a misallocation of talents, and hindering social mobility, innovation and
growth(Morck and Yeung, 2003; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
Despite the existing narrative about the rise and the fall in the importance of family
firms, a theory that captures the underlying forces in the changing role of family firms
in the process of development has been absent. This paper advances a unified theory
of the rise and fall of family firms. The theory highlights the beneficial effects of family
firms in early stage stages of development and the endogenous decline in their produc-
tivity in later stages of development. Moreover, the research generates novel testable
predictions, about the roots of the variation in the prevalence of family firms across
societies, establishing the role of socio-cultural characteristics in observed variations in
the productivity of family firms.
The family firm is a common form of business organization regardless of the stage
of development of the economy, even among large publicly listed companies in mod-
ern high-income countries (La Porta et al., 1999). While the predominance of family
firms can be hardly viewed as a proximate determinant of economic development, it is
the capacity to invest in the entrepreneurial capital of family members involved in the
family business, and to adopt good management practices conducive to technological
innovations that explains their positive or negative role in the process of development.
In many cases, family firms have proven to be capable of keeping up with organiza-
tional and technological changes across generations, conditioning the continuation of
the company within the family to rigorous processes of formal training and practical
experience for descendants (Bennedsen and Foss, 2015).
By the same token, the econometric evidence does not unambiguously support the
hypothesis of family firms’ underperformance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga
and Amit, 2006; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007). Most importantly, the evidence suggests
that the negative impact of the family’s involvement in the company’s management
tends to disappear if the family CEO has accumulated enough human capital (Pe´rez-
Gonza´lez, 2006), and that the socio-cultural environment in which family firms are em-
bedded is a key factor to understand differences in the management quality of family
firms (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
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Figure 1: Management quality across firms’s type and cultural attributes
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Note. Individualistic (collectivistic) are countries in which the degree of individualism (Hofstede et al.,
2010) is greater (lower) than the median (plot (b)).
Figure 1 illustrates the heterogeneity of family firms quality and its link with the
socio-cultural environment. Plot (a) shows that not only family firms have a lower av-
erage management quality than non-family ones, but also that the distribution of man-
agement quality across family firms is more spread out and has a fatter left tail of badly
managed firms than that of non-family firms. Focusing on the quality of family firms
across societies, plot (b) suggests that on average, family firms are managed worse in
societies sharing collectivistic values than in individualistic societies; in particular, in
the former the tail of badly managed firms is much fatter.1
Our model accounts for the variety of family firms in terms of quality of man-
agement practices and their diverse impact on economic development. Therefore, the
model generates an endogenous evolution of the economy consistent with studies doc-
umenting that the process of industrial development is associated with an initial large
number of small-sized family firms, and a selection process for which badly managed
family firms are replaced by well-managed and innovative family and non-family firms
(Chandler, 1977; Atack, 1986; Gollin, 2008).
We analyze the succession in family firms and the choice of management technol-
ogy in a Lucas (1978) economy with overlapping generations.2 Managerial capital is
fed by two sources: the entrepreneurial human capital of the firm leader and the family
specific human capital. Entrepreneurial human capital can be acquired by any individ-
ual through education, and its productivity is influenced by personal innate ability. By
contrast, family specific human capital can be exploited only by entrepreneurs’ descen-
dants and its productivity is less responsive to the individual innate ability of the latter,
1Moreover, the quality of management practices used by family firms is positively correlated with the
level of income per capita, even after accounting for the (statistically insignificant) share of family firms
in the economy.
2For a related view of management as an endogenous technology choice, see Bloom et al. (2016).
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while it is sensitive to the centrality that society attributes to family legacy and inter-
personal contacts in business life. In this context, two polarized groups of family firms
emerge. One group is conducted by highly talented descendants, who adopt good
management practices based on entrepreneurial human capital. Another is formed
by family firms whose control is left to the least talented heirs who manage the com-
pany by exploiting the name, reputation and business contacts of their family, reaping
a profit higher than the wage with which their low talent would be remunerate in the
labor market. In addition, only the most talented workers’ descendants found new en-
terprises since they cannot rely on the name and web of contacts of their family. As a
result, with low-ability heirs continuing the family business, family firms are, on aver-
age, outperformed by their non-family counterparts. However, there is no difference in
the quality of management and financial performance between family and non-family
firms operated by highly educated entrepreneurs.
Provided that entrepreneurial human capital in the economy influences the pace
of technological progress (Galor and Moav, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2006; Doepke and
Zilibotti, 2014), the output growth rate is negatively affected by the managerial value
of family specific human capital. The initial stages of development are characterized
by a large number of small family firms managed by exploiting family specific hu-
man capital in a slow-growing economy. As development proceeds, some family firms
are replaced by new, more efficient entrants which adopt good management practices,
while some of the surviving family firms intensify the use of entrepreneurial human
capital. These changes promote economic growth, reducing the centrality of family
specific human capital in business life and raising the value of entrepreneurial human
capital. Still, the dual role of family specific human capital at the firm and aggregate
level generates a “reversal of fortune” among countries in the long run. The family
specific human capital supports the productivity of family firms and income per capita
in the short run, but it becomes detrimental in the long run, generating a misallocation
of talents and restraining the adoption of modern management practices conducive to
technology growth. As a result, societies that are relatively rich in the early phase of
industrialization thanks to the high productivity of firms using family specific human
capital, become relatively poor in the long run.3
We document a number of robust correlations consistent with the major empirical
implications of our theory. The negative gap in the quality of management practices
between family and non-family firms is particularly marked in countries with strong
collectivistic values where the importance of the family name, reputation and relation-
ships in the local culture is high, while it tends to disappear in individualistic soci-
eties. This management quality gap is ascribable to the group of family firms which
keep the management leadership within the family, relying on family specific human
3A similar result is obtained in a different theoretical setting by He´mous and Olsen (2017), who con-
sider the role of relational contracts and the negative (positive) effects that tight business relationships
have on broad (specific) innovations.
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capital. With regard to the distribution of management quality across family firms,
the share of badly (well) managed family firms is higher (lower) in societies which
assign high value to family specific human capital, especially in less dynamic and in-
novative industrial sectors. Furthermore, the variability in the quality of management
practices adopted by family firms decreases with the value of family specific human
capital. Finally, countries with collectivistic-oriented values industrialize later and in
late-industrialized countries the quality of family firms’ management is lower than in
countries with mature industrialization. However, as our theory predicts, in the early
stage of development, collectivistic values support the management quality of family
firms, while they do not have significant effects on the distribution of management
quality across family firms.
Our paper is primarily related to three strands of literature. First, we link to the
literature on the macroeconomic consequences of talent allocation and accumulation of
entrepreneurial human capital, being closest in particular to Iyigun and Owen (1999),
Hassler and Mora (2000) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2013). Unlike these papers, we
stress the family firms’ privileged access to specific managerial assets embodied in the
family’s name, reputation and contacts, which induces entrepreneurs to hand down the
company within the family even to the least talented heirs. In this context, we study
how business succession, talent allocation and quality of management practices evolve
during the development process and influence the long-run growth rate.
Second, our paper links to the literature on family and social ties, firm performance
and economic development (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014, 2015). Close to the spirit of
our paper, Amore (2016) documents that in Italian regions characterized by weak so-
cial capital, dynastic management is pervasive, while van Hoorn (2014) shows that
the quality of management practices improves in individualistic societies. At a macro
level, Fogli and Veldkamp (2018) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) find that the
degree of individualism in society is positively associated with the rate of technology
diffusion and economic growth. Buggle (2017) shows that societies using collaborative
forms of irrigation agriculture in pre-industrial era favored the emergence of collec-
tivistic values, experienced a reversal of technological advantages after 1500, and have
a lower level of innovativeness in present times. We shed new light on this culture-
development nexus, finding that the management quality gap between family and
non-family firms is narrower and industrialization is facilitated in societies where in-
dividualistic values prevail.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on family firms (Bhattacharya and Raviku-
mar, 2001; Burkart et al., 2003). These studies analyze the prevalence of family firms
as a result of entry barriers linked to financial market imperfections, agency problems
and amenity potential, which make the succession within the family an (inefficiently)
high profitable alternative option to selling the firm or hiring external managers. In
such a context, the cutoff level of heirs’ entrepreneurial talent above which it is opti-
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mal to keep the control of the firm within the family is inefficiently low, and only very
untalented heirs remain excluded from the firm’s management. In this paper, we high-
light a new source of competitive advantage of family control which is related to the
possibility of using family specific human capital and rent-seeking management prac-
tices as an income insurance device for entrepreneurs’ descendants. The managerial
advantage of family firms increases the benefits of transmitting the company within
the family to untalented heirs and, unlike barrier-to-entry advantages, it is consistent
with the coexistence of a large tail of poorly managed family firms and a cluster of well
managed family-owned enterprises (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic the-
ory of family firms in the process of development. In Section 3 we extend the analysis
to include market for firms, managers and capital. Section 4 presents empirical results.
All the proofs, data details and additional material are reported in the Appendices in
the Supplementary Material.
2 The model
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which economic activity extends
over infinite discrete time. In each period t, a generation is born, populated by a con-
tinuum of individuals of measure one. Individuals differ in the innate ability ait, which
is uniformly distributed over the unit interval, a ∼ U [0, 1].
Each individual has a single parent and a single child such that the population
is constant across households and over time.4 Individuals live for two periods and
in each period of their life they are endowed with one unit of time. In the first pe-
riod (childhood), they spend the unit of time acquiring either the managerial capital
required to run a firm or general human capital for the labor market. In the second pe-
riod (adulthood), individuals either work for or own/manage a firm, according to the
type of competences accumulated in childhood, earn the corresponding payoff (profit
or wage) and consume. In addition, parents choose how children allocate their unit
of time in acquiring managerial capital or general human capital and, therefore, their
occupation in adulthood.
We model the firm as a license to operate a production technology (Caselli and
Gennaioli, 2013). We assume that business licenses are freely available to individuals
in a perfectly elastic supply, and firms are not endowed with any tradable asset. As a
result, there is no market for firms’ ownership: existing licenses (firms) in the hands
4By making the one-child assumption, we consciously ignore the important and complex effects that
the size and structure of the family have on business succession, management practices and performance.
For example, the bigger the family, the wider the pool of potential successors and the greater the chance
of leaving the business leadership to a talented heir. However, as family size increases, the “productivity”
of family name, reputation and contacts for doing business increases too. Moreover, personal and profes-
sional conflicts between family members tend to increase with family size, causing problems of ownership
transfer and management inefficiencies (Bertrand et al., 2008; Ellul et al., 2010).
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of parent entrepreneurs can be either transmitted to the heirs or canceled (shutting the
firm down), while new licenses are accessible at no cost to workers’ descendants. The
possibility of trading licenses between (descendants of) entrepreneurs and workers in
a market for firms is analyzed in Section 3.
2.1 Factors of production
In any period t, the economy is composed by a fringe of competitive firms nt, which
produce a single homogeneous good yt. Firms are operated by a single manager, who
is also the owner and residual claimant, using managerial capital with a limited span
of control on human capital, the only variable factor of production:5
yit = Atm
i
t
(
Hit
)1−α
, (1)
where mit indicates the managerial capital of firm i, H
i
t the efficiency units of human
capital, At the aggregate technology of the economy, with 0 < α < 1.
Taking the wage rate wt as given, entrepreneurs choose the quantity of efficiency
units of human capital so as to maximize profits:
max
Hit≥0
piit = Atm
i
t
(
Hit
)1−α − wtHit. (2)
The conditional demand function of human capital for firm i is therefore
Hit =
(
(1− α) Atmit
wt
)1/α
. (3)
Substituting (3) in (2), the profits of an entrepreneur with managerial capital mit are
piit = pit
(
mit
)1/α
, (4)
where pit =
(
θAt/w1−αt
)1/α
, with θ ≡ αα(1− α)1−α, are the profits per efficiency unit
of managerial capital, that depend positively on the level of the aggregate technology
and negatively on the wage rate.
2.1.1 Managerial capital For newly founded enterprises, the managerial capital is
made by the entrepreneurial human capital of the founder, accumulated through for-
mal schooling. By contrast, the managerial capital of the family firm is affected not only
by the entrepreneurial human capital of the family member called to the helm of com-
pany, but also by the family specific human capital inherited by his/her family. Many
5The possibility of hiring professional managers is considered in Section 3.2. Following Lucas (1978),
physical capital can be introduced without affecting the qualitative results of the model by assuming a
small open economy with perfect capital mobility and no financial frictions.
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studies have documented the critical role played, today as in the past, by the family
legacy and interpersonal ties between the family members and prominent families in
the business or political community to gain special access to resources and manage the
family business effectively (Fisman, 2001).6
In modeling managerial capital, we allow for three distinctive features characteriz-
ing the managerial value of family specific human capital. First, family specific human
capital pertains to the family more than to the firm and cannot be easily transferred to
unrelated people outside the family. In Japan, for example, a common strategy used by
the longest-running family businesses to displace least talented heirs without squan-
dering the value of family name, legacy and contacts is the inclusion of non-blood
heirs in the family through the adoption of an adult son or arranged marriage (Mehro-
tra et al., 2013; Bunkanwanicha et al., 2013). Consistent with the family specific human
capital being linked to family ownership, Chung and Luo (2013) find that Taiwanese
firms appointing a new CEO external to the controlling family improve their financial
performance only if the share of family ownership (and, hence, the importance of fam-
ily specific human capital) is low, while family ownership tends to be beneficial when
the successor is a family member. Second, the managerial value of family specific hu-
man capital is not simply passed on to descendants, but it is acquired by the latter by
spending time and resources in apprenticeships and on-the-job training, and by absorb-
ing the family business culture and contacts (Lindquist et al., 2015). Third, anecdotal
evidence indicates that the contribution of family specific human capital to the man-
agerial capital of the firm is partially insensitive to the identity and innate talent of the
descendant called to the helm of the company.7 In this view, besides contributing to ex-
pand learning opportunities of family members through the transfer of tacit knowledge
and entrepreneurial values and attitudes (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008), family specific
human capital act as a sort of income insurance in favor of family members who, inde-
pendent of their innate ability, have access to the name, reputation and contacts of the
family to manage the family business and sustain profits.
For expositional simplicity, we assume that the contributions of entrepreneurial and
family specific human capital to managerial capital are perfectly separable and that the
latter is unaffected by the innate talent of the family member leading the company.8
6Consistent with the managerial value of family specific human capital, companies managed by
dynastically-promoted CEOs maintain more stable and effective labor relations with employees than non-
family firms (Sraer and Thesmar, 2007; Mueller and Philippon, 2011), and dynastically-promoted CEOs
are more likely among firms whose founder has been involved in politics (Xu et al., 2015).
7To illustrate, when Toyota Motor Corporation was hit by a series of scandals relating to the safety of
its vehicles, the company soon announced that a member of the Toyoda family after more than fifteen
years would return to the helm, relying on the Toyodas’ reputation and name more than on the specific
entrepreneurial skills of the new leader (Bennedsen and Fan, 2014, p. 32).
8In Appendix D we show that our results are robust to more general functional forms for managerial
capital that also account for the possible complementarity between entrepreneurial and family specific
human capital, as well as for the possibility that the family specific human capital contributes to enhance
the entrepreneurial human capital of family members.
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Formally, the managerial capital of individual i of generation t + 1 is given by:
mit+1 = τ
i
t+1a
i
t+1 + ι
(
1− τit+1
)
Φt+1 (φ, gt+1) , (5)
where ι is an indicator function assuming the value one if the parent is an entrepreneur
and zero if he/she is a worker, τit+1 and 1− τit+1 are, respectively, the fraction of time
spent by individuals in childhood accumulating entrepreneurial and family specific
human capital, and Φt+1 indicates the managerial productivity of the family specific
human capital.
Entrepreneurial human capital refers to the managerial capital accessible to all en-
trepreneurs and managers according to their own specific personality and talent, in-
cluding the capacity to create connections to capture valuable information on market
and technology prospects. By contrast, accessibility to the family specific human capi-
tal introduces a competitive advantage for firms owned and managed by founders’ de-
scendants as opposed to newly founded firms. The managerial productivity of family
specific human capital Φ is influenced exogenously by the socio-cultural arrangement
of society and the relevance that it attributes to family legacy and contacts for doing
business, captured by the parameter φ ≥ 0, with Φφ > 0 and Φ(0, g) = 0, such that
φ = 0 indicates a society in which the family specific human capital has no influence
on family firms’ managerial capital. Besides, the productivity of family specific hu-
man capital depends endogenously on the growth rate of aggregate technology gt+1.
The idea is that the contribution of the family specific human capital to family firms’
management is subject to an erosion effect due to the technological dynamism of the
economy, which weakens the insurance value of family name and inherited connec-
tions by restricting the intergenerational transmission of society-specific family benefits
(Galor and Moav, 2000; Hassler and Mora, 2000; Ashraf and Galor, 2011). In societies
where new technologies are introduced at a high pace, the managerial value of the
family specific human capital deteriorates more rapidly than that of entrepreneurial
human capital because of the continuous update of the individuals’ skills through for-
mal schooling. Hence, the transfer of family reputation and contacts across generations
becomes a less critical factor for doing business. This is consistent with recent empiri-
cal evidence provided by Giuliano and Nunn (2017) who find that practices inherited
from previous generations are relatively more beneficial in more stable societies. With-
out any loss of generality, throughout this paper we shall consider the following special
functional form for the productivity of the family specific human capital:
Φt+1 = φ (1− gt+1) . (6)
Moreover, we assume that the productivity that society attributes to the family specific
human capital is not extremely high, such that in a stagnant economy their contribu-
tion to managerial capital is not always greater than the marginal contribution of the
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entrepreneurial human capital, whatever the innate talent of the heir:
Assumption 1. φ < 1.9
2.1.2 General human capital Alternatively, individuals can spend their endowment
of time in childhood accumulating general human capital, which depends on their in-
nate ability. Although the family specific human capital may also have a value outside
family firms, to the extent that the additional benefits of the family specific human capi-
tal in the labor market are lower than their managerial value, without loss of generality
we normalize the value of the family specific human capital in the labor market to zero.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible we assume that the impact of time on general
human capital is the same as that on entrepreneurial human capital:
hit+1 = at+1. (7)
2.2 Preferences and occupational choices
Parents have log-linear, altruistic preferences over the second-period household con-
sumption cit, and the future income of their children I
i
t+1:
uit = γ ln c
i
t + (1− γ) ln Iit+1. (8)
Parents choose occupation and education time investment of their children, after ob-
serving their innate abilities.10 Entrepreneurs decide whether to continue the firm
within the family, leaving the control to their heirs, or to shut the firm down. Corre-
spondingly, their descendants accumulate either managerial, in the form of entrepreneurial
and family-asset upbringing, or general human capital. Conversely, parent workers
choose between the entrepreneurial and wage-earning career for their children, who,
having no family specific human capital to inherit, can only accumulate entrepreneurial
or general human capital.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs Conditional on choosing to continue the firm within the fam-
ily, parent entrepreneurs establish how descendants share their time endowment in
childhood between the accumulation of entrepreneurial human capital and assimila-
tion of family specific human capital with the objective to maximize the profit-income
in adulthood, pit+1(mit+1)
1/α. Given the assumption of perfect substitutability between
entrepreneurial and family specific human capital, from equations (4) and (5) we have
9The case φ ≥ 1 is analyzed in Appendix B.
10This simplifying assumption undervalues the insurance effects of the family specific human capital
and, if something, it goes against our theory. Actually, if parents had to choose the education and occu-
pation of the children before knowing their talent, the time spent in absorbing the family specific human
capital could be a sort of insurance policy that is more valuable as more risk-averse parents are.
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the following optimal allocation of time:
τit+1 =
0 if ait+1 < a¯t+1 = φ (1− gt+1)1 if ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1 = φ (1− gt+1) . (9)
Entrepreneurs’ heirs invest their time in acquiring either entrepreneurial or fam-
ily specific human capital according to whether their innate talent (i.e., the marginal
productivity of entrepreneurial human capital) is higher or lower than the marginal
productivity of the family specific human capital, φ (1− gt+1). From (4), the income
that descendants can gain from continuing the family business is
Ii,ee,t+1 =
pit+1 (φ (1− gt+1))
1/α ≡ Ii,eφ,t+1 if ait+1 < a¯t+1
pit+1
(
ait+1
)1/α ≡ Ii,ea,t+1 if ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1, (10)
where the superscript and subscript indicate, respectively, the occupation of the parent
and the occupational choice for the heirs (’e’ for entrepreneur and ’ω’ for worker).
If parent entrepreneurs choose not to continue the firm, the income of descendants
is given by the wage rate earned on the labor market times the human capital accumu-
lated in childhood. From (7),
Ii,eω,t+1 = wt+1a
i
t+1. (11)
Parent entrepreneurs leave the firm to the heirs within the family or initiate their
descendants to a wage-earning career according to whether Ii,ee,t+1 ≷ I
i,e
ω,t+1. Let a
φ
t+1
and aat+1 be the levels of the descendant’s innate ability for which the wage income is
equal to the profit income that could be earned by managing the firm by relying on,
respectively, family specific and entrepreneurial human capital. From (10) and (11),
aφt+1 =
[
φ (1− gt+1) θAt+1
wt+1
] 1
α
, (12)
aat+1 =
(
wt+1
θAt+1
) 1
1−α
. (13)
The ability thresholds (12) and (13) vary with the wage rate: the higher the income
that descendants can earn on the labor market, the lower the incentive of parent en-
trepreneurs to transmit the firm within the family and the lower the threshold aφt+1 and
the higher aat+1. Therefore, we can define two relevant wage thresholds:
wˆt+1 = θAt+1[φ(1− gt+1)]1−α, (14)
w˜t+1 = θAt+1, (15)
as, respectively, the wage rate wˆt+1 for which a
φ
t+1 = a
a
t+1 = a¯t+1 and the wage w˜t+1 for
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Figure 2: Entrepreneurs’ occupational choice
(a) wt+1 < wˆ (b) wˆ ≤ wt+1 ≤ w˜ (c) wt+1 > w˜
which aat+1 = 1. Summarizing:
Proposition 1. Education and occupational choices of parent entrepreneurs are such that:
(a) for any wt+1 ≤ wˆ, all the descendants continue the family firms. Heirs with ability ait+1 <
a¯t+1 acquire and use the family specific human capital in the firm’s management; heirs with
abilities ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1 accumulate and use entrepreneurial human capital;
(b) for any wt+1 ∈ (wˆ, w˜], the descendants with intermediate innate abilities, ait+1 ∈ (aφt+1, aat+1),
become workers, while the others continue the family firms. Low ability heirs, with ait+1 ≤
aφt+1, acquire family specific human capital and use crony management technologies, while
highly talented ones, with ait+1 ≥ aat+1, invest in entrepreneurial human capital and use
entrepreneurial management technologies;
(c) for any wt+1 > w˜, low ability heirs for whom ait+1 ≤ aφt+1, continue the family firms by
exploiting the family specific human capital. All the others become workers.
In Figure 2 we provide a graphical representation of the occupational choice of par-
ent entrepreneurs. When the market wage is low (panel 2(a)), the option of the em-
ployment sector is unattractive; parent entrepreneurs will never shut their firms down,
and the control of all the firms in the economy is retained within the family. For in-
termediate wage rates, a polarization of family firms in terms of talent and quality of
management practices emerges (panel 2(b)): heirs with an innate ability lower than
aφt+1 as well as heirs with an ability level higher than a
a
t+1 continue the family business,
while those with an ability level ait+1 ∈ (aφt+1, aat+1) leave the family business to work
for a wage. In this case, low ability agents would earn a wage on the labor market
lower than the profits they gain by managing the firm by relying on family name and
contacts. Conversely, high ability heirs are selected by their parents to continue the
family business by using the best management practices. Finally, for high wage rates,
only descendants in the lower tail of the ability distribution (i.e., ait+1 ≤ aφt+1) continue
the firm by exploiting the family specific human capital, while all the others will leave
11
the company to join the employment sector (panel 2(c)).11
2.2.2 Workers Unlike parent entrepreneurs, workers do not have family specific hu-
man capital to transfer to their descendants. Their descendants can only accumulate
entrepreneurial human capital needed for managing a new enterprise or general hu-
man capital to work for a wage. As a result, education and occupational choices of
parent workers are regulated only by the ability of their descendants. Specifically, from
(7), (8) and (4):
Ii,ωe,t+1 = pit+1
(
ait+1
)1/α
, (16)
Ii,ωω,t+1 = wt+1at+1. (17)
Comparing (16) and (17), the relevant threshold level of talent which makes workers’
descendants indifferent between wage-earning and entrepreneurial career is aat+1 as in
(13).
Proposition 2. Education and occupational choices of parent workers are such that:
(a) for any wt+1 ≤ w˜, high ability descendants, with ait+1 ≥ aat+1, accumulate entrepreneurial
human capital and found new firms, while the low ability ones, with ait+1 < a
a
t+1, become
workers;
(b) for any wt+1 > w˜, all descendants become workers, regardless of their innate ability.
Figure 3 displays the occupational choice of parent workers. When the market wage
rate is low, the employment sector is unattractive to highly talented descendants who
may earn a higher income by starting and managing an individual firm (panel 3(a)).
In contrast, when the market wage rate is very high, working for a wage is the most
rewarding option for workers’ descendants whatever their innate talent (panel 3(b)).
2.3 Macroeconomic equilibrium
In this section we characterize the macroeconomic equilibrium, in terms of aggregate
technology, industry size, quality of management practices and the economy’s growth
rate. In order to do that, let us start by describing the evolution of total factor produc-
tivity.
11If we assume that entrepreneurship is more risky than wage employment and low quality en-
trepreneurs are more likely to go bankrupt, the role of family specific human capital could be weaker.
However, the insurance nature of the family specific human capital, besides supporting income, can also
limit the probability of going bankrupt. In this case, it is still more rewarding for the least talented heirs
to continue the family business rather than work in the labor market.
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Figure 3: Workers’ occupational choice
(a) wt+1 < w˜ (b) wt+1 > w˜
2.3.1 Technology growth We assume that the aggregate technology evolves over
time according to the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy that accumulates en-
trepreneurial human capital.12
At+1 = (1+N at+1) At. (18)
As the talent threshold aat+1 above which descendants accumulate entrepreneurial
human capital is the same regardless of the parents’ occupations, the growth rate of
total factor productivity is:
gt+1 = 1− aat+1 (nt) . (19)
This assumption is in line with growth theories and empirical evidence highlight-
ing the critical role of allocation of individual talents to entrepreneurial rather than
rent-seeking activities (Hassler and Mora, 2000; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2012). In
addition, it greatly simplifies algebra, allowing us to prove:
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, wt+1 > wˆ holds: not all entrepreneurs’ descendants continue the
family firms, and some of them work for a wage.
According to Lemma 1, the occupational choice in Proposition 1(a) is inconsistent
with the labor market equilibrium, and the economy is characterized by positive entry
and exit of firms and a certain degree of social mobility.
2.3.2 Labor market equilibrium Using equations (3), (5) and (7), and integrating the
optimal choices of the parents over the innate ability distribution of the descendants,
the aggregate supply and demand of general human capital are:
HSt+1 (wt+1) =
ˆ
W
hit+1da
i
t+1 =
ˆ
W
ait+1da
i
t+1 (20)
12This excludes scale effects on the economy growth rate. Results are qualitatively robust if we assume
that the growth rate depends on the total amount of entrepreneurial human capital (see Appendix C).
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and
HDt+1 (wt+1) =
ˆ
N
Hit+1da
i
t+1 =
ˆ
N
(
(1− α) At+1mit+1
wt+1
)1/α
dait+1, (21)
where N andW are the relevant sets of firms and workers at time t + 1 reflecting the
occupational choices of parents at time t.
Proposition 3. For any nt, a unique competitive equilibrium exists, defined by the tuple{
wt+1, HSt+1, H
D
t+1
}
for which HSt+1 (wt+1) = H
D
t+1 (wt+1). The equilibrium wage rate wt+1
is a one-to-one function of the number of firms operating in the previous generation, nt.
The equilibrium wage rate in t+ 1 varies with the number of firms operating in the
previous period/generation t. This is due to the heterogeneity of parents associated to
the possibility of transmitting family specific human capital. The higher the number
of firms in t, the higher the number of parent entrepreneurs who can transmit family
specific human capital to their descendants in t + 1. This induces some low-talented
individuals, who, lacking family specific human capital, would have chosen to work
for a wage, to continue the family firm, thus causing an increase in labor demand and a
decrease in labor supply, and therefore an increase in the wage rate. Since occupational
choices are regulated by the number of firms operating in t that in turn determines the
number of firms in t + 1, the characterization of the steady state equilibrium would
require to take into account their joint evolution. The one-to-one relation between wt+1
and the number of firms in t greatly simplifies the analysis by allowing the wage thresh-
olds in (14) and (15) to be matched to the correspondingly one-period lagged threshold
numbers of firms nˆt and n˜t.
2.3.3 Steady-state equilibrium From Proposition 3 and Lemma 1, the dynamic sys-
tem governing the evolution of the industry size is given by the piecewise differential
equation:
nt+1 =
nta
φ
t+1(nt) + 1− aat+1(nt) if nt < n˜
nta
φ
t+1(nt) if nt ≥ n˜,
(22)
where n˜ is the number of firms for which the equilibrium wage rate is w˜ and aa = 1.
The corresponding evolution of the growth rate of aggregate technology is:
gt+1 =
1− aat+1(nt) if nt < n˜0 if nt ≥ n˜. (23)
A steady-state equilibrium is defined as a stationary solution to the dynamic equa-
tion (22), in which firms and individuals maximize their objective functions and mar-
kets clear.
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Definition 1. A sequence {wt, nt, aφt , aat , gt}∞t=κ is a steady state equilibrium if: (i) firms max-
imize profits; (ii) parents choose the occupation and education of descendants that maximize
utility; (iii) the labor market clears; (iv) ability thresholds, number of firms and technology
growth rate are constant over time.
Using this definition, we can prove that our economy is characterized by a unique
and globally stable steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The number of firms monotonically converges to a unique and globally stable
steady state
n∗ =
1− aa(n∗)
1− aφ(n∗) , (24)
where n∗ ∈ [0, n˜] such that the distribution of individuals’ talent across occupations and man-
agement practices are those described in propositions 1(b) and 2(a). At the steady state, the
growth rate of aggregate technology is
g∗ = 1− aa(n∗). (25)
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a polarization of the distribution
of individual abilities of the heirs succeeding to the helm of the family firms and of the
managerial practices deployed to lead the family business, and by a positive rate of
social mobility between labor and industry, n∗(aa(n∗)− aφ(n∗)). A share ν f ,φ = aφ (n∗)
of the industry is populated by family firms run by low-ability descendants who rely
on the managerial productivity of family specific human capital inherited from their
parents, while a share ν f ,a = 1− aa (n∗) is made up by well-managed family firms con-
ducted by highly talented descendants who use the entrepreneurial human capital ac-
cumulated in childhood. On the other side, a share νn f = (1− n∗) (1− aa (n∗)) /n∗ of
new, non-family firms founded by workers’ descendants enters the industry by using
entrepreneurial management practices. In terms of quality of management practices
and performance, newly founded and well managed family firms are indistinguish-
able. However, the average performance of family firms is lower than that of non-
family ones due to the bias in the allocation of talent caused by the income-insurance
effect of the family specific human capital.
Ultimately, educational and occupational choices of parents, as well as industry
structure, growth rate of technology and income per capita, depend on the socio-cultural
and institutional structure of society affecting the managerial value of the family spe-
cific human capital φ.
Proposition 5. The steady-state talent thresholds aφ(n∗) and aa(n∗) increase with φ. As a
result, the share of family firms managed using family specific human capital increases, while
that using entrepreneurial human capital and the growth rate decrease. In addition, the variance
of management quality of family firms and the social mobility rate decrease as φ increases.
15
The importance that the socio-cultural setting of society attaches to family name,
values and contacts in business life has both direct and general equilibrium effects
on the allocation of talent and economic development. Where family specific human
capital is highly valued for doing business, entrepreneurs are more likely to maintain
the control of the firms within the family by transferring the family specific human
capital to their low-ability heirs. This increases the number of firms in the market,
the labor demand and the wage rate, thus discouraging highly talented individuals
from accumulating entrepreneurial human capital. The resulting decrease in the rate
of technological progress further increases the productivity of family specific human
capital, making it relatively more rewarding to acquire and use family specific rather
than entrepreneurial human capital. Ultimately, the share of badly managed family
firms increases, while those of well managed family and non-family firms using en-
trepreneurial managerial practices decrease. Such changes in the allocation of talents
reduce the entrepreneurial human capital and the steady-state growth rate of the econ-
omy.13
A specific result of the insurance nature of the family specific human capital, re-
ported in Proposition 5, is that the variability of quality of management practices across
family firms decreases with the productivity of family specific human capital. The intu-
ition is transparent. In societies where the family name, reputation and contacts allow
low-ability heirs to continue the family company (relatively) successfully, the share
of family firms using family-based management practices, whose productivity is in-
dependent of entrepreneurial ability, increases, while the share of family firms using
entrepreneurial human capital decreases. As a result, the distribution of quality of
management practices across family firms has a lower variance and a fatter left tail.
2.4 Family firms in the development process
As a preliminary step to analyze the evolution of family firms and industry structure
in the transition from stagnation to growth, we reformulate the economy’s dynamics
in terms of growth rates in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. For any nt < n˜ there is a one-to-one inverse correspondence between gt and
nt, and the growth rate of aggregate technology evolves monotonically toward the steady state
according to gt+1 = v(gt), with 0 < ∂gt+1/∂gt < 1. For any nt ≥ n˜ the economy is stagnant,
gt+1 = gt = 0. There exists an ˜˜n < n˜ such that for nt = ˜˜n the economy experiences a
managerial and technological take-off, with gt+1 > gt = 0 and aat+1 < 1.
The growth dynamics is associated with an evolution of industry for which, along
the transition path, the number of firms in the economy steadily decreases, while their
13When the productivity of the family specific human capital is extremely high, φ ≥ 1, all family busi-
nesses use “crony” management practices, there is no firm entry and no social mobility, and the economy
is stagnant at a zero growth rate (Appendix B).
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Figure 4: Growth and firm transition
(a) Growth dynamics (b) Firms’ evolution
average size increases (Figure 4). Consistent with the traditional boost-retardation role
of family firms, in the early stages of development, when the economy is still stagnant,
the industry is populated by a large number of small family firms, which rely on the
influence of the family name and contacts to manage their businesses and sustain pro-
ductivity. Because of high wages, some family firms shut down, while those which
remain in the market increase their size. When the number of firms shrinks to ˜˜n, and
the firms’ average size has reached a minimum threshold level, it becomes profitable
for individuals at the top of the ability distribution to adopt more efficient managerial
practices and accumulate entrepreneurial human capital. The economy experiences a
managerial and technology take-off triggered by a new fringe of well managed enter-
prises conducive to innovation and economic growth.
From this moment on, a process of structural transformation of industry starts, such
that traditional family firms relying on family specific human capital are replaced by
entrepreneurial family and non-family firms that foster advancements in technology
and social mobility. The increasing dynamism of the economy and society weakens the
income-insurance effect of the family specific human capital. This decreases the pro-
ductivity of traditional management practices and, as a result, increases the supply of
labor, decreases the wage rate and makes it rewarding for highly talented individuals
to invest their time in accumulating entrepreneurial human capital. Due to the reallo-
cation of talents and resources across occupations and management technologies the
share of family firms in the economy decreases, while their heterogeneity increases.
Proposition 7. Along the transition to the steady state, the shares of family and non-family
firms using entrepreneurial human capital increase and the share of family firms using family
specific human capital decreases. In addition, the total share of family firms decreases, while the
variance in the quality of management practices of family firms increases.
In the early stages of development, family specific human capital is an important
source of productivity for family firms and the economy. However, in later stages,
the name, legacy and web of contacts of the family, while remaining valuable assets
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at the firm level generate negative selection effects on talent allocation, occupational
choices and management practices at the aggregate level, transforming them into a
hurdle for innovation and growth. This dual role of the family specific human capital
can cause a “reversal of fortune” for countries that are rich in the short run because of
the high productivity of family specific human capital, and become relatively poor in
the long run because of the distortionary impact of family specific human capital on
entrepreneurial human capital accumulation.
Proposition 8. In the early stages of development (i.e., nt ≥ n˜), the income per capita is
increasing in φ. However, the greater the managerial productivity of the family specific human
capital, the later the managerial take-off and the lower the growth rate.
Proposition 8 illustrates that in pre-industrialization stages, a large share of family
firms supported by stronger productivity of family specific human capital can sustain
the income of the economy, at the cost of delaying the adoption of more efficient man-
agement practices and weakening the long-run prospects of the economy.
3 Markets for firms and managers
So far, we have assumed that parent entrepreneurs can choose between leaving the
firm leadership to descendants or closing the family business down and directing their
descendants to a wage-earning career. In reality, family firms are often sold and/or
managed by professional CEOs hired from outside the family. This gives entrepreneurs
the opportunity to leave to their untalented heirs the proceeds of the firm’s sale or
dividends produced by professional managers, which add to the wage that heirs can
earn in the labor market.
In this Section, we introduce in the model markets for firms and managers, concep-
tualizing firms as homogeneous licenses that can be exchanged in the market and as-
suming that each individual can own at most one license (i.e., firm). We abstract from
the existence of the capital market and assume that the new potential entrepreneurs
(i.e., the workers’ descendants starting a new business) can purchase the business li-
censes from entrepreneurs’ descendants and pay for it ex post out of realized profits.14
In this case, unless the managerial value that society attributes to the family specific
human capital is very low, parent entrepreneurs can still prefer to transfer the business
within the family also to poorly talented heirs exploiting family specific human capital
14In Appendix E, we consider the case in which the licenses must be paid in advance by workers’ de-
scendants, who can use monetary bequests left by parents and financial resources raised in the capital
market. In this setting, as long as capital markets are complete, the initial distribution of parental wealth
does not affect occupational choices and therefore the aggregate equilibrium, which are qualitatively the
same as in the basic model when we abstract from capital markets. By contrast, under imperfect cap-
ital markets, the initial wealth of parent workers influences the decisions on the descendants’ careers.
However, the introduction of this additional source of advantage for family firms simply exacerbates the
misallocation of talents induced by the family specific human capital, leaving our results qualitatively
unchanged.
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rather than selling the firm. Then, we allow for the possibility of entrepreneurs contin-
uing the firm by leaving the leadership to professional managers external to the family.
In this case, family firms hiring professional managers use entrepreneurial human capi-
tal and are equally well managed as non-family firms, while family firms conducted by
family members divide between badly and well managed firms as in the basic model.
3.1 Market for firms
To highlight the main economic mechanisms in the simplest and analytically tractable
model, we do not allow for the creation of new businesses, but we assume that business
licenses are in a fixed number n, hence removing any dynamics from the analysis.15
As an alternative to continuing the firm within the family ensuring their descen-
dants the income Ii,ee = pi(m
i)1/α, parent entrepreneurs can sell the firm at a price p
and transfer the proceeds to their heirs, whose total income in adulthood is given by
the wage income plus the proceeds of the sale, Ii,eω = w a
i + p. By contrast, in order
to start up a new enterprise workers’ descendants have to buy a license from existing
entrepreneurs. In line with our main hypothesis that the family specific human capital
can be transferred only to a lesser extent to buyers or managers external to the family,
we assume that new entrepreneurs cannot manage the firms by exploiting the family
specific human capital of the selling family such that their entrepreneurial income is
Ii,ωe = pi(a
i)1/α − p. Otherwise, they can undertake a wage-earning career gaining the
wage income Ii,ωω = wa
i.
The occupational choices of parent entrepreneurs are governed by the descendants’
innate ability and by the two thresholds aφ and aa for which the total income that the
latter can realize by working for a wage and inheriting the proceeds from the firms’
sale is equal to the income that they can earn by managing the family firm by using,
respectively, family specific or entrepreneurial human capital:
aφ =
pi (φ(1− g))1/α − p
w
, (26)
pi (aa)1/α = waa + p. (27)
As in the basic model, parent entrepreneurs choose to keep the ownership of the
firm within the family as long as the heirs’ ability is either lower than aφ or higher
than aa. Likewise, workers’ descendants join the labor market as employees or start a
new business by purchasing a license depending on whether their wage income Ii,ωω is
greater or lower than the entrepreneurial income Ii,ωe . The occupational choice of parent
workers is then governed by the indifference threshold aa in (27), such that workers’
descendants with ability level ai < aa join the labor market, while the most talented
15Given the static nature of the analysis, we drop the time indicator as long as it does not generate
confusion.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium: family firms continuation
(a) Polarization (φ > φ) (b) Selling crony firms (φ ≤ φ)
with ai ≥ aa buy a business license and start a new enterprise.
Since, the number of business licenses (firms) is fixed, the equilibrium is defined as
the pair of non-negative prices (w∗, p∗) such that: (i) parents optimally choose the occu-
pations for descendants; (ii) firms maximize profits, and (iii) labor and firm-ownership
markets clear. We focus on equilibria with positive exchanges of licenses, omitting the
analysis of deeply crony societies in which all firms are transferred within the family
(formally, we assume φ < 1).
Proposition 9. A unique equilibrium with a positive growth rate exists. There exists an n¯ > 0
such that for any n < n¯, the equilibrium is characterized by a positive price for business licenses
p∗ > 0. Moreover, for any p∗ > 0, there exists a φ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
(a) if φ > φ, the share of family firms n (aa− aφ) is sold to entrant entrepreneurs (i.e. workers’
descendants); family firms that continue by the next generation polarize into badly managed
firms conducted by low-talented heirs relying on family specific human capital, and well
managed firms conducted by high-talented heirs using entrepreneurial human capital;
(b) if φ ≤ φ, the share of family firms n aφ is sold in the market, and all the family and non-
family firms are managed by using entrepreneurial human capital.
The existence of a market for firms qualifies, but does not invalidate, the results
of the basic model. In particular, in societies where family name, legacy and connec-
tions are valuable assets for managing a business, leaving the firm’s ownership to low-
talented descendants can still be the optimal choice for parent entrepreneurs (Fig. 5(a)).
However, if φ is very low, the parents of untalented heirs prefer to sell the firm to new
entrants and leave their descendants the proceeds (Fig. 5(b)). Therefore, in the pres-
ence of a market for firms the crony family firms can disappear when the managerial
value of the family specific human capital is low but still positive (lower than φ), while
in the basic setting without license exchanges φ is normalized to zero.
The fundamental mechanism driving occupational choices is also unchanged: higher
values of φ increase the managerial value of the family specific human capital and the
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incentive to transfer the firm to the least talented heirs with depressing effects on the
growth rate and the market for firms.
Proposition 10. As φ increases, the share of family firms, and among these the proportion
of those using bad management practices, increases, while the share of firms managed by en-
trepreneurial human capital, the growth rate of technology and the number of exchanges in the
market for business licences decrease.
Unlike the basic model, the number of firms is no longer an endogenous state vari-
able determining the evolution of economy. Although we ruled out any dynamics, if
we assume that at the initial stages of development the economy is populated by many
small firms, the comparative statics analysis for n provides some indications on the role
of family firms during the development process.
Proposition 11. The threshold value of the productivity of family specific human capital φ
decreases with n. Moreover, for any n < n¯, as n decreases, the share of family firms and
the proportion of those using crony management practices decrease, while the share of firms
managed by entrepreneurial human capital, the growth rate of technology and the share of firms
exchanged in the market increase.
In the first stages of development, when the economy is populated by a large num-
ber of small firms, the likelihood of firms continuing within the family by relying on
the managerial value of the family specific human capital is great. The larger the num-
ber of firms, the lower the equilibrium price of firm ownership (Proposition 9), and the
lower the incentive to sell the family business, including those managed by the least
talented heirs. In addition, the larger n, the lower φ and the higher the likelihood that
the actual productivity of the family specific human capital is high enough to ensure
that crony family firms persist in equilibrium. Consistent with the evolution of family
firms described in Section 2.4, as firms become larger and fewer in number, the mar-
ket for firms becomes more efficient. An increasing share of crony family firms is sold
to new highly talented entrepreneurs replacing the least talented descendants of the
current generation of entrepreneurs, and enhancing economic growth.
3.2 Market for managers
Assume that entrepreneurs can keep the ownership of the business within the family
and leave its leadership to professional managers external to the family. Also, assume
that the family specific human capital cannot be used outside the family by professional
managers.16 For the sake of tractability, we abstract from agency problems between
owners and managers and other possible corporate governance frictions which would
16Alternatively, we could assume that the family specific human capital is in part linked to family own-
ership and in part to family management, and that the former can be transferred to professional managers.
If we also assume that, due to organizational frictions, managing an enterprise as an external manager
rather than as an owner reduces the productivity of entrepreneurial human capital, then the most tal-
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introduce complex matching issues between (the ability of) external CEOs and family
firms (Tervio¨, 2008). Therefore, profits of firms hiring non-family CEOs depend only
on the entrepreneurial human capital of the latter.
Let dij be the dividend paid by manager j to the family firm owner i. The total in-
come of heirs of family firms hiring an external CEO is Ii,eω,m = wa
i + dij, while the total
income of workers’ descendants who manage a family firm is Iωm = pi(a
j)1/α − dij. Par-
ent entrepreneurs choose to hire a professional managers if the total income that they
provide to heirs is at least equal to the income that they can give by selling the firm
wai + dij ≥ wai + p. Likewise, the participation constraint for workers’ descendants is
that the net income that they gain by managing a family firm is at least equal to the
income that they obtain by buying a business license, pi(aj)1/α − dij ≥ pi(aj)1/α − p.
Hence, in equilibrium a market for managers opens only if dij = p. Then, parent en-
trepreneurs are indifferent between selling the firm and hiring an external manager,
while the talent thresholds aφ and aa below and above which they leave the firm man-
agement to family descendants are the same as in equations (26) and (27). Therefore:
Proposition 12. Family firms hiring professional managers use entrepreneurial human capital
and are equally well managed as non-family firms. Family firms conducted by family members
divide between badly and well managed firms according to the managerial value of the family
specific human capital.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section we provide a number of correlations consistent with the major predic-
tions of our theory. First, family firms in the second generation or beyond have worse
management practices than non-family firms. Second, the management quality gap
between family and non-family firms is negligible in countries in which the value of
the family name, legacy and contacts is low. Third, the management quality of fam-
ily firms conducted by professional CEOs is indistinguishable from that of non-family
firms, independent of cultural values prevailing in society. Fourth, in societies attach-
ing higher values to family specific human capital, the fraction of badly (well) managed
family firms is higher (lower), and the variability of family firms’ management quality
is lower. Finally, in countries which are not yet industrialized, collectivistic values are
positively correlated with the average management quality of family firms, while they
do not affect the overall distribution of management quality across family firms.
ented workers’ descendants would have a stronger incentive to be employed as external managers rather
than acquire a business license. However, the insurance effect of the family specific human capital for
entrepreneurs’ descendants would remain unaltered, and the possibility of a polarization equilibrium as
well.
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Figure 6: Management quality across countries
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4.1 Data and variables
4.1.1 Management quality and family firms We draw data on the quality of man-
agement practices and firm ownership from the World Management Survey (WMS)
by Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen. The data cover over 10,000
manufacturing firms, operating in 154 industrial sectors (3-digit US SIC 1987), across 21
countries over the period between 2001 and 201217. The quality of management prac-
tices (Management quality) is measured by averaging the interview-based evaluations
of 18 specific management practices employed by the firms, covering three key areas of
business organization: performance monitoring, targets and incentives. To each man-
agerial practice a score is assigned from 1 (“worst practice”) to 5 (“best practice”) and
management quality is the firm average of each individual question score.
The survey provides information on the ownership structure of the firms, allowing
us to define a dummy variable Family firm, which takes the value 1 for family firms
and 0 otherwise. The WMS identifies family firms as those in which the descendants in
the second generation or beyond from the founder are the largest shareholders with at
least 25% of equity. In the non-family-firm category, we include all the types of private
firms, while excluding government companies.
Figure 6 displays the cross-country variation in the average management quality
(panel (a)) and in the distribution of management quality of family firms (panel (b)),
as measured by the percentage of family firms below and above the 40th and 60th per-
centile of management quality. Less developed countries are characterized by a larger
proportion of low-quality family firms and a smaller proportion of high-quality fam-
ily firms than advanced economies. However, it is interesting that also in developed
17We thank the authors for sharing an extended version of their public datatset. For details on the
survey and firm level variables, see Bloom et al. (2012) and Appendix F.1.
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countries the share of family firms of low management quality is non-negligible.
4.1.2 Productivity of family specific human capital Our preferred (inverse) proxy
for the productivity of family specific human capital is the index of individualism (In-
dividualism) proposed by Hofstede et al. (2010). Individualism reflects “the degree to
which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find soci-
eties in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after
him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies
in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, of-
ten extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 92). We expect
the productivity of the family specific human capital to be higher in more collectivistic
societies, where the transfer of family reputation and relationships is facilitated by cul-
tural values supporting strong interdependence and cooperation among individuals
belonging to the same social group.
Individualism ranges from 0 (strongly collectivistic) to 100 (strongly individualistic).
It is computed for each country based on factor analysis of the mean scores to 14 survey
questions about work goals. The common business culture of interviewees mitigates
the concerns for possible frame of reference effects that affect cross country surveys
asking for subjective scale scores.
This index has been recently used in the economic literature as the proxy that
best captures the individualistic cultural dimension of society which more than others
affects productivity, innovation capacity and economic growth (Gorodnichenko and
Roland, 2011, 2017; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2018). In particular, van Hoorn (2014) finds
that the degree of (Hofstede) individualism has a strong influence on firms’ organiza-
tion and management quality.
4.1.3 Other cultural and institutional variables Given the multifaceted nature of
the family specific human capital, we take into account other variables commonly used
in the literature to capture cultural and institutional features of society, which may
be correlated with the value that family legacy and contacts have in the business life or
confound the influence of the family specific human capital on the management quality
of family firms.
First, we account for another variable that captures the extent to which individuals
easily recognize and support each others within extended groups (Freedom of choice). It
is computed from the WVS as the degree to which people feel that they have freedom of
choice and the control of their own lives, hence characterizing individualistic attitudes
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Olsson and Paik, 2016; Tabellini, 2010). As we expect
the productivity of family specific human capital to be higher in more collectivistic
societies, Freedom of choice, likewise Individualism, should also be positively correlated
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with the reduction in the management quality gap between family and non-family
firms.
Besides the interdependence and strength of relationships between individuals and
families in extended social groups, the cross-country variation in the management
quality of family firms may be affected by the intensity of kinship ties within the same
family, which influence the transmission of and the advantages gained from the fam-
ily specific human capital (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). To account for this possibility,
we use the variable Family ties (unimportance), which is measured as the first princi-
pal component from responses to three questions from the World Value Survey (WVS),
concerning the importance of the family in the respondent’s life, the duties and re-
sponsibilities of parents and children, and the love and respect for one’s own parents
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2010, 2014).
We also account for the possibility that the productivity of the family specific hu-
man capital and the firms’ choice of management technology are affected by the qual-
ity of the institutional environment in which they operate. We account for Institutional
quality which captures the functioning of institutions in terms of control of corruption,
respect of the law and government efficiency. It is measured by the first principal com-
ponent of the six indicators of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
(Kaufmann et al., 2010), with higher value indicating better functioning institutions. In
addition, we include the variable Barriers to entry index, capturing the administrative
and bureaucratic obstacles to starting and running businesses that is measured by the
first principal component of seven indicators from the Doing Business dataset (World
Bank). Finally, provided that the share and quality of family firms can be affected by
the functioning of the financial sector, we account for Financial development, measured
by the ratio between credit to private sector to GDP (World Bank).18
4.2 Econometric analysis
4.2.1 The management gap Our model predicts that there is a negative gap in the
quality of management practices between family and non-family firms. This gap is
larger in countries characterized by stronger collectivistic values where the importance
of family name, reputation and relationships in the local culture is high, while it tends
to disappear in more individualistic societies. To test these predictions, we estimate
Management qualityisct = β Family f irmisct + η Family f irmisct × Individualismc +
+ XisctΦ+ αc + αc t + λt + µs + ε isct, (28)
18The details on source and construction as well as summary statistics of the variables are in Appendix
F, where we also show that our results are robust to the use of other cultural and institutional variables
such as trust, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and family structure, executive constraints, legal ori-
gins and the single components of Institutional quality and Barrier to entry index.
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where i is the firm, s the industry sector, c the country and t the time of the interview.
Xisct is a vector of firm level controls drawn from the WMS that includes firm size, per-
centage of managers and non-managers with a college degree, percentage of managers
who left the firm in the 12 months before the interview, a dummy for whether the firm
is owned by a multinational, and a set of noise controls including interviewer dum-
mies, tenure and seniority of interviewed managers, and day of month and month of
the year dummies that help to improve the precision of the estimates by washing out
part of the random measurement errors in the survey (Bloom et al., 2016). Finally, all
regressions include country (αc) and industry (µs) fixed effects, country-specific time
trends αc t and time dummies λt.19
Table 1 reports the regression results for the coefficients of interest, β and η, ex-
pecting the former to be negative and the latter positive. Columns (1) and (2) show
that the coefficients for Family firm and its interaction with Individualism have the pre-
dicted signs, and are statistically significant. Family firms tend to be managed worse
than non-family firms on average, but this gap is significantly smaller in individualis-
tic societies where the productivity of family specific human capital is low, and disap-
pears when the value of social connectivity has little importance in the local culture. In
columns (3) through (7) we separately include the interaction terms between Family firm
and the other country level cultural and institutional variables. In all specifications, co-
efficients for Individualism keep their statistical significance and magnitude, while coef-
ficients for other interactions are non-significant although with expected sign. Column
(8) reports results for the more general model including all the interaction terms jointly.
Interestingly, institutional variables are jointly insignificant for explaining the manage-
ment quality gap of family firms, while cultural variables gain statistical significance.
That Freedom of choice is statistically significant while Family ties is slightly not, it is also
in line with our conjecture that the productivity of family specific human capital, and
hence the management quality gap between family and non-family firms, is affected
more by the interdependence and strength of cooperation among individuals belong-
ing to the same social group rather than by the vertical transmission within the close
family.
Figure 7 displays the marginal effects of Family firm for different levels of Individu-
alism for the full model in column (8). The management quality gap decreases with the
degree of individualism and becomes statistically not different from zero in individ-
ualistic societies. Also the economic magnitude of this heterogeneity is substantial: a
one standard deviation increase in the degree of individualism (25.6) is associated with
an average reduction of 0.077 points in the management quality gap between family
19Given that our main variable of interest varies at country level (i.e., Individualism), throughout we
present estimates with robust standard errors clustered at country level. However, since the small number
of clusters could bias the estimates, in unreported regressions available upon request, we checked that our
results are robust to clustering at country×industry level, with 1598 or 392 clusters depending on whether
we use either the three or two-digits sector classification, or yet clustering at industry level only (with 153
three digits clusters).
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Figure 7: Individualism and the Marginal Effects of Family Firms on Managerial Quality
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Note: Marginal effects refer to column (8) of Table 1.
and non-family firms, corresponding to a moderating effect of about 8.5% of the direct
effect of Family firm (100 × (0.077/0.907)). To put it differently, the overall differen-
tial in the management quality of family and non-family firms changes from -0.302 for
the least individualistic country to -0.247 management quality points for the average
individualistic one, implying a reduction in the management quality gap of 18.2%.20
We examine the robustness of these findings with several checks. First, in Tables F.9-
F.12 in Appendix, we show that Individualism is robust to the inclusion of a wide range
of country level variables as well as to different specifications.21 Moreover, although
Individualism pre-dates the firms’ management quality, the latter can be a highly per-
sistent feature of firms and a weak management quality of family firms can increase
the value of the family specific human capital for doing business. Then, to address
this potential reverse causality concern, we follow an IV approach similar to that sug-
gested by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), instrumenting Individualism with the use
of pronouns in the country’s language from Tabellini (2008) and the genetic diversity
of local population from Ashraf and Galor (2013). Language structures with strict rules
governing the use of first and second pronouns are correlated to cultural traits empha-
sizing individualism. Hence, we expect the dummy variable No Pronoun Drop, equal
to one if the rule forbidding first person pronoun drop is operative and zero other-
wise, to be positively correlated with Individualism. Similarly, evidence suggests that
20This is calculated as follows. The average value of Individualism is 59.8, while the least individualistic
countries (China and Singapore) have an Individualism value of 20. The average management quality is
2.937 in the overall estimation sample and 2.797 for the least individualistic countries. Then, the overall
effect of Family firm on the management quality gap changes from (20× 0.003− 0.907)/2.797 = −0.302 to
(59.8× 0.003− 0.907)/2.937 = −0.247 for the average individualistic country.
21In particular, we check the robustness to human capital, trust, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization,
family structure, executive constraints, legal origins and the single components of Institutional quality and
Barrier to entry index. By contrast, when we exclude Individualism, coefficients for Freedom of choice, Family
ties, Institutional quality and Barriers to entry gain statistical significance, with the expected impact on the
management quality gap (Table F.8 in Appendix).
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genetic diversity has an adverse effect on social cohesion, and thus plausibly, a posi-
tive impact on the emergence of individualism (Ashraf and Galor, 2018). Columns (9)
and (10) show that our findings are broadly robust and not subject to a weak or in-
valid instrument problem, as the Hansen overidentification test, the Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic and the Anderson-Rubin indicate (see Table F.7 in Appendix for the first stage
estimates). Notwithstanding, provided that the choice of satisfactory instruments in a
cross-country setting is always highly questionable, we are very careful not to give a
causal interpretation to any of our results. Still, this strategy provides a useful robust-
ness check to the effect of Individualism.
4.2.2 Family and professional managers Another specific prediction of our model
is that the management quality gap between family and non-family firms is due to the
group of family firms which keep the management leadership within the family, rely-
ing on the family specific human capital, while the family firms that hire professional
managers are on average managed as well as the non-family ones (Proposition 12). To
test this prediction, we split the dummy Family firm into two further dummies: Family
CEO that takes the value 1 if the CEO at the helm of the family firm is a member of the
family, and 0 otherwise; External CEO, that takes the value 1 if the family firm is run by
a professional CEO external to the family, and 0 otherwise. Then, we estimate
Management qualityisct = β1 Family CEOisct + η1 Family CEOisct × Individualismc +
+ β2 External CEOisct + η2 External CEOisct × Individualismc +
+ XisctΦ+ αc + αct + λt + µs + ε isct, (29)
where we expect β1 and η1 to be statistically significant and, respectively, negative and
positive, while β2 and η2 not to be statistically different from zero.
Table 2 reports the regression results. In column (2) we consider a specification
without any country level variables, while in column (3), we estimate the full speci-
fication including all the cultural and institutional controls of Table 1 interacted with
the two dummies Family CEO and External CEO. Consistent with our theory, coeffi-
cients for Family CEO and its interaction with Individualism are significant and with the
same signs as for the basic model. By contrast, External CEO and External CEO × Indi-
vidualism are not significant, suggesting that family firms with professional managers
are indistinguishable from non-family firms, regardless of the degree of collectivism of
society and productivity of the family specific human capital.
Again, these results are robust to several checks. First, in columns (4) and (5) we
implement the IV strategy, where the interactions between Family CEO, External CEO
and Individualism are instrumented with our set of instruments interacted with Family
CEO and External CEO (see Table F.7 in Appendix for the first stage estimates). Then,
in Tables F.13-F.15 in Appendix, we report the robustness to different specifications as
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Table 2: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital: Family and External CEOs
Management quality
OLS IV (second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family CEO -0.073∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.956∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.066) (0.254) (0.067) (0.300)
External CEO 0.078∗∗ 0.026 -0.340 -0.064 -0.412
(0.030) (0.065) (0.345) (0.081) (0.342)
Family CEO × Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
External CEO × Individualism 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Full interactions No No Yes No Yes
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.155 0.155
Hansen overidentification test (p-value) 0.691 0.191
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 14.726 11.583
Anderson-Rubin (p-value) 0.003 0.000
The dependent variable is the quality of management practices. OLS estimates in columns (1)-(3).
Second stage results of the instrumental variable estimates in columns (4)-(5), where the interac-
tions between Family CEO, External CEO and Individualism are instrumented with Genetic Diversity
from Ashraf and Galor (2013) and No Pronoun Drop from Tabellini (2008) interacted with Family
CEO and External CEO. All regressions include firm level and noise controls, country and industry-
sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Firm level controls are: firm
size, education of managers and non-managers, dummy for whether the firm is owned by a multi-
national and the percentage of managers who left the firm in the 12 months before the interview.
Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month
of the year dummies. Full interactions is the complete set of interactions of Family CEO and Exter-
nal CEO with the other country level controls as in Table 1. See Table F.2 and Table F.7 in Appendix
for, respectively, the full specification and first stage estimates. The Stock-Yogo (2005) 10% critical
value for the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, is 7.56 in both columns (4) and (5). Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
well as to the inclusion of different country variables.
4.2.3 Distribution of family firms quality The insurance nature of the family spe-
cific human capital originates two specific predictions about the distribution of man-
agement quality across family firms. First, higher managerial value of the family spe-
cific human capital increases the threshold abilities aφ and aa, thus increasing the share
of badly managed family firms and decreasing the share of well managed ones. At the
same time, the variability of the quality of management practices adopted by family
firms decreases as the productivity of the family specific human capital increases.
To test these predictions, we follow a cross-country, cross-industry approach (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998). We aggregate the WMS data at the country-industry level22 and
22We aggregate the data at the US SIC 1987 2-digit classification (20 sectors). In our sample, the number
of country-industry cells is 290, due to missing sectors in some countries and family firms in some country-
industry cells. The missing cells are mainly concentrated in the least individualistic countries, China and
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Table 3: Individualism and Management Quality of Family Firms
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is:
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individualism -0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Country controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 290 290 290 290
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.267 0.233 0.271
OLS estimates. The dependent variables are the percentage of family firms be-
low the 40th (Low) and above the 60th (High) percentile of management qual-
ity distribution. The units of analysis are country-industry observations for 21
countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). All regressions include continent
and industry fixed effects, and the average firm size in the country-industry cell.
Country controls in columns (3) and (4) are: Freedom of choice, Family ties, Institu-
tional quality, Barrier to entry index, Human capital, Financial development, Absolute
latitude. See Table F.3 in Appendix for full specification. Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
build two new dependent variables, Family firm qualityLow and Family firm qualityHigh,
as the percentages of family firms, respectively, below the 40th and above the 60th
percentiles of the management quality distribution.23 Then, we estimate
Family f irm qualityzsc = β Individualismc + δ Firm Sizesc + XcΓ+ µs + εsc, (30)
where we expect β to be negative when z = Low, and positive when z = High. As
Individualism varies at country level, we do not include country fixed effects, while
accounting for a large set of country variables Xc including Freedom of choice, Family ties
(unimportance), Institutional quality, Barrier to entry index, Financial development, Human
capital and Absolute latitude. In addition, we account for the average firm size in the
country-industry cell, and for industry fixed effects µs.
The regression results (Table 3) show that the coefficient for Individualism is statis-
tically significant and negatively (positively) associated with the percentage of family
firms of low (high) quality. These findings holds both in the specification without and
with country level controls, as well as in other specifications in Appendix, where we
check the robustness to an array of different country level controls and empirical spec-
Singapore, and in three industrial sectors below the average level of R&D intensity, Tobacco (code 21),
Petroleum & Coal products (code 29) and Leather and leather products (code 31).
23In this way, we assume that firms between the 40th and 60th percentiles of management quality dis-
tribution cannot be easily distinguished in badly and well managed ones. In Appendix, we show that
results are robust to the adoption of 25th and 75th quality percentile thresholds (Tables F.18 and F.23) or
even to the assumption that all firms can be classified as badly or well managed, using the median (Tables
F.19 and F.24).
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Figure 8: The Impact of Family Firms on Management quality and R&D intensity Across Sec-
tors
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Note: Each observation indicates the industry sector averages of management quality and percentage of
family firms. The size of the circles represents the R&D intensity of each industrial sector. Individualistic
(collectivistic) are countries with individualism degree greater or equal to (lower than) its median.
ifications (Tables F.16-F.17) and to different measures of Family firm qualityzsc computed
using either the 25th-75th or the 50th (median) quality percentile thresholds (Tables
F.18-F.19). Consistent with our theory, in countries where the managerial value of the
family specific human capital is higher the share of family firms of low quality is larger,
while that of high quality is lower.
In line with an erosion-type argument, the managerial value of the family specific
human capital can also vary at industry level, being lower in more dynamic and inno-
vative industrial sectors. We measure the dynamism of industry s (R&D intensity) as
the 2000-2005 average of the industry R&D expenditures over production in the United
States (STAN, OECD).
The negative correlation between the industry average management quality and
percentage of family firms has a clear gradient (Figure 8(a)), where industrial sectors
with higher R&D intensity display higher management quality and lower share of fam-
ily firms. A similar pattern emerges in Figure 8(b) where we distinguish between col-
lectivistic and individualistic countries, defined as those with values of Individualism
lower than and above the median. Moreover, the average management quality of col-
lectivistic countries is lower than that of individualistic ones, and the cross-industry
correlation between management quality and percentage of family firms is stronger.
Therefore, we proxy the productivity of the family specific human capital in the
country-industry by the interaction between Individualism and R&D intensity:
Family f irm qualityzsc = β Individualismc × R&D intensitys + Xsc Γ+
+ δ Firm Sizesc + αc + µs + εsc.
(31)
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Table 4: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms, country-industry analysis
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is: Std. Dev.
Low High Low High Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country × Industry controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 290 290 290 290 240 240
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.348 0.303 0.341 0.061 0.041
OLS estimates. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are the percentage of family firms below the 40th (Low)
and above the 60th (High) percentile of management quality distribution. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(6)
is the standard deviation of the management quality of family firms by country-industry. The units of analysis are
country-industry observations for 21 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). All regressions include country
and industry fixed effects, and the average firm size in the country-industry cell. Country×Industry controls are:
Human capital×Skill intensity, Capital endowment×Capital intensity, Financial development×External dependence, Institu-
tional quality×Contract intensity, Barrier to entry×Intangible intensity. See Table F.4 in Appendix for full specification.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Coefficient β now identifies the cross-country, cross-industry effect of differences in
country individualism and industry dynamism on the distribution of family firms
quality. Besides industry fixed effects, we include country fixed effects to account for
unobservables at country level. In addition, we add a set Xsc of country-industry vari-
ables accounting for country factor endowment and industry factor intensity (Human
capitalc×Skill intensitys; Physical capitalc×Capital intensitys), country financial develop-
ment and industry dependence from external finance (Financial developmentc×External
dependences), country institutional quality and industry intensity in institutional quality
(Institutional qualityc×Contract intensitys; Barriers to entryc×Intangible intensitys).
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 4 show that the effect of Individualism on the shares
of badly and well managed family firms is stronger in more innovative sectors, where
we expect the managerial value of the family specific human capital to be lower. These
effects are statistically significant across a variety of specifications24 and quantitatively
relevant. Considering a country at the 25th percentile of the Individualism distribution
(in our sample Greece), a one standard deviation increase in the degree of individual-
ism generates an increase in the difference between the shares of high-quality family
firms in the industries at the 75th (“Industrial machinery & equipment”) and at the 25th
percentiles of the R&D intensity distribution (“Apparel & other textiles”) from 0.25 to
0.45. Concurrently, the difference between the shares of badly managed family firms
decreases from 0.5 to 0.3.
Finally, consistent with Proposition 5 according to which the variability of man-
agement quality across family firms is larger when the managerial value of the family
24In Appendix, we show the robustness of these results to different empirical specifications (Table F.20),
to several country×industry and country×R&D intensity controls (Tables F.21-F.22) as well as to differ-
ent measures of Family firm qualityzsc computed using either the 25th-75th or the 50th (median) quality
percentile thresholds (Tables F.23-F.24).
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Table 5: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital by Industrialization Stage
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family firm -0.047∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.056) (0.027) (0.064) (0.065)
Family firm × Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family firm × Not industrialized -0.096∗∗∗ -0.049 0.155
(0.031) (0.033) (0.096)
Family firm × Not industrialized × Individualism -0.005∗∗
(0.002)
Observations 7950 7950 7950 7950 7950
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.368 0.367 0.368 0.368
OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the quality of management practices. Not industrialized is a
dummy equal to one if the country was not industrialized by year 2005 and zero otherwise, according to the
YIT measure (Bentzen et al., 2013). Data on the timing of industrialization for Singapore are missing. All
regressions include firm level and noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific
time trends and year dummies. Firm level controls are: firm size, education of managers and non-managers,
dummy for whether the firm is owned by a multinational and the percentage of managers who left the firm
in the 12 months before the interview. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and
seniority, day of month and month of the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism and
Not industrialized) are captured by the country fixed effects. See Table F.5 in Appendix for full specification.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
specific human capital is lower, columns (5) and (6) show that the standard deviation of
the family firms’ management quality correlates positively with Individualism × R&D
intensity.
4.2.4 Family firms in the industrialization process Consistent with theory (Propo-
sition 8), we provide evidence on the role of family firms in the industrialization pro-
cess. First, the Year of industrial transition (YIT), computed by Bentzen et al. (2013) as the
year in which employment in industry exceeds employment in agriculture, and used as
a proxy for the timing of the industrial/managerial take-off, correlates negatively with
Individualism. This suggests that societies that attach great economic value to family
specific human capital industrialize later.
Thus, we examine (i) whether the management quality of family firms is lower in
late- than in early-industrialized countries, and (ii) whether in the former countries,
unlike in countries with mature industrialization, the managerial value of the family
specific human capital improves the average management quality of family firms. To
this end, we augment model in (28) including the triple obtained interacting Family firm
× Individualism with the dummy Not industrialized, assuming the value 1 if a country is
not yet industrialized by year 2005 and zero otherwise, according to the YIT measure.25
Table 5 presents the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) reproduce the basic
25We choose the 2005 as the year closest to the time span of the WMS. According to the YIT measure
(Bentzen et al., 2013), indeed, the first available years of Industrial transition before the 2005 are the 1986
and the 1987, while in our estimation sample firms are all interviewed between 2006 and 2012.
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Table 6: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms by Industrialization Stage
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is:
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Not industrialized Industrialized Not industrialized Industrialized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001 0.002 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.009 0.004 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Country × Industry controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35 35 249 249 35 35 249 249
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.257 0.296 0.331 0.050 0.185 0.284 0.321
OLS estimates. The dependent variables are the percentage of family firms below the 40th (Low) and above the 60th
(High) percentile of management score distribution. The units of analysis are country-industry observations for 20
countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). Not industrialized and industrialized indicate countries not yet and al-
ready industrialized by 2005. Data on the timing of industrialization for Singapore are missing. All regressions include
country and industry fixed effects, and the average firm size in the country-industry cell. Country×Industry controls
are: Human capital×Skill intensity, Capital endowment×Capital intensity, Financial development×External dependence, Insti-
tutional quality×Contract intensity, Barrier to entry×Intangible intensity. See Table F.6 in Appendix for full specification.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country×industry sector; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
results of model (28), excluding Singapore, for which the year of industrialization is
missing. In columns (3) through (5), we distinguish between countries already and
not yet industrialized in 2005. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, column (3)
shows that the quality of management practices of family firms in late-industrialized
countries is lower than that of family firms in countries with mature industrialization.
In column (4), we include the interaction between Family firm × Individualism, and the
coefficient for the interaction Family firm × Not industrialized loses magnitude and sig-
nificance, suggesting that the association between industrialization and management
quality of family firms passes through the productivity of the family specific human
capital rather than the industrialization condition per se. In column (5), the negative
coefficient for the triple interaction term indicates that in countries which are not yet
industrialized family firms display a higher management quality as more collectivistic-
oriented is the local culture. This is consistent with the idea that in the early stage of
development, when the managerial take-off has not yet taken place, the productivity
of the family specific human capital sustains the management capacity of firms.
The last piece of evidence we provide is in the spirit of a placebo exercise. Accord-
ing to our theory, in the pre-industrialization stage, when the economy is stagnant, the
industry is populated only by family firms managed by exploiting the family specific
human capital. In this stage, the productivity of the family specific human capital has
no effect on the distribution of management quality across family firms.
Then, in Table 6, we split our sample between countries not yet and already in-
dustrialized by year 2005. Reassuringly, our results show that in countries which are
not yet industrialized Individualism × R&D intensity has no statistical power to explain
the distribution of management quality across family firms, while in countries already
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industrialized it significantly affects the share of badly and well managed family firms.
To mitigate the potential concern that these results could be driven by the unbal-
anced nature of the samples of industrialized and not industrialized countries and by
the scant number of observations among the not industrialized sample, in Table F.25 in
Appendix we show that even when we use other benchmark years for distinguishing
the industrialized and not industrialized countries results remain broadly unchanged.
5 Conclusions
Our paper fills a gap in the historical and economic literature, providing a unified
framework that explains both the dual role of family firms in economic development
and their evolution in terms of managerial capital.
The key ingredient of our theory explaining succession in family firms, occupa-
tional choices, the management quality of (family and non-family) firms is the priv-
ileged access of entrepreneurs’ heirs to an intangible, rent-seeking asset, which con-
tributes to the managerial capital of family firms, without contributing to increase the
aggregate technology and economy’s growth rate. Although conceivably beneficial for
all entrepreneurs’ heirs in any possible occupation, access to family specific human
capital is assumed to be especially valuable to prop up the managerial productivity
and income of the least talented descendants, who find it more rewardable to continue
the family business rather than supply their low abilities to the labor market. The in-
surance nature of the family specific human capital and its productivity depend on the
socio-cultural context of the society in which firms operate. The interaction between
the endogenous quality of managerial capital of family firms and the advancement of
technology explains the diverse role of family firms in the development process and
their evolution during industrialization.
We present a number of robust correlations consistent with our theory. We find that
the degree of collectivism of societies, which is positively correlated with the produc-
tivity of the family specific human capital, influences the management quality gap be-
tween family and non-family firms and the distribution of management quality across
family firms. In particular, we show that the share of badly (well) managed family firms
is higher (lower) in societies which assign high value to family specific human capital,
especially in less dynamic and innovative industrial sectors. We also show that coun-
tries with collectivistic-oriented values industrialize later and that in late-industrialized
countries the quality of family firms’ management is lower than in countries with ma-
ture industrialization. However, as our theory predicts, in the early stage of develop-
ment, collectivistic values support the management quality of family firms, while they
do not have significant effects on the distribution of management quality across family
firms.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the main model
Proof of Proposition 1
Using (10)-(11) and (14)-(15) it follows that: (a) wt+1 < wˆ =⇒ aφt+1 > aat+1, which implies that
Ii,eφ,t+1 > max
{
Ii,eω,t+1, I
i,e
a,t+1
}
for ait+1 < a¯t+1, while I
i,e
a,t+1 ≥ max
{
Ii,eω,t+1, I
i,e
φ,t+1
}
for ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1; (b)
wt+1 ∈ [wˆ, w˜] =⇒ aφt+1 < aat+1 < 1, which implies that Ii,eφ,t+1 ≥ max{Ii,eω,t+1, Ii,ea,t+1} for ait+1 ≤ aφt+1,
Ii,ea,t+1 ≥ max{Ii,eω,t+1, Ii,eφ,t+1} for ait+1 ≥ aat+1, while Ii,eω,t+1 > max{Ii,eφ,t+1, Ii,ea,t+1} for ait+1 ∈ (aφt+1, aat+1);
(c) wt+1 > w˜ =⇒ aφt+1 < 1 < aat+1, which implies that Ii,eφ,t+1 R Ii,eω,t+1 for ait+1 Q aφt+1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using (16) and (17), it follows that: (a) wt+1 ≤ w˜ =⇒ aat+1 ≤ 1, which implies that Ii,ωe,t+1 R Ii,ωω,t+1 for
ait+1 R aat+1; (b) wt+1 > w˜ =⇒ aat+1 > 1, which implies that Ii,ωe,t+1 < Ii,ωω,t+1 for ait+1 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting in eq. (12) aat+1 for 1− gt+1 from eq. (19) and (aat+1)1−α for wt+1/θAt+1 from eq. (13), it
follows that for any aat+1 < 1, a
φ
t+1 = φ
1/α aat+1 ⇔ aφt+1 < aat+1. Hence, there can be no equilibrium
wage rate, ensuring aφt+1 = a
a
t+1 such that for any equilibrium wage rate wt+1 > wˆ holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using eq. (19) in (20) and (21) and solving the integrals, the aggregate human capital supply and
demand are given by:
HSt+1 =
1
2
(aat+1)2 − nt(a
φ
t+1)
2 if wt+1 < w˜
1− nt(aφt+1)2 if wt+1 ≥ w˜,
(A.1)
and
HDt+1 =
[
(1− α) At+1
wt+1
] nt a
φ
t+1 (φ a
a
t+1)
1/α +
α
1+ α
[
1− (aat+1)(1+α)/α
]
if wt+1 < w˜
nt a
φ
t+1 φ
1/α if wt+1 ≥ w˜.
(A.2)
Using (12) and (13) in (A.1) and (A.2), the equilibrium wage schedule is:
wt+1 = θAt+1

[
2 α (1− α)
α (3− α)− (1+ α) (2− α)ntφ 2α
] α (1−α)
(1+α)
if nt < n˜
φ n
α
2
t
(
2− α
α
)α/2
if nt ≥ n˜,
(A.3)
2
where n˜ ≡ nt : wt+1 = w˜ is the number of firms such that the equilibrium wage rate is equal to w˜
n˜ =
α
(2− α) φ2/α . (A.4)
Proof of Proposition 4
From Propositions 1 and 2, the dynamic system governing the evolution of the industrial sector is
nt+1 =
nt a
φ
t+1 + 1− aat+1 if nt < n˜
nt a
φ
t+1 if nt ≥ n˜.
(A.5)
The system in (A.5) admits a unique stable steady state n∗ < n˜, with n∗ : n1(n∗) = n∗; at the
steady state the corresponding growth rate is then g∗ = 1− aa(n∗) = g(n∗) > 0. To see this, using
(12) and (13) and the equilibrium wage in (A.3), rewrite explicitly the system in (A.5) as:
nt+1 =

1−
(
1− φ1/αnt
)
aa(nt) ≡ n1(nt) if nt < n˜(
α nt
2− α
) 1
2
≡ n2(nt) if nt ≥ n˜.
(A.6)
with
aa(nt) =
[
2 α (1− α)
α(3− α)− (1+ α)(2− α) φ2/αnt
] α
1+α
. (A.7)
First, from (A.6) and (A.7), note that for any nt < n˜, n1(0) = 1− [2(1− α)/(3− α)]α/1+α ∈ [0, 1],
n1(n˜) = n2(n˜) < n˜ and n1(nt) is monotonically increasing with a slope less than one; formally,
∂n1(nt)/∂nt > 0 and |∂n1(nt)/∂nt| < 1. Hence, n1(nt) must intersect the 45° degree line from above
only once, with a slope less than one. Moreover, for any nt ≥ n˜, n2(nt) is increasing and concave,
∂n2/∂nt > 0 and ∂2n2/∂n2t < 0, with n2(1) < 1. Hence, n2(nt) cannot intersect the 45° degree line
such that there cannot exist any admissible steady state for nt ≥ n˜.
From above, the unique steady state n∗ of the dynamic system in (A.5) must satisfy the equation
n1(n∗) = n∗ in [0, n˜]. Formally, it must derive as the solution of the following implicit equation:
n∗ =
1− aa(n∗)
1− aφ(n∗) ≡ f (n
∗). (A.8)
Using (A.7) and Lemma 1, ensuring that aφ(nt) = φ1/αaa(nt) for any nt < n˜, f (0) > 0 and f (n˜) = 0.
Further, from (A.8), it derives that:
∂ f (n∗)
∂n∗
= −
(
1− φ 1α
)
(
1− φ 1α aa(n∗)
)2 ∂aa(n∗)∂n∗ < 0 (A.9)
since
∂aa(nt)
∂nt
=
aa(nt) α (2− α) φ 2α
α (3− α)− (1+ α) (2− α) φ 2α nt
> 0 (A.10)
immediately follows from eq. (A.7). Thus, there exists a unique fixed point n∗ of the function f (n∗)
and hence a unique solution for the equation n1(n∗) = n∗.
The unique steady state is also globally stable since, as shown above, n1(nt) intersects the 45° de-
3
gree line from above, with a slope less than one. At the steady state n∗, the distribution of the individ-
uals’ abilities is stationary since the thresholds aa(nt) and aφ(nt) are independent of At+1, despite the
constant positive growth rate of the technology. Using eq. (A.7), ∂aa(nt)/∂At+1 = ∂aφ(nt)/∂At+1 =
0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Thresholds and growth Substituting n∗ from (A.8) for nt in (A.7) and rearranging using aφ = φ
1
α aa
from Lemma 1, aa(n∗) can be written as the solution to the implicit equation:
F(aa) = aa − z(aa; φ) = aa −
[
2 α (1− α) (1− φ1/αaa)
α(3− α) (1− φ1/αaa)− (1+ α)(2− α) φ2/α(1− aa)
] α
1+α
= 0. (A.11)
Then,
d aa(n∗)
d φ
= − ∂ F(a
a)/∂ φ
∂ F(aa)/∂ aa
> 0, (A.12)
since
∂ F(aa)
∂ aa
= 1+ z(aa; φ)
[
α(2− α)φ2/α (1− φ1/α)
(1− φ1/α aa) (α(3− α) (1− φ1/αaa)− (1+ α)(2− α) φ2/α(1− aa))
]
> 0,
(A.13)
and
∂ F(aa)
∂ φ
= −z(aa; φ)
[
(2− α)φ2/α (1− aa) (2− φ1/αaa)
φ(1− φ1/α aa) (α(3− α) (1− φ1/αaa)− (1+ α)(2− α) φ2/α(1− aa))
]
< 0.
(A.14)
From (A.12), it immediately follows that the growth rate g(n∗) = 1 − aa(n∗) is decreasing in φ.
Finally, Lemma 1 also implies that
d aφ(n∗)
d φ
= φ
1
α
(
aa
α φ
+
d aa(n∗)
d φ
)
> 0.
Share of family and non-family firms From the above results, it immediately follows that the share
of family firms ν f , φ = aφ(n∗) is increasing in φ, while the share of family firms ν f , a = 1− aa(n∗) is
decreasing in φ. Further, the overall share of family firms in the economy ν f = aφ(n∗) + 1− aa(n∗) is
increasing in φ
∂ ν f
∂ φ
= −∂ (a
a − aφ)
∂ φ
> 0, (A.15)
since, after using aφ = φ
1
α aa,
∂ (aa − aφ)
∂ φ
=
∂ aa(1− φ 1α )
∂ φ
= (1− φ 1α ) da
a
dφ
− a
aφ
1
α−1
α
< 0. (A.16)
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To see this, observe that using (A.12)-(A.13)-(A.14) and rearranging, (A.16) is always verified since,
for any φ ∈ [0, 1], the following holds:
α (2− α) φ 1α (1− φ 1α )
[
(1− aa)
(
2− aaφ 1α
)
− aaφ 1α
]
<(
1− aa φ 1α
) [
α (3− α)
(
1− aa φ 1α
)
− (1+ α) (2− α) (1− aa) φ 2α
]
.
The result in (A.16) also implies that the entry rate, defined as the share of new, non-family, firms
founded by worker’ descendants, νn f =
(1− n∗) (1− aa(n∗))
n∗
, is decreasing in φ. To see this, note
that in steady state the entry of new firms is equal to the exit of firms’ heirs. Formally:
n∗
(
aa(n∗)− aφ(n∗)) = (1− n∗) (1− aa(n∗)) .
Hence, it also verified that
aa(n∗)− aφ(n∗) = (1− n
∗) (1− aa(n∗))
n∗
.
Since the left hand-side is decreasing in φ (A.16), so must the right-hand side.
Social Mobility Define the overall social mobility as the total exit E from the firm sector (i.e., equal
to total entry for the equilibrium condition). Formally, E = n∗ (aa(n∗)− aφ(n∗)). Then,
∂ E
∂ φ
= aa(n∗)(1− φ 1α )
(
∂ n∗
∂ φ
)
+ n∗
(
∂ aa(n∗)(1− φ 1α )
∂ φ
)
. (A.17)
Using (A.8) and (A.16) and rearranging,
∂ E
∂ φ
=
(
d aa(n∗)
d φ
) (1− φ 1α) (1− 2 aa + φ 1α aa2)(
1− aaφ 1α
)2 − φ 1α aa (1− aa)2
αφ
(
1− aaφ 1α
)2 < 0. (A.18)
To see this, note that using (A.12)-(A.13)-(A.14) and rearranging, (A.18) is always verified since, for
any φ ∈ [0, 1], the following holds:
α (2− α) φ 1α (1− φ 1α )
[(
1− 2 aa + aa2φ 1α
) (
2− aaφ 1α
)
− aa(1− aa)φ 1α
]
<
(1− aa)
(
1− aa φ 1α
) [
α (3− α)
(
1− aa φ 1α
)
− (1+ α) (2− α) (1− aa) φ 2α
]
.
Variance Recalling that management quality is constant and independent of individual abilities for
all family firms managed by heirs with ability ai ≤ aφ, while it is distributed uniformly for all the
family firms managed by heirs with ability ai ≥ aa, from the result in (A.12) it immediately follows
that the variance of the management practices quality of family firms is decreasing in φ.
Proof of Proposition 6
From the definition of growth rate, eq. (A.7) implies that for any nt < n˜
gt+1 = 1− aa(nt) = g(nt), (A.19)
5
with ∂gt+1/∂nt < 0 deriving from (A.10).
Substituting in nt+1 = n1(nt) of the system (A.6) 1− gt+1 for aat+1 and g−1(gt+1) for nt from (A.19),
we can rewrite
nt+1 = 1− aat+1
(
1− ntφ 1α
)
= gt+1 +
(
χ (1− gt+1) (1+α)α − α
(1+ χ)φ
1
α (1− gt+1) 1α
)
= ψ(gt+1), (A.20)
where χ ≡ α (3 − α)/2 (1 − α). Eq. (A.20) also implies that for each period t, nt = ψ(gt), with
˜˜n ≡ n : ∀ t, nt = ψ(0)
˜˜n =
α
(2− α)φ1/α , (A.21)
and ˜˜n < n˜ follows immediately using (A.4). Moreover,
∂nt
∂gt
=
∂ψ(gt)
∂gt
= 1− (1− gt)
(1+α)
α (1+ α− χ) + α
α (1+ χ) φ
1
α (1− gt) (1+α)α
< 0, (A.22)
is verified for any gt > 0.
Using (A.7) and substituting back ψ(gt) for nt in eq. (A.19), we finally have
gt+1 = v(gt) = 1−
 α(1− gt)
1
α
(1− gt) 1α
[
χ− (1+ χ) φ 2α gt − χφ 1α (1− gt)
]
+ αφ
1
α

α
(1+α)
, (A.23)
with v(0) = 1− [α/(χ (1− φ 1α ) + α φ 1α )] α(1+α) ∈ (0, 1), ∂gt+1/∂gt > 0, |∂gt+1/∂gt| < 1 and v(gmax) <
gmax, where gmax is the maximum value that the growth rate can assume consistently with a non-
negative number of firms nt; formally, gmax ≡ gt : ψ(gmax) = 0, gmax = ψ−1(0).
Proof of Proposition 7
For each period t + 1 and any nt ∈ [0, n˜],
1. The share of family firms is given by:
ν
f
t+1 =
nt
(
aφt+1 + 1− aat+1
)
nt+1
,
and it is increasing in nt,
∂ν
f
t+1
∂nt
=
(
∂aat+1/∂nt
)
φ
1
α (1− nt) + (1− aat+1)(1− aat+1(1− φ
1
α ))
n2t+1
> 0, (A.24)
since ∂aat+1/∂nt > 0 from (A.10) above.
2. The share of family firms using family specific human capital is given by:
ν
f ,φ
t+1 =
nta
φ
t+1
nt+1
,
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and it is increasing in nt. Formally:
∂ν
f ,φ
t+1
∂nt
= φ
1
α
(
∂aat+1/∂nt
)
nt + aat+1(1− aat+1)
n2t+1
> 0. (A.25)
3. The share of family and non-family firms managed by employing entrepreneurial human cap-
ital is given by:
νat+1 =
1− aat+1
nt+1
,
and it is decreasing in nt. Formally:
∂νat+1
∂nt
= −∂ν
f ,φ
t+1
∂nt
= −φ 1α
(
∂aat+1/∂nt
)
nt + aat+1(1− aat+1)
n2t+1
< 0. (A.26)
4. The entry rate is given by:
ν
n f
t+1 =
(1− nt)
(
1− aat+1
)
nt+1
,
and it is decreasing in nt. Formally:
∂ν
n f
t+1
∂nt
= −
(
∂aat+1/∂nt
)
(1− nt)ntφ 1α + (1− aat+1)(1− aat+1(1− φ
1
α ))
n2t+1
< 0, (A.27)
where, throughout, we use aφt+1 = φ
1/α aat+1 and rewrite nt+1 = 1− aat+1 (1− ntφ1/α).
5. Recalling that management quality is constant and independent of individual abilities for all
family firms managed by heirs with ability ait+1 ≤ aφt+1, while it is distributed uniformly for all
family firms managed by heirs with ability ait+1 ≥ aat+1, from (A.10) it immediately follows that
the variance of the management practices quality of family firms is a positive function of nt and
hence a negative function of gt.
Finally, for any nt > n˜, aat+1 ≥ 1 and the total number of firms in the economy is nt+1 = ntaφt+1.
Hence, ν ft+1 = ν
f ,φ
t+1 = 1 and ν
a
t+1 = ν
n f
t+1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
(a) For any nt ≥ n˜ the aggregate income per capita is given by:
Yt+1 = nt
aφt+1ˆ
0
yit+1 da
i
t+1 = Σnta
φ
t+1φ
1
α
t+1, (A.28)
where Σ ≡
[
(1− α)1−α At+1w−(1−α)t+1
]1/α
. Using (12), the corresponding equilibrium wage rate in
(A.3) and applying gt+1 = 0, (A.28) can be rewritten as:
Yt+1 = ΣˆAtn
α/2
t φ, (A.29)
which is linearly increasing in φ, with Σˆ ≡ [(1− α)/α]1−α [α/(2− α)]2−α/2.
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(b) The second part of the Proposition follows from observing that, first, from (A.21) ˜˜n is decreasing
in φ; further, for any nt > ˜˜n, the speed of convergence of nt toward ˜˜n (i.e., aat = 1, and a
a
t+1 < 1)
is decreasing in φ. Define the growth rate of nt, using the function n2(nt) in eq. (A.6), as follows:
n˙ =
nt+1
nt
− 1 =
[
α
(2− α)nt
]1/2
− 1. (A.30)
We log-linearize n˙ around ˜˜n, by rewriting eq. (A.30) as a function of log nt
l˙ =
nt+1
nt
− 1 =
[
α
(2− α) elog(nt)
]1/2
− 1, (A.31)
and linearizing (A.31) around log ˜˜n as follows:
l˙| log ˜˜n ≈ l˙| log ˜˜n +
∂l˙
∂ log nt
∣∣∣∣
log ˜˜n
(log nt − log ˜˜n). (A.32)
From (A.21) and (A.31),
l˙| log ˜˜n = φ
1
2 α − 1 (A.33)
and
∂l˙
∂ log nt
∣∣∣∣
log ˜˜n
= −φ
1
2 α
2
(A.34)
such that (A.32) is given by:
l˙| log ˜˜n = φ
1
2 α − 1− φ
1
2 α
2
(log nt − log ˜˜n). (A.35)
Finally, from (A.35) the speed of convergence of nt toward ˜˜n is given by:
s =
∂l˙| log ˜˜n
∂ log nt
= −φ
1
2 α
2
, (A.36)
which is straightforwardly decreasing in φ.
Proof of Proposition 9
We start by sketching the main equations of the model. As the threshold aa is the same for parent
owners and workers, the growth rate becomes again g = 1− aa. Substituting (1− g) in eq. (26),
aφ =
φ1/αpi (aa)1/α − p
w
. (A.37)
Since, at the equilibrium, aa is defined by eq. (27), we use a change of variable argument and
substitute pi (aa)1/α in eq. (A.37) from (27), writing
aφ =
φ1/α(waa + p)− p
w
= φ1/αaa − p(1− φ
1/α)
w
. (A.38)
The market for firms equilibrium is defined by the equality between the supply LS = n(aa − aφ) and
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demand LD = (1− n)(1− aa) of firms’ licenses, which implies that:
aa = 1− n + naφ. (A.39)
Finally, using eqs. (A.38) and (A.39), we can explicitly find the two thresholds as:
aφ =
(1− n)wφ1/α − p(1− φ1/α)
w(1− nφ1/α) , (A.40)
aa =
(1− n)w− np(1− φ1/α)
w(1− nφ1/α) , (A.41)
where w and p are the wage and price of firms to be found in the aggregate equilibrium. As we have
already used the licenses equilibrium equation (A.39) to find out the thresholds, we can recover the
firms’ price of equilibrium by substituting aa back from (A.41) into (27). This implies that the firms’
price of equilibrium is given as the solution of the implicit equation:
P(w, p) = pi
[
(1− n)w− np(1− φ1/α)
w(1− nφ1/α)
]1/α
− (1− n)(w + p)
(1− nφ1/α) = 0. (A.42)
To close the model we need the labor market equilibrium, that is the equilibrium wage rate. From
the equality between the supply HS(w) and demand HD(w) for workers, the wage of equilibrium is
implicitly given by
H(w, p) = HS(w, p)− HD(w, p) = 0, (A.43)
with
HS(w, p) = n
aaˆ
aφ
ai dai + (1− n)
aaˆ
0
ai dai =
(aa)2 − n(aφ)2
2
, (A.44)
and
HD(w, p) =
(
(1− α)A
w
)1/αn
 a
φˆ
0
(φaa)1/α dai +
1ˆ
aa
(ai)1/α dai
+ (1− n) 1ˆ
aa
(ai)1/α dai

=
(
(1− α)A
w
)1/α{
nφ1/αaφ(aa)1/α +
α
[
1− (aa)1+α/α]
1+ α
}
,
(A.45)
where aφ and aa are defined in (A.40)-(A.41). The solution of the system of equations (A.42)-(A.43) in
the two unknowns w and p returns the pair of equilibrium prices (w∗, p∗) that contemporaneously
clear the markets for labor and firms.
Rewriting eq. (A.42) as
PL(w, p) ≡ pi
[
(1− n)w− np(1− φ1/α)
w(1− nφ1/α)
]1/α
=
(1− n)(w + p)
(1− nφ1/α) ≡ P
R(w, p), (A.46)
it is immediately verified that PL(w, p) decreases and PR(w, p) increases in p in the whole real
domain (−∞,∞), with lim
p→−∞ P
L(w, p) → ∞, lim
p→−∞ P
R(w, p) → −∞, lim
p→∞ P
L(w, p) → −∞ and
lim
p→∞ P
R(w, p) → ∞, guaranteeing the existence of a unique price of equilibrium, for any possible
value of the wage rate w.
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Likewise, from eqs. (A.43)-(A.44)-(A.45), it follows that, for any price p, HS(w, p) is increasing and
HD(w, p) decreasing in w (algebraically details below available upon request), hence guaranteeing a
unique wage rate of equilibrium.
We then look at the particular equilibrium solution such that the pair (w∗, p∗) is characterized by
a positive firms’ price p∗ > 0. Given the features of the functions PL(w, p) and PR(w, p), this is the
case if PL(w, p = 0) > PR(w, p = 0) which implies that p∗ > 0 for any equilibrium wage satisfying
w < θA
[
1− n
1− nφ1/α
]1−α
≡ wp. (A.47)
Given ∂HS(w, p)/∂w > 0 and ∂HD(w, p)/∂w < 0, it follows from eq. (A.43) that the equilibrium
wage rate is lower than wp as long as HS(w = wp, p = 0) > HD(w = wp, p = 0). Using eqs.
(A.40)-(A.41),
HS(w = wp, p = 0) =
(1− nφ2/α)
2
[
1− n
1− nφ1/α
]2
,
and
HD(w = wp, p = 0) =
(
1− α
α
) [
1− n
1− nφ1/α
] α−1
α
{
α
1+ α
−
[
1− n
1− nφ1/α
] 1+α
α
[
α
(
1− nφ2/α)− nφ2/α
1+ α
]}
=
=
(
1− α
1+ α
) [
1− n
1− nφ1/α
] α−1
α
−
(
1− α
α(1+ α)
) [
1− n
1− nφ1/α
]2 [
α
(
1− nφ2/α
)
− nφ2/α
]
.
After rearranging, HS(w = wp, p = 0) > HD(w = wp, p = 0) if
NL(n) ≡
(
1− n
1− nφ1/α
) 2−α
1−α [
α(3− α)− (2− α)(1+ α)nφ2/α
]
> 2α(1− α) ≡ NR(n), (A.48)
which is, in turn, verified for any n < n¯, where n¯ is the solution implicitly defined by the equation
N(n) = NL(n)− NR(n) = 0. Since NL(0) = α(3− α) > 2α(1− α) = NR(0) and ∂NL(n)/∂n < 0,
and noting that NL(n) = 0 admits two solutions in n = 1 and n = nˆ with n¯ < nˆ < 1, then n¯ exists
and is unique, with n¯ < 1.
For any equilibrium at a positive firms’ price p∗ > 0, we then need to find the conditions sepa-
rating an equilibrium with polarization from one in which also the crony family firms are sold in the
market. Formally, we are interested in the conditions such that for any aφ < a¯ < aa < 1, aφ > 0 or
aφ ≤ 0.
The first set of conditions, aφ < a¯ < aa < 1, guarantees that a market for firms is active with
positive exchanges of licenses as aa < 1 ensures a positive demand, while aφ < a¯ < aa a positive
supply of licenses, with a¯ = φ(1− g) = φaa. Using (A.38) and (A.41), aφ < a¯ < aa < 1 holds for
any p > 0 and φ ∈ (0, 1), since from (A.41) aa < 1 ⇐⇒ −n(1− φ1/α)(w + p) < 0, while from
(A.38), aφ < φaa ⇐⇒ φ1/αaa − pw−1(1− φ1/α) < φaa =⇒ −pw−1(1− φ1/α) < aa(φ − φ1/α),
which is always verified for any p > 0 and φ ∈ (0, 1) that ensures that the right-hand side is positive
(φ− φ1/α) > 0.
Finally, we can show the conditions separating the polarization equilibrium (aφ > 0) from that in
which also the crony family firms are sold (aφ ≤ 0). Using (A.40), aφ > 0 for any equilibrium price p
such that
p <
(1− n)wφ1/α
1− φ1/α ≡ pφ. (A.49)
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Using (A.49) in (A.46), it follows in turn that p < pφ for any equilibrium wage rate satisfying
w > θA(1− n)1−α
(
1− φ1/α
)α ≡ wφ (A.50)
as PL(w, p = pφ) < PR(w, p = pφ) is verified for w > wφ.
Then, using (A.43), the equilibrium wage rate is lower than wφ as long as HS(w = wφ, p = pφ) <
HD(w = wφ, p = pφ). Using (A.44)-(A.45),
HS(w = wφ, p = pφ) =
(1− n)2
2
and
HD(w = wφ, p = pφ) =
(1− α)
[
1− (1− n) 1+αα
]
(1+ α)(1− n) 1−αα (1− φ1/α)
which imply, after rearranging, that HS(w = wφ, p = pφ) < HD(w = wφ, p = pφ) if
φ >
1− 2(1− α)
[
1− (1− n) 1+αα
]
(1+ α)(1− n) 1+αα

α
≡ φ, (A.51)
with φ < 1, ∀n. Summing up, for any n < n¯ such that an equilibrium with a market for firms is
active at a positive price p∗ > 0, if φ > φ, aφ > 0 such that the polarization equilibrium emerges;
otherwise, if φ ≤ φ, aφ ≤ 0 such that also the crony family firms are sold in the market and all the
firms of the economy are managed through entrepreneurial human capital technology.
Finally, note that due to the unitary elasticity of the equilibrium wage rate with respect to the
level of the technological frontier A (algebraic details available upon request), in the steady state
equilibrium all the endogenous variables (i.e., w∗, p∗ and hence pi(w∗)) grow at the endogenous
growth rate of technology, g. Formally, since at the equilibrium (w∗, p∗), the wage rate grows at the
endogenous growth rate g, then also the profit rate pi grows at the same rate g such that from eq.
(A.42) also the equilibrium price is on the balanced growth path. Thus, using eqs. (A.40)-(A.41), it
results that the thresholds aφ and aa are constant over time and the distribution invariant.
Proof of Proposition 10
The proof is based on the positive derivative of aφ w.r.t. φ. As follows from (A.39), in equilibrium it
is verified that
∂aa
∂φ
= n
(
∂aφ
∂φ
)
. (A.52)
Then, the derivative w.r.t. φ of the share of family firms using crony management, of the share of
firms using entrepreneurial human capital and of the growth rate derive immediately from (A.52).
Likewise, the derivative of the share of family firms v f = aφ + 1− aa w.r.t. φ
∂v f
∂φ
= (1− n)
(
∂aφ
∂φ
)
,
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and that of the number of exchanges
∂(1− n)(1− aa)
∂φ
= −n (1− n)
(
∂aφ
∂φ
)
.
From (A.40), it follows that
∂aφ
∂φ
=
φ
1
α−1(1− n) (w∗ + p∗)
αw∗
(
1− nφ 1α
)2 −
(
1− φ 1α
) (
w∗p′φ − p∗w′φ
)
(w∗)2
(
1− nφ 1α
) > 0,
since
w∗p′φ − p∗w′φ < 0, (A.53)
where w∗ and p∗ are the wage rate and the license price of equilibrium, and p′φ and w′φ are the total
derivatives of the equilibrium wage and price w.r.t φ. Totally differentiating (A.42) and (A.43) with
respect to φ at the equilibrium point (w∗, p∗), then
Pw w′φ + Pp p′φ = −Pφ (A.54)
Hw w′φ + Hp p′φ = −Hφ (A.55)
where Pw, Pp, Pφ, Hw, Hp and Hφ are the partial derivatives w.r.t. w∗, p∗ and φ of the implicit functions
P(w, p; φ) = 0 in (A.42) and H(w, p; φ) = 0 in (A.43). In matrix form, the system of (A.54)-(A.55) is
given by [
Pw Pp
Hw Hp
] [
w′φ
p′φ
]
=
[
−Pφ
−Hφ
]
(A.56)
so that, applying Cramer’s rule,
w′φ ≡
dw∗
dφ
=
∣∣Jwφ ∣∣
|J| =
∣∣∣∣∣−Pφ Pp−Hφ Hp
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pw PpHw Hp
∣∣∣∣∣
=
PpHφ − PφHp
PwHp − PpHw , (A.57)
and
p′φ ≡
dp∗
dφ
=
∣∣Jpφ ∣∣
|J| =
∣∣∣∣∣Pw −PφHw −Hφ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pw PpHw Hp
∣∣∣∣∣
=
PφHw − PwHφ
PwHp − PpHw . (A.58)
Noting that the Jacobian |J| of the two endogenous variables w∗ and p∗ is greater than zero, |J| > 0
(algebraic details available upon request), using (A.57)-(A.58) the condition in (A.53) can then be
rewritten, after rearranging, as
Pφ
(
w∗Hw + p∗Hp
)
< Hφ
(
p∗Pp + w∗Pw
)
, (A.59)
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which can be verified to be always satisfied after substituting
Pp ≡ ∂P(w, p; φ)
∂p
= −
(
1− n
1− nφ 1α
)1+ n
(
1− φ 1α
)
(w + p)
α
[
(1− n)w− np
(
1− φ 1α
)]
 , (A.60)
Pw ≡ ∂P(w, p; φ)
∂w
= −
(
1− n
1− nφ 1α
)1+
(
w + p
αw
)1− α− np
(
1− φ 1α
)
(1− n)w− np
(
1− φ 1α
)
 , (A.61)
Pφ ≡ ∂P(w, p; φ)
∂φ
=
n (1− n) φ 1α−1 (w + p)
α
(
1− nφ 1α
)2
 (1− n) (w + p)α [(1− n)w− np (1− φ 1α)] − 1
 , (A.62)
Hp ≡ ∂H(w, p; φ)
∂p
= −
 n
(
1− φ 1α
)
w
(
1− nφ 1α
)
 [aa − aφ − H¯ (aa) 1α (n aφφ 1α
αaa
−
(
1− φ 1α
))]
, (A.63)
Hw ≡ ∂H(w, p; φ)
∂w
=
 n p
(
1− φ 1α
)
w2
(
1− nφ 1α
)
 [aa − aφ − H¯ (aa) 1α (n aφφ 1α
αaa
−
(
1− φ 1α
))]
+
+
(
H¯
αw
)n φ 1α aφ (aa) 1α + α
(
1− (aa) 1+αα
)
(1+ α)

, (A.64)
Hφ ≡ ∂H(w, p; φ)
∂φ
=
n (1− n) φ 1α−1 (w + p)
αw
(
1− nφ 1α
)2
[
aa − aφ − H¯ (aa) 1α
(
n aφφ
1
α
αaa
−
(
1− φ 1α
))]
+
− H¯n φ
1
α aφ (aa)
1
α
αφ
, (A.65)
where aφ and aa are given in (A.40)-(A.41), and H¯ = ((1− α)At+1/w)
1
α .
Proof of Proposition 11
The first part derives by differentiating φ wrt n from eq. (A.51).
The proof of the second part of the Proposition showing the link between the number of firms n
and the share of family firms v f = aφ + 1− aa, the share of family firms using crony management
practices v f ,φ = aφ, the share of firms in the economy using entrepreneurial human capital v f ,a =
(1− aa)/n, the growth rate g = 1− aa and the number of firms’ exchanges (1− n)(1− aa), derives
from the derivatives of aφ and aa w.r.t. n. In particular, using (A.40), (A.41), and the equilibrium
condition in (A.39),
∂aφ
∂n
= −
(
1− φ 1α
w∗(1− nφ 1α )
)[
φ
1
α (w∗ + p∗)
(1− nφ 1α )
+
w∗p′n − p∗w′n
w∗
]
> 0, (A.66)
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and
∂aa
∂n
= n
(
∂aφ
∂n
)
− (1− aφ) = −( 1− φ 1α
w∗(1− nφ 1α )
)[
(w∗ + p∗)
(1− nφ 1α )
+
n (w∗p′n − p∗w′n)
w∗
]
> 0, (A.67)
where w∗ and p∗ are the wage rate and the license price of equilibrium, and p′n and w′n are the total
derivatives of the equilibrium wage and price w.r.t n. Totally differentiating (A.42) and (A.43) with
respect to n at the equilibrium point (w∗, p∗), then
Pw w′n + Pp p′n = −Pn (A.68)
Hw w′n + Hp p′n = −Hn, (A.69)
where Pn and Hn are the partial derivatives w.r.t. n of the implicit functions P(w, p; n) = 0 in (A.42)
and H(w, p; n) = 0 in (A.43), while Pp, Pw, Hp and Hw are given in equations (A.60)-(A.61)-(A.63)-
(A.64). In matrix form, the system of (A.68)-(A.69) is given by[
Pw Pp
Hw Hp
] [
w′n
p′n
]
=
[
−Pn
−Hn
]
(A.70)
so that, applying Cramer’s rule,
w′n ≡
dw∗
dn
=
|Jwn |
|J| =
∣∣∣∣∣−Pn Pp−Hn Hp
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pw PpHw Hp
∣∣∣∣∣
=
PpHn − PnHp
PwHp − PpHw , (A.71)
and
p′n ≡
dp∗
dn
=
∣∣Jpn ∣∣
|J| =
∣∣∣∣∣Pw −PnHw −Hn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pw PpHw Hp
∣∣∣∣∣
=
PnHw − PwHn
PwHp − PpHw , (A.72)
with
Pn ≡ ∂P(w, p; n)
∂n
=
(w + p)
(
1− φ 1α
)
(
1− nφ 1α
)2
1− (1− n)(w + p)α [(1− n)w− np (1− φ 1α)]
 , (A.73)
and
Hn ≡ ∂H(w, p; n)
∂n
=−
n (w + p) φ 1α
(
1− φ 1α
)
w
(
1− nφ 1α
)2
 [aa − aφ − H¯ (aa) 1α (n aφφ 1α
αaa
−
(
1− φ 1α
))]
+
−
(
aφ
)2
2
− aa (1− aφ) + H¯ (aa) 1α
[
n aφ(1− aφ)φ 1α
αaa
−
(
1− aφ
(
1− φ 1α
))]
.
(A.74)
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Then, from (A.66)
∂aφ
∂n
> 0⇔
[
φ
1
α (w∗ + p∗)
(1− nφ 1α )
+
w∗p′n − p∗w′n
w∗
]
< 0, (A.75)
since, using w′n from (A.71), p′n from (A.72), Pn and Hn from (A.73)-(A.74) along with Pp, Pw, Hp and
Hw from (A.60)-(A.61)-(A.63)-(A.64), and rearranging, it results that
Pn
(
w∗Hw + p∗Hp
)− Hn (w∗Pw + p∗Pp) < −|J|w∗ (w∗ + p∗) φ 1α
1− nφ 1α
. (A.76)
Finally, from (A.67)
∂aa
∂n
> 0⇔
[
(w∗ + p∗)
(1− nφ 1α )
+
n (w∗p′n − p∗w′n)
w∗
]
< 0, (A.77)
since, using w′n from (A.71), p′n from (A.72), Pn and Hn from (A.73)-(A.74) along with Pp, Pw, Hp and
Hw from (A.60)-(A.61)-(A.63)-(A.64), and rearranging, it results that
Pn
(
w∗Hw + p∗Hp
)− Hn (w∗Pw + p∗Pp) < −|J|w∗ (w∗ + p∗)
n
(
1− nφ 1α
) . (A.78)
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Appendix B. Crony society
Throughout the paper we have maintained the assumption φ < 1, that is that the family specific
human capital is not extremely productive for doing business. In this appendix we remove this as-
sumption and study the case φ ≥ 1. To this end, we need to distinguish two further cases, depending
on whether the overall productivity of family specific human capital, Φt+1 = φ (1− gt+1), is greater
or less than 1.
B.1 Education and occupational choices
First, let us define a new relevant wage threshold ˆˆwt+1 such that a
φ
t+1 = 1, that is the level of wage
for which the parent entrepreneur of the most talented descendant is indifferent between leaving her
the company relying on the managerial value of family specific human capital, and steering him/her
to a wage earning career. From equation (12) in the paper:
ˆˆwt+1 = θAt+1φ(1− gt+1), (B.1)
with w˜ ≤ wˆ ≤ ˆˆw for any Φt+1 ≥ 1, and ˆˆw < wˆ < w˜ for any Φt+1 < 1. Let w˚ = max[wˆ, ˆˆw]. Hence,
Proposition B.1. The educational and occupational choices of parent entrepreneurs are:
(a) for any wt+1 ≤ w˚, all descendants continue the family business:
(a.1) when Φt+1 < 1, descendants with ability ait+1 < a¯t+1 obtain family specific human capital and
use crony management technologies, while those with ability ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1 accumulate and use en-
trepreneurial human capital;
(a.2) when Φt+1 ≥ 1, all descendants obtain family specific human capital and use crony management
technologies.
(b) for any wt+1 > w˚, low-ability descendants, those with ait+1 ≤ aφt+1, continue the family firms by exploiting
family specific human capital acquired in childhood, while descendants with innate ability ait+1 > a
φ
t+1 are
induced to accumulate general human capital and undertake a wage-earning career;
The educational and occupational choices of parent workers are unaffected by the managerial productivity of
family specific human capital, and remain the same as those reported in Proposition 2 for the case φ < 1.
Contrary to the results in Proposition 1 in the paper, if the wage rate is sufficiently low (i.e.,
wt+1 ≤ w˚) but the managerial value that society assigns to family name, reputation and connections
is sufficiently high (i.e., φ ≥ 1), working for a wage becomes the less rewarding alternative and all the
heirs retain control of the family businesses. However, when φ is not extremely high such that there
are some gt+1 for which the overall productivity of family specific human capital is still sufficiently
small (i.e., Φt+1 < 1), continuing the family firm by investing in the entrepreneurial human capital
of the heirs can be an optimal choice for parent entrepreneurs. In this case, the choice depends only
on the extent of the productivity of family specific human capital such that heirs with an ability level
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lower than a¯t+1 continue operating the family businesses using crony management practices, taking
advantage of the system of relations inherited from their parents, while those with an ability level
higher than a¯t+1 receive an entrepreneurial education that they employ in managing the family firms
using entrepreneurial management practices (panel 2(a) in the paper). If, instead, φ is so high that
for any gt+1 ≥ 0 the overall productivity of family specific human capital is always the best way to
manage the family business (Φt+1 ≥ 1), all the heirs retain the control of the company, exploiting
the family specific human capital assimilated from the family. Otherwise, if the market wage is
greater than w˚, the wage-earning career and accumulation of general human capital are rewarding
options for the most talented, who no longer find it profitable to continue the family business by
using entrepreneurial human capital due to the sufficiently high level of φ.
By contrast, since parent workers have no family specific human capital to transmit to the de-
scendants, the value society assigns to family specific human capital does not directly influence their
education and occupational choices, although it indirectly affects their optimal equilibrium choices
through the general equilibrium channel.
B.2 Equilibrium and dynamics
Likewise Definition 1 in the paper, the steady-state equilibrium requires that the labor market clears
and that ability thresholds, industry size and technology growth rate are constant over time.
Proposition B.2. A unique competitive equilibrium wage exists such that HSt+1 (wt+1) = H
D
t+1 (wt+1).
Using the optimal occupational choice from Propositions B.1 and 2 and the definition of the tech-
nology growth rate gt+1 in eq. (18) in the paper, we have
Lemma B.1. There exist a φ¯ > 1 and a n¯ > 0 such that: a) for any φ ∈ [1, φ¯), Φt+1 = φ (1− gt+1(nt)) Q 1
for nt Q n¯; b) for any φ ≥ φ¯, Φt+1 = φ (1− gt+1(nt)) > 1 for all nt ≥ 0.
Hence, the dynamical system governing the evolution of nt is given by
nt+1 =

1− (1− nt) aat+1 if nt < ˜˜n
nt if nt ∈ [ ˜˜n, ˆˆn]
nta
φ
t+1 if nt > ˆˆn,
(B.2)
where ˜˜n is the number of firms for which the equilibrium wage rate is equal to w˜ (i.e., aat+1 = 1), with
˜˜n = [ ˜˜nT, ˜˜nC] depending on whether φ ∈ [1, φ¯) or φ ≥ φ¯, and ˆˆnt is the number of firms for which the
equilibrium wage rate is equal to ˆˆwt+1 (i.e., a
φ
t+1 = 1). The corresponding evolution of the growth
rate of aggregate technology is given by
gt+1 =

1− (1− nt) a
a
t+1
1− ntφ if nt <
˜˜nT and φ ∈ [1, φ¯)
(1− nt) (1− aat+1) if nt < ˜˜nC and φ ≥ φ¯
0 otherwise.
(B.3)
Proposition B.3. The number of firms converges to a unique and globally stable steady state n∗, indeterminate
in the interval n∗ ∈ [ ˜˜n, ˆˆn]. At the steady state, the economy features no social mobility across occupations and
zero growth rate, g∗ = 0.
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In the crony regime, the economy converges into a fully immobile society, with no entry of new
individual firms and where all the family firms are managed by using family specific human capital.
The intuition is straightforward. Given the high managerial productivity of family specific human
capital, all entrepreneurs transfer the control of firms within the family, introducing their descen-
dants to crony management practices. As an indirect effect, the large number of family firms in the
economy sustains the aggregate demand for general human capital and the wage rate, thus inducing
parent workers to invest in general rather than entrepreneurial human capital of their children. The
social inertia arising from the use of family specific human capital to manage a firm thus eradicates
any possible source of entrepreneurial human capital from the economy, wiping out technological ad-
vancements and blocking the economy in a zero-growth equilibrium. In this case, marginal changes
of φ are unable to modify the industry configuration and pull the economy out of the zero-growth
trap. Only a socio-institutional shock can put the economy on a positive growth path and create
mobility across occupations in society.1
The industry dynamics toward the steady state depends on the initial number of firms in the
economy. In this case, depending on the extent of φ, it can also feature a “falling into cronyism”
process, with an endogenous reversal from an entrepreneurial to a crony regime.
Proposition B.4. For any nt > ˆˆn, the economy converges monotonically to the steady state n∗; during the
transition, the entrepreneurial sector is formed by only family firms using family specific human capital and
the growth rate of technology is constantly zero.
If φ ∈ [1, φ¯), for any nt < ˜˜nT the economy experiences an endogenous transition from an entrepreneurial
to a crony regime, with the total number of firms first monotonically converging and then discretely jumping to
the steady state equilibrium n∗ ∈ [ ˜˜nT, ˆˆn]; during the transition, the share of family firms and the proportion of
those using crony management practices increase, while the share of firms managed by entrepreneurial human
capital and the growth rate decrease to zero.
If φ ≥ φ¯, for any nt < ˜˜nC, the economy shows no transitional dynamics and the number of firms instan-
taneously converges to the steady state n∗ ∈ [ ˜˜nC, ˆˆn].
Figure B.1 illustrates the possible transitional dynamics in a crony society. When the initial num-
ber of firms and the market wage rate is high (nt > ˆˆn), the dynamic transition is similar to that an-
alyzed in Section 2.4 in the paper. Also in this case an increase in the productivity of family specific
human capital has supportive effects on the aggregate income per capita in the short run. However,
unlike the case of an entrepreneurial society, the high level of the productivity of family specific hu-
man capital inhibits the managerial take-off and the economy smoothly converges to a crony steady
state n∗ = ˆˆn with g∗ = 0.
If φ ∈ [1, φ¯) and the initial number of firms is small enough to make g0 > (φ− 1)/φ, n0 < ˜˜nT, the
economy starts from an entrepreneurial regime in which the productivity of family specific human
capital is lower than 1; hence, part of family firms’ owners invest in their heirs’ entrepreneurial
1Historical research provides real-world testimonies to this “big-push” hypothesis, such as the different evolution of
industrialization in Britain, Japan and Italy after the Second World War. In all three countries the initial boost to indus-
trialization was driven by powerful family firms. However, while in Japan the anti-zaibatsu laws passed by the Allied
occupiers in the postwar period largely weakened the power of the largest family businesses of the country and the related
network of connections, opening the route to the modern keiretsu system (Morikawa, 2001; Morck and Nakamura, 2007),
and in Britain the economic reforms pursued by the Labor Government at the end of the 1940s, including the sharp rise in
the death duty tax rate to 80%, led many family firms to go public and give up the control of the business (Colli and Rose,
1999), in the case of Italy such radical changes never occurred. Even if there were a number of reforms in Italy to reduce
the influence of family ownership, their marginal nature was unable to dismantle the pervasiveness of family control and
promote modern managerial practices (Amatori, 1997; Colli and Rose, 1999).
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Figure B.1: Dynamics: crony society
human capital and there is entry of newly founded entrepreneurial firms. However, the increase
in the number of firms in the economy and the consequent increase in labor costs will slow down
growth until gt = (φ − 1)/φ. This pushes the productivity of the family specific human capital
up to the point in which entrepreneurs no longer have an incentive to invest in the entrepreneurial
human capital of their heirs, and all the family firms are managed by exploiting the family specific
human capital through crony management practices. At this stage, while some entry of new firms
allowed by the low wage rate may still sustain a positive growth rate, the economy ceases to evolve
smoothly and the total number of firms instantaneously jumps to its steady-state value in the interval
[ ˜˜nT, ˆˆn] with a zero growth rate. When this state is reached, the high productivity of family specific
human capital dissuades the new generations of family firm leaders from investing in entrepreneurial
human capital and the economy is stuck in a socially immobile equilibrium where family firms are
perpetuated, using crony management practices.
Finally, if φ ≥ φ¯ and nt < ˜˜nC, the economy does not experience any transitional dynamics and
the number of firms instantaneously jumps to a steady state equilibrium n∗ ∈ [ ˜˜nC, ˆˆn]. This is the case
in which the socio-cultural structure of society gives so much importance to family, name, reputation
and connections that entrepreneurs have no incentive to invest in the entrepreneurial human capital
of their heirs. Moreover, while the initially small size of the entrepreneurial sector allows entry of
some new firms and, hence, a positive growth rate, they vanish quickly in the course of only one
generation.
B.3 Proofs for Appendix B
Proof of Proposition B.1
Using (10)-(11) and (14)-(15)-(B.1), it follows that:
(a) wt+1 ≤ w˚. (a.1) When Φt+1 < 1, w˚ = wˆ such that wt+1 < wˆ =⇒ aφt+1 > aat+1, which implies that
Ii,eφ,t+1 > max
{
Ii,eω,t+1, I
i,e
a,t+1
}
for ait+1 < a¯t+1, while I
i,e
a,t+1 ≥ max
{
Ii,eω,t+1, I
i,e
φ,t+1
}
for ait+1 ≥ a¯t+1;
(a.2) when Φt+1 ≥ 1, w˚ = ˆˆw such that wt+1 < ˆˆw =⇒ aφt+1 > 1, which implies that Ii,eφ,t+1 ≥
Ii,eω,t+1, ∀ ait+1 ∈ [0, 1].
(b) wt+1 > w˚. When Φt+1 ≥ 1, wt+1 > ˆˆw =⇒ aφt+1 < 1 < aat+1, which implies that Ii,eφ,t+1 R Ii,eω,t+1 for
ait+1 Q a
φ
t+1. When Φt+1 < 1, wt+1 > wˆ =⇒ aφt+1 < 1 and aφt+1 < a¯t+1 < aat+1; if also wt+1 > w˜,
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aat+1 > 1 and hence again a
φ
t+1 < 1 < a
a
t+1 gives the result. Otherwise, if wt+1 ∈ [wˆ, w˜], then
aat+1 < 1. From Lemma 1, a
φ
t+1 = φ
1
α aat+1; from the assumption that φ ≥ 1 this further implies
that aφt+1 > a
a
t+1 leading to the contradiction ensuring that when Φt+1 < 1 no equilibrium wage
wt+1 ∈ [wˆ, w˜] can exist such that for any wage wt+1 < w˜ it must also hold that wt+1 < wˆ.
Proof of Proposition B.2
Using the results according to which when Φt+1 < 1, wt+1 /∈ [wˆ, w˜] (see point (b) in proof of Propo-
sition B.1), and wt+1 = w˜ =⇒ aat+1 = 1 =⇒ gt+1 = 0 =⇒ Φt+1 ≥ 1, the aggregate supply and
demand of human capital are given by:
HSt+1 =
1
2
×

(1− nt)(aat+1)2 if wt+1 < w˜
(1− nt) if wt+1 ∈ [w˜, ˆˆw]
1− nt(aφt+1)2 if wt+1 > ˆˆw,
(B.4)
and
HDt+1 =
[
(1− α) At+1
wt+1
]
×


nt a¯
(1+α)
α
t+1 + α
[
1− (1− nt)(aat+1)
(1+α)
α
]
1+ α
if Φt+1 < 1
nt a¯
1
α
t+1 +
α(1− nt)
1+ α
[
1− (aat+1)
(1+α)
α
]
if Φt+1 ≥ 1
if wt+1 < w˜
nt a¯
1
α
t+1 if wt+1 ∈ [w˜, ˆˆw]
nt a
φ
t+1 a¯
1
α
t+1 if wt+1 > ˆˆw.
(B.5)
The equilibrium wage schedule is then:
wt+1 = θAt+1


α+ nt a¯ (1+α)αt+1
χ(1− nt)

α(1−α)
1+α
≡ ωT1 (nt) if Φt+1 < 1
nt
(
a¯
1
α
t+1 (1+ α)− α
)
+ α
χ(1− nt)

α(1−α)
1+α
≡ ωC1 (nt) if Φt+1 ≥ 1
and if nt < ˜˜n
a¯t+1
[
(1+ α)nt
(χ− α)(1− nt)
]α
≡ ω2(nt) if nt ∈ [ ˜˜n, ˆˆn]
a¯t+1
[
(1+ χ)nt
χ− α
]α/2
≡ ω3(nt) if nt > ˆˆn
(B.6)
where ˜˜n and ˆˆn are defined as the number of firms such that the equilibrium wage rate is equal,
respectively, to w˜ (i.e., aa = 1) and ˆˆw (i.e., aφ = 1), and recall that χ = α(3− α)/2(1− α).
Proof of Lemma B.1 and Propositions B.3 and B.4
As they are strictly linked, we prove Lemma B.1 and Propositions B.3 and B.4 all together. In partic-
ular, when φ ≥ 1, we have to distinguish three cases.
Crony path with transition: φ ≥ 1 and nt > ˆˆn. When φ ≥ 1, for any nt > ˆˆn, the occupational
choices imply that the dynamic system of nt is governed by the equation nt+1 = nt a
φ
t+1, whose
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properties are: nt+1( ˆˆn) = ˆˆn, nt+1(1) < 1, with nt+1(nt) increasing and concave for any nt > ˆˆn. Then,
for any nt > ˆˆn, the system features transitional dynamics toward the unique steady state n∗ = ˆˆn,
characterized by social immobility and zero growth rate as aφ( ˆˆn) > 1 and aa( ˆˆn) > 1.
Endogenous transition from entrepreneurial to crony regime: φ ∈ [1, φ¯) and nt < ˜˜nT. When
Φt+1 < 1 and nt is low enough that wt+1 < w˜ such that aat+1 < 1, we have a
φ
t+1 > a
a
t+1 since from the
proof of Proposition B.1 wt+1 /∈ [wˆ, w˜] and hence wt+1 < wˆ for any wt+1 < w˜. Hence, the occupational
choices and the corresponding distribution of firms and workers imply that the dynamic systems of
the number of firms and of the growth rate are given by:
nt+1 = 1− (1− nt) aat+1, (B.7)
and
gt+1 = nt(1− φ(1− gt+1)) + (1− nt)(1− aat+1), (B.8)
which, after rearranging, is given by
gt+1 = 1−
(1− nt) aat+1
1− ntφ . (B.9)
Using (B.7), eq. (B.9) can be rewritten as
gt+1 =
nt+1 − φnt
1− φnt . (B.10)
Substituting (B.10) in (B.7), using aat+1 from eq. (13) in the paper and the corresponding equilib-
rium wage ωT1 (nt) in (B.6), the dynamic systems of the number of firms and of the growth rate are
explicitly given by
nt+1 = 1− (1− φnt)
[
α(1− nt)1/α
χ(1− φnt) 1+αα − (1− nt)1/αntφ 1+αα
] α
1+α
≡ nT(nt), (B.11)
and
gt+1 = 1−
[
α(1− nt)1/α
χ(1− φnt) 1+αα − (1− nt)1/αntφ 1+αα
] α
1+α
≡ gT(nt). (B.12)
Finally, substituting back (B.12) and ωT1 (nt) from (B.6) in (12) and (13), the thresholds a
φ
t+1 and
aat+1 can be explicitly written as
aφt+1 = φ
1
α
(
1− nt
1− φnt
) 1−α
α
[
α(1− nt)1/α
χ(1− φnt) 1+αα − (1− nt)1/αntφ 1+αα
] α
1+α
(B.13)
and
aat+1 = (1− φnt)
 α
(1− nt)
(
χ(1− φnt) 1+αα − (1− nt)1/αntφ 1+αα
)
 α1+α . (B.14)
Consistently, aφt+1 > a
a
t+1 holds for φ > 1. Using (B.12), Φt+1 = φ(1− gt+1) < 1 as long as
φ
1+α
α (1− nt) 1α (α+ nt) < χ (1− ntφ)
1+α
α . (B.15)
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The necessary condition ensuring that (B.15) is satisfied at least for some gt+1 ≥ 0 ⇔ nt ≥ 0
can be derived by imposing the maximum value that gt+1 can assume (i.e., the minimum value of
1− gt+1). Since gt+1 is a monotonically decreasing function of nt, the max (gt+1(nt) : nt = 0, ..., 1) is
in nt = 0. Using nt = 0 in (B.15), it follows that φ(1− gt+1) < 1 for some nt > 0 if
φ <
(χ
α
) α
1+α ≡ φ¯, (B.16)
with φ¯ > 1. Then, for φ < φ¯, the properties of the function gt+1 = gT(nt) ensure that an n¯ must exist
such that φ(1− gt+1(n¯)) = 1. Formally, n¯ is implicitly defined by the condition in (B.15) verified with
equality, φ
1+α
α (1− n¯) 1α (α+ n¯) = χ (1− n¯φ) 1+αα . For nt < n¯ =⇒ a¯t+1 < 1, aφt+1 > a¯t+1 > aat+1 holds.
Let ˜˜nT stand for the number of firms such that, for φ ∈ [1, φ¯), aa( ˜˜nT) = 1, with n¯ < ˜˜nT from (B.14).
The properties of the dynamic system in (B.11) are as follows: nT(0) = 1− (α/χ)α/1+α ∈ [0, 1];
nt+1 = nt in nt = ˜˜nT, that is nT( ˜˜nT) = ˜˜nT, with nt+1 ≷ nt for any nt ≶ ˜˜nT; ∂nT(nt)/∂nt R 0 for
any nt Q n¨, with n¨ < n¯ < ˜˜nT. These properties ensure that the law of motion in (B.11) admits a
uniquely indeterminate steady state in the interval n∗ ∈ [ ˜˜nT, ˆˆn], with the growth rate g∗(n∗) = 0, as
aa(n∗) ≥ 1. For any n0 < n¯, the system features transition dynamics endogenously evolving from a
state in which φ(1− gt+1) < 1 to one in which φ(1− gt+1) ≥ 1, then discretely jumping to the steady
state n∗ ∈ [ ˆˆn, ˜˜n].
Crony path with no transition: φ ≥ φ¯ and nt < ˜˜nC. As follows from condition (B.15), for any φ ≥ φ¯
and nt ≥ 0, φ(1− gt+1) > 1 holds.
When Φt+1 ≥ 1 and nt is low enough that wt+1 < w˜ such that aat+1 < 1, we have that aat+1 <
1 < a¯t+1 < a
φ
t+1. Hence, the occupational choices and the corresponding distribution of firms and
workers imply that the dynamic systems of the number of firms and of the growth rate are given by:
nt+1 = 1− (1− nt) aat+1 (B.17)
and
gt+1 = (1− nt) (1− aat+1), (B.18)
that, using (B.17), can be rewritten as
gt+1 = nt+1 − nt. (B.19)
Substituting (B.19) in (B.17), using eq. (13) and the corresponding equilibrium wage ωC1 (nt) in
(B.6), the dynamic system of the number of firms is given by the implicit function
nt+1 = 1− (1− nt)
[
(1+ α)ntφ
1/α(1+ nt − nt+1)1/α + α(1− nt)
χ(1− nt)
] α
1+α
≡ nC(nt), (B.20)
Let ˜˜nC be the number of firms such that, for φ ≥ φ¯, aa( ˜˜nC) = 1, eq. (B.20) is characterized by
the following properties: nC(0) = 1− (α/χ)α/1+α ∈ [0, 1]; nt+1 = nt in nt = ˜˜nC, that is nC( ˜˜nC) = ˜˜nC;
∂nC(nt)/∂nt < 0. Hence, for any nt < ˜˜nC, the economy jumps without transition into the interval
[ ˜˜nC, ˆˆn], with an indeterminate steady state number of firms n∗ and a growth rate g∗ = 0.
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Appendix C. Generalizing the growth rate function
C.1 Aggregate entrepreneurial human capital
In this Appendix we assume that the growth rate of aggregate technology, g, increases with the total
entrepreneurial human capital in the economy rather than with the fraction of firms in the population
using entrepreneurial management practices.
Since the managerial capital function is the same as in the basic model, the occupational and
educational choices are unchanged. In particular, workers’ descendants and entrepreneurs’ heirs
with ability higher than aat+1 = (wt+1/θAt+1)
1/(1−α) are geared toward the entrepreneurial career by
employing all their time endowment in accumulating entrepreneurial human capital (τi = 1), while
entrepreneurs’ heirs with ability lower than aφt+1 = (φ(1− gt+1)θAt+1/wt+1)1/α continue the family
firms by relying on family specific human capital (τi = 0). All the other individuals become workers.
Then, recalling that ability is uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1), we have:
gt+1 =
ˆ 1
aat+1
τi ait+1 da
i
t+1 =
1− (aat+1)2
2
. (C.1)
C.1.1 Steady state
Due to analytic intractability, in this case we numerically simulate the model and compute the steady
state values for the growth rate of aggregate technology (g∗), the total number of firms (n∗), the
shares of family and non-family (ν f and νn f ) firms and the ratio between the family firms using crony
management practices and those using entrepreneurial management practices (ρ = aφ/(1 − aa)),
varying the exogenous component of the productivity of the family specific human capital φ. The
only parameter we have to set is α, which governs the degree of span of control. We do not calibrate
it, but we try with a set of possible values for α suggested in the literature ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 (for
instance Buera et al., 2011; Gennaioli et al., 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Simulation results for an
intermediate value of α = 0.25 are shown in Figure C.1.
Consistent with Proposition 5 in the basic model, panel (a) shows the negative relation between
the steady state growth rate and the productivity of the family specific human capital. This is gener-
ated by the selection effect of φ on occupational and educational choices. An increase in the produc-
tivity of family specific human capital raises the share of family firms in the economy and reduces the
share of non-family firms (panel (c)). The former effect, in particular, is driven by the reduction in the
share of family firms managed through the accumulation of entrepreneurial human capital and the
increase in the share of family firms managed by exploiting the family specific human capital (panel
(d)). Thus the total quantity of entrepreneurial human capital in the economy and the growth rate
shrink.
These correlations are qualitatively robust to variations in the degree of span-of-control (results
are available upon request). Quantitatively, for any given level of φ, a greater span-of-control (a lower
α) reduces profits at any level of managerial capital, as this matters less for determining the scale and
productivity of firms. This implies that all individuals, including the most talented ones, are less
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Figure C.1: Simulations (α = 0.25)
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(c) Shares of family (ν f ) and non-family (νn f ) firms
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(d) Family firms ratio (ρ)
prone to enter the entrepreneurial career and accumulate entrepreneurial human capital, generating
a decrease in the number of firms and the growth rate. Moreover, since managerial capital matters
less for determining the firms’ outcome, also the role of the family specific human capital shrinks,
inducing a corresponding decrease in the share of family firms.
C.1.2 Dynamics
For any given φ and any initial industry size n0, the dynamics toward the steady state is identified
by the sequence of intra-temporal equilibria characterized by the ability thresholds (i.e., wage rate)
clearing the labor market. Hence, the inter-temporal equilibrium is obtained by iterating over time
using the dynamic equation of the number of firms (see equation (22) in the paper).
Simulations for φ = 0.7 are shown in Figure C.2 (results are robust to changes in φ ∈ (0, 1)). In
line with the adjustment process of the basic model, panels (a) and (b) show a monotonic convergence
toward the unique globally stable steady state n∗ and g∗.2 The main variables of the model adjust
2For α = 0.25 and φ = 0.7, the admissible range of nt is the whole domain nt ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., n˜ > 1), such that the
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Figure C.2: Simulations of the dynamical process (α = 0.25, φ = 0.7)
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(b) Dynamic equation of gt+1 = G(gt)
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correspondingly. An economy in the early stages of development (gt ≈ 0) is characterized by a large
number of small firms, predominantly constituted by family firms exploiting family specific human
capital. Over time, the economy evolves toward its steady state, with a monotonically increasing
growth rate (panel (b)). The resulting reduction in the productivity of the family specific human
capital generates a decrease in the share of family firms (panel (c)) driven by the decrease in the share
of family firms managed using family specific human capital and the increase in the share of family
firms managed through entrepreneurial human capital (panel (d)).
thresholds aφt+1 and a
a
t+1 are interior throughout, ensuring positive entry and exit of firms in any period.
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Appendix D. Generalizing the managerial capital function
D.1 Family specific and entrepreneurial human capital as imperfect sub-
stitutes
In this appendix we relax the assumption of perfect substitutability between family specific and en-
trepreneurial human capital in the management of family firms by replacing the managerial capital
function of the basic model (see equation (5)) with a more general CES formulation:
mit+1 =
[(
τit+1a
i
t+1
) σ−1
σ
+ ι
(
(1− τit+1)φ(1− gt+1)
) σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (D.1)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two managerial inputs inversely measuring the
degree of complementarity between the two managerial factors,3 τi and 1 − τi are the time spent
by children in acquiring entrepreneurial and family specific human capital, respectively, and ι is the
usual indicator variable for the firm type (1 for family and 0 for non-family firms). This functional
form, while keeping the hypothesis that family and non-family firms differ in the fact that family
entrepreneurs have exclusive access to family specific human capital, admits that the family specific
human capital supports the productivity of entrepreneurial human capital as well.4 We start by
assuming σ > 1, such that the two managerial inputs are imperfect substitutes. Then we discuss the
robustness to the more extreme case of unitary elasticity of substitution.
As in the basic model, parents choose education and occupation for their children. Since parent
workers do not have family specific human capital to transfer to descendants, their occupational
choice is still governed by the unique threshold ability aat+1 ≡ aNFt+1 (see equation (13) in the main
text)
aNFt+1 =
(
wt+1
pit+1
) α
1−α
=
(
wt+1
θAt+1
) 1
1−α
, (D.2)
such that descendants with ability higher than aNFt+1 undertake an entrepreneurial career, or else work
for a wage. By contrast, conditional on keeping the control of the family firm within the family,
parent entrepreneurs choose the amount of time descendants spend on acquiring entrepreneurial
and family specific human capital with the aim of maximizing the firm’s managerial capital (D.1)
and profits:
(τit+1)
∗ =
(
ait+1
)β
(φ(1− gt+1))β +
(
ait+1
)β , (D.3)
3 It is interesting to note that how complementary family specific and entrepreneurial human capital are also depends
on the workings of society, and the importance it attributes to the family specific human capital for doing business.
4 Results are qualitatively the same if we assume that family specific and entrepreneurial human capital enter the man-
agerial capital function of family firms with different weights, such that: mit+1 = [(1− ιµ)(τiait+1)
σ−1
σ + ιµ((1− τi)φ(1−
gt+1))
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 . For the sake of comparison with the basic model (as σ approaches infinity, the CES formulation in (D.1)
coincides with equation (5) in the main text), we present simulations based on equation (D.1). The consequences of al-
lowing different weights on the two inputs of the managerial capital function can be interpreted in light of the effects on
the relative marginal productivity of the family specific human capital with respect to entrepreneurial human capital, with
increases in µ strengthening the productivity of the former.
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with β = σ − 1. Substituting the optimal time solutions (D.3) into (D.1), the optimal managerial
capital of family firms is:
mit+1 =
[
(ait+1)
β + ι (φ(1− gt+1))β
] 1
β
. (D.4)
Unlike the basic model, the optimal managerial capital of family firms is no longer a piecewise
function revealing the exclusive acquisition and use in the company’s management of family specific
or entrepreneurial human capital, but it is represented by the continuous nonlinear function of these
two factors in (D.4).5 This reflects the dual role of the family specific human capital as an insurance
factor that ensures a positive lower bound to family firms’ managerial capital and profitability, and
as a positive support to the entrepreneurial ability of the family descendant at the helm of the family
company. Hence, since the family specific human capital also increases the managerial productivity
of entrepreneurs’ descendants investing in entrepreneurial human capital, the innate ability of the
marginal family entrepreneur using entrepreneurial management practices is lower than the ability
of the marginal new entrepreneur, aa,Ft+1 < a
a,NF
t+1 . Due to the nonlinearity of the managerial capital
function (D.4), the occupational choices of the parent entrepreneurs are only implicitly determined
by the usual indifference condition between wage- and profit-income
wt+1ait+1 = pit+1
(
mit+1
) 1
α
. (D.5)
Lemma D.1. For ι = 1, the function m is such that: (i) m|ai=0 > 0; (ii) ∂m/∂a
i > 0; (iii) ∂2m/∂(ai)2 ≷ 0
for any ait+1 ≷ a¯ ≡ φ(1− gt+1)[α(2− σ)/(1− α)]1/(σ−1), with a¯ < 1 for any φ ∈ (0, 1) and α ≤ 0.5; (iv)
∂m/∂φ > 0.
Lemma D.1 implies that the indifference condition in (D.5) can have either two solutions, com-
patible with an equilibrium with entry and exit, or one or no solution, compatible with equilibria
without mobility. We focus on the case in which the productivity of family specific human capital is
not so high as to exclude the existence of an equilibrium with positive entry and exit. In this case, the
two solutions satisfying the income-indifference condition in (D.5) are implicitly given by
[
(φ(1− gt+1))β + (aφt+1)β
] 1
αβ
=
(
wt+1
pit+1
)
aφt+1 (D.6)
[
(φ(1− gt+1))β + (aFt+1)β
] 1
αβ
=
(
wt+1
pit+1
)
aFt+1, (D.7)
with aFt+1 > a
φ
t+1 to be verified in equilibrium. For heirs with innate ability lower than a
φ and higher
than aF parent entrepreneurs decide to continue the firm within the family. Otherwise, for descen-
dants of intermediate ability, parent entrepreneurs shut the firm down, inducing children to accumu-
late general human capital and work for a wage (Figure D.1).
Unlike the basic model, when family specific and entrepreneurial human capital are not perfect
substitutes, family firms cannot be discretely differentiated as crony or entrepreneurial according to
the type of management practices employed. By contrast, all the family firms are managed by using
both family specific and entrepreneurial human capital, although at a different level of intensity,
which depends on the innate ability of the descendant who continues the family firm: descendants
5For any given elasticity σ between the time inputs, the optimal managerial capital presents an “actual” elasticity of
substitution between family specific human capital and entrepreneurial ability equal to e = 1/(2− σ), which is greater
than 1 for any σ ∈ (1, 2), and equal to 1 for σ = 1.
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Figure D.1: Occupational choices of parent entrepreneurs
with a little talent rely more on, and invest more time in, the accumulation of family specific rather
than entrepreneurial human capital, while the reverse is true for highly talented descendants.
In this context, the dynamics of firms in the industry is given by:
nt+1 = nta
φ
t+1 + nt(1− aFt+1) + (1− nt)(1− aNFt+1) =
= nta
φ
t+1 + 1−
[
ntaFt+1 + (1− nt)aNFt+1
]
,
(D.8)
such that, in steady-state, the entry-exit equilibrium condition is:
n =
1− aNF
1− aNF + aF − aφ . (D.9)
The labor market equilibrium, HSt+1 = H
D
t+1, is given by:
nt
[
(aFt+1)
2 − (aφt+1)2
]
+ (1− nt)(aNFt+1)2
2
=
[
(1− α)
α(aNFt+1)
1−α
α
]nt
aφt+1ˆ
0
(
mit+1
) 1
α
dait+1 +
nt
1ˆ
aFt+1
(mit+1)
1
α dait+1 + (1− nt)
1ˆ
aNFt+1
(ait+1)
1
α dait+1
 .
(D.10)
Finally, assuming that the growth rate of aggregate technology depends on the total entrepreneurial
human capital, and using the optimal time solution (D.3), we have:
gt+1 = nt

aφt+1ˆ
0
(τit+1)
∗ ait+1 da
i
t+1 +
1ˆ
aFt+1
(τit+1)
∗ ait+1 da
i
t+1
+ (1− nt)
(
1− (aNFt+1)2
)
2
. (D.11)
In this case, the least talented heirs contribute to the aggregate growth rate as well as those most
talented, albeit with a lower level of entrepreneurial human capital determined by both their low
innate ability and low investment in entrepreneurial education.
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D.1.1 Steady state
The steady state equilibrium is defined as in the basic model as the tuple {wt, nt, aφt , aFt , aNFt , gt}∞t=κ
which, for each t, solves the system of equations (D.2)-(D.6)-(D.7)-(D.10)-(D.9)-(D.11) under the con-
straints n ∈ (0, 1) and 1 > aFt > aφt , ensuring positive entry and exit. In order to numerically compute
how the steady state changes with the productivity of family specific human capital φ, we need to
set the span-of-control and elasticity parameters α and σ.6 Simulations for α = 0.25 and σ = 1.4 are
reported in Figure D.2, but results are robust to different values of span-of-control and elasticity of
substitution. As in the basic model, we focus on equilibria with positive firm entry and exit. The
interval of values of φ for which there is firm entry and exit (and social mobility) in equilibrium is
narrower than that in the perfect substitution case, as the family specific human capital now also
contributes to entrepreneurial human capital.7
All results are qualitatively identical to the case of perfect substitution reported in Figure C.1,
although under imperfect substitution the family specific human capital has contrasting effects on
the growth rate. As in the basic model, an increase in the productivity of the family specific human
capital has negative selection and education effects on economic growth by reducing the mass of
individuals at the top of the ability distribution founding a new enterprise (i.e., the share of non-
family firms in the economy; panel D.2(c)) and the investment in entrepreneurial human capital by
entrepreneurs’ descendants (see equation (D.3)). However, the family specific human capital also
supports the marginal productivity of the entrepreneurial human capital employed in family firms,
and this produces a positive scale effect on the steady-state growth rate by increasing the share of
family firms continuing the business through generations (panel D.2(c)). On the whole, the educa-
tion and selection effects are always stronger than the scale effect, justifying the negative association
between the productivity of the family specific human capital and the growth rate displayed in Fig-
ure D.2(a). This can be explained by two mechanisms. Due to the higher time investment in family
specific human capital of the low-ability individuals with respect to their high-ability counterparts,
an increase in the productivity of the family specific human capital benefits particularly the mass
of least talented heirs. Hence, as φ increases the family firms’ ratio, the ratio between family firms
managed by the lowest and highest talented heirs, increases (panel D.2(d)). Further, since the produc-
tivity of the family specific human capital also increases the marginal productivity of entrepreneurial
human capital of all the firms’ heirs, aFt+1 < a
NF
t+1 holds such that the highest talented marginal heirs
continuing the family business have a lower entrepreneurial ability than the marginal workers’ de-
scendants. These two mechanisms explain why the positive effect of the productivity of the family
specific human capital on the growth rate is outweighed by the negative effect such that the net effect
is the negative correlation shown in panel D.2(a).
The simulation results are robust to variations in the degree of span-of-control and elasticity of
substitution σ. Quantitatively, for any given level of α and φ, a reduction in the elasticity of substitu-
tion implies a lower growth rate and total fraction of firms in the economy, accompanied by a higher
share of family firms. This is because in societies in which the elasticity of substitution is lower the
6The only technical constraint we need to impose is that the product α× (σ− 1) is a positive integer, in order that the
integrand in (D.10) is a polynomial and integration over ait+1 has a closed, numerically tractable, solution. Otherwise,
integration involves solutions over hyper-geometric functions which are numerically intractable.
7 Specifically, in this case an upper limit φ¯ ∈ (0, 1) can be numerically identified such that for any φ ≥ φ¯, there is no
mobility across sectors and the growth rate is stuck at its minimum (which, unlike the perfect substitution case, is greater
than zero since all family entrepreneurs manage their company with a minimum level of entrepreneurial human capital).
For the parameter configuration used for simulations in figure D.2 we have that φ¯ ≈ 0.154.
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Figure D.2: Simulations (α = 0.25, σ = 1.4)
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(c) Shares of family and non-family firms
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family specific human capital is “more complementary” to entrepreneurial human capital, augment-
ing the impact that the former has on the latter. This increases - ceteris paribus - the mass of firms’ heirs
continuing the family business both at the bottom and at the top of the ability distribution (formally,
increasing aφ and reducing aF). While this effect tends to increase the growth rate, it also sufficiently
heightens, via the general equilibrium channel, the selection effect (i.e., formally increasing aNF) that
the net effect is a lower growth rate.
D.1.2 Dynamics
As in Appendix C.1, given α, φ and an initial condition n0, the dynamics toward the steady state
is identified by the sequence of intra-temporal equilibria characterized by the ability thresholds (i.e.,
wage rate) clearing the labor market, and the inter-temporal equilibrium is obtained by iterating over
time using the dynamic equation of the number of firms in (D.8).
The dynamic adjustment of the economy features oscillations around the steady state equilibrium
rather than a monotonic convergence towards it as in the basic model. In particular, if φ is sufficiently
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Figure D.3: Simulations of the dynamic process (α = 0.25, σ = 1.4, φ = 0.01)
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(d) Family firms ratio (ρt+1)
low,8 the dynamic process is characterized by oscillatory convergence of the state variable nt to its
unique globally stable steady-state value, as panel D.3(a) illustrates for the case of α = 0.25, σ = 1.4
and φ = 0.01. As the other variables adjust accordingly, also the growth rate (panel D.3(b)), the shares
of family and non-family firms (panel D.3(c)), and the quality of family firms (panel D.3(d)) converge
in oscillations to their unique globally stable steady state. By contrast, if φ is large, the steady state
becomes globally unstable as the oscillations become sufficiently large (i.e., |n′t+1(nt)| > 1) that either
the state variable nt is at its steady state or it diverges from it.
D.2 Unitary elasticity
In this section, we consider the robustness of the basic model to the more extreme assumption that
the elasticity of substitution between managerial inputs tends to one. For σ → 1, the managerial
capital in (D.1) converges at the limit to infinity, while the closer finite approximation for managerial
8Numerically, it is possible to compute a φˆ ∈ (0, φ¯) (see footnote 7) such that for any φ < φˆ, |n′t+1(nt)| < 1, ∀nt.
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capital assumes the multiplicative form
mit+1 =
(
τit a
i
t+1
) [(
1− τit
)
φ (1− gt+1)
]ι
. (D.12)
From equation (D.3), entrepreneurs’ descendants divide their time equally between the acquisi-
tion of entrepreneurial and family specific human capital (τi = 1/2), independent of their innate
ability. For workers’ descendants, instead, conditional on choosing to found a new enterprise, the
time investment is still τi = 1 as in the basic model. Hence, the optimal managerial capital is:
mit+1 = (φ(1− gt+1)/4)ι ait+1. (D.13)
Since the family specific human capital does not enter into the managerial capital function of
workers’ descendants, their occupational choices remain unchanged, such that descendants with an
innate ability greater than aNFt+1 in (D.2) become entrepreneurs; otherwise they work for a wage. How-
ever, due to the unitary elasticity of substitution, the family specific human capital does not provide
an income insurance to entrepreneurs’ heirs anymore, while they only affect the marginal productiv-
ity of the entrepreneurial human capital of family entrepreneurs. Therefore, the occupational choices
of parent entrepreneurs are governed only by the upper ability threshold aFt+1, which is obtained by
substituting (D.13) in (D.5) as
aFt+1 =
(
wt+1
pit+1 (φ(1− gt+1)/4)
1
α
) α
1−α
=
aNFt+1
(φ (1− gt+1) /4)
1
1−α
. (D.14)
The dynamics of firms is then given by
nt+1 = nt(1− aFt+1) + (1− nt)(1− aNFt+1), (D.15)
such that the equilibrium between firm entry and exit is reached at:
n =
1− aNF
1− aNF + aF . (D.16)
The labor market equilibrium condition, HSt+1 = H
D
t+1, is given by:
nt(aFt+1)
2 + (1− nt)(aNFt+1)2
2
=
[
(1− α)
(1+ α)(aNFt+1)
1−α
α
] [
nt (φ (1− gt+1) /4)
1
α
(
1− (aFt+1)
1+α
α
)
+
+(1− nt)
(
1− (aNFt+1)
1+α
α
)]
,
(D.17)
which, using (D.14), can be solved for the unique threshold aNFt+1 (i.e., wage rate from (D.2)) that clears
the labor market
aNFt+1 =
 2(1− α)
(
1− nt + nt (φ (1− gt+1) /4)
1
α
)
(3− α)
(
1− nt + nt (φ (1− gt+1) /4)−
2
1−α
)

α
1+α
. (D.18)
Assuming again that the growth rate of aggregate technology depends on total entrepreneurial
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human capital in the economy, and recalling that τi|ι=1 = 0.5 and τ
i
|ι=0 = 1, we have:
gt+1 =
nt
2
1ˆ
aFt+1
ait+1 da
i
t+1 + (1− nt)
1ˆ
aNFt+1
ait+1 da
i
t+1 =
nt
[
1− (aFt+1)2
]
+ 2(1− nt)
[
1− (aNFt+1)2
]
4
. (D.19)
D.2.1 Steady state
As usual, we focus on the existence of steady states characterized by a positive turnover of firms in
the industry and social mobility. As we stated above, when σ→ 1, the family specific human capital
loses its insurance role, while they keep the role of supporting the productivity of the entrepreneurial
human capital of family entrepreneurs. Family name and contacts are an “asset” for entrepreneurs’
descendants only if φ is sufficiently high, such that φ(1− gt+1)/4 > 1, where 1 indicates the marginal
productivity of the entrepreneurial human capital of workers’ descendants (see equation (D.13)). In
this case, the marginal descendant continuing the family business has a lower innate ability than the
marginal new entrepreneur (aF < aNF; see panel D.4(b)). Otherwise, if φ(1− gt+1)/4 < 1, family
name and contacts would act as a “liability” on the productivity of entrepreneurial human capital
of family entrepreneurs, making it systematically lower than that of workers’ descendants, such that
aF > aNF.
Steady state simulations for α = 0.25 are shown in Figure D.4, where the main variables are
plotted against φ (as usual, results are robust to changes in the span of control parameter α).
The negative association between the steady state growth rate and the productivity of the family
specific human capital (panel (a)) is still driven by the selection and education effects of φ on the
total amount of entrepreneurial human capital employed by firms. As in Section D.1.1, the increase
in productivity of the family specific human capital reduces the mass of individuals at the top of
the ability distribution entering the entrepreneurial sector and thus the share of non-family firms in
the economy (panels (b) and (d)), and reduces the time investment of entrepreneurs’ descendants
in entrepreneurial human capital. Since entrepreneurs’ descendants do not invest in entrepreneurial
human capital as much as workers’ descendants, the selection effect is stronger than the positive
scale effect of φ on g produced by the greater number of entrepreneurs continuing the firm within
the family.
D.2.2 Dynamics
Figure D.5 shows the dynamic adjustment towards the steady state when σ → 1 and φ = 6 and
α = 0.25 (results are robust to changes in φ and α). Again, variables follow an oscillatory path that
may or may not converge to the unique steady state according to whether or not φ is sufficiently low.
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Figure D.4: Simulations (α = 0.25)
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Figure D.5: Simulations of the dynamical process (α = 0.25, φ = 6)
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Appendix E. Capital markets and monetary bequest
Throughout the paper, we have abstracted from the existence of capital markets and the possibility
that parents can shape the occupational choices of their descendants transferring them also a mone-
tary bequest.
In this Appendix, we introduce these features by slightly redesigning the optimization problem
and allowing parents to bequeath a monetary amount to their descendants. Then, differently from
Section 3 in the paper, we assume that workers’ descendants willing to start an entrepreneurial career
must pay for the business license in advance by using possible monetary bequests left by parents and
raising money in the capital market. Otherwise, descendants (both of workers and entrepreneurs)
can lend the bequest received on the markets.
Capital markets provide workers’ descendants with financial resources to pay the cost of the li-
cense whenever the bequest received is lower than the cost of the business license. If capital markets
are perfect (i.e., if people can supply and demand funds at the same interest rates), the initial dis-
tribution of parental wealth, while influencing the wealth distribution of the descendants through
the monetary bequest, does not affect the parents’ occupational choices and, as a consequence, has
no effect on the aggregate equilibrium (Section 3). By contrast, if capital markets are imperfect, the
initial wealth of parent workers shapes descendants’ careers, introducing a source of misallocation
that exacerbate the misallocation induced by the family specific human capital. Therefore, in what
follows we focus on this latter case, assuming that there exists a wedge between borrowing (RB) and
lending (RL) interest rates, RB − RL > 0, such that the larger the wedge the stronger the frictions in
the capital market.
E.1 Optimization and occupational choices
Parent entrepreneurs Since the only capital expenditure is the acquisition of a business license, cap-
ital market imperfections do not affect the occupational and bequest choices of parent entrepreneurs
with respect to the case of no capital markets.
Formally, assuming that parent entrepreneurs can transfer to their heirs a monetary bequest, their
optimization problem becomes
max
bi,et
ui,et = γ ln c
i
t + (1− γ) ln
[
Iiz,t+1 + RL b
i,e
t
]
s. t. Ωit = c
i
t + b
i,e
t , (E.1)
where bi,et is the monetary bequest, capitalized at the lending rate RL, Ω
i
t is the parental wealth and
z = {e,ω} is the occupation of the descendant, entrepreneur (e) or worker (ω). Whatever the career
chosen for the heirs, the optimal amount of bequest is:(
bi,et
)∗
= (1− γ)Ωit −
γ
RL
Iiz,t+1 (E.2)
and the indirect utility of parents is:
υi,ez,t = η + ln[RL Ω
i
t + I
i
z,t+1], (E.3)
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where η = γ lnγ+ (1− γ) ln(1− γ). Parents choose whether or not to continue the firm within the
family depending on whether their indirect utility in the case of the firm’s sale is lower or higher than
that in the case of continuation. If parents choose to sell the firm, their wealth isΩit = pi
i
t +RLb
i
t−1 + p,
where bit−1 is the bequest they received when young from their grandparents and p is the proceeds
of the sale, while the descendant’s non-inherited income is Iiω,t+1 = w
i
t+1. If, instead, parents choose
to continue the firm within the family, their wealth is Ωit = pi
i
t + RLb
i
t−1 while their descendants’
non-inherited income is Iie,t+1 = pi
i
t+1. It is easy to show that the optimal occupational choices remain
qualitatively the same as those derived in the setting without capital markets (Section 3), and the
steady-state thresholds aφ and aa characterizing these choices are:
aφ =
pi (φ(1− g∗))1/α − RL p
w
, (E.4)
pi (aa)1/α = waa + RL p. (E.5)
By comparing thresholds (E.4) and (E.5) with (26) and (27), the results without capital markets in
Section 3 can then be interpreted as a parameterization of a model with credit markets setting RL = 1.
Parent workers To characterize the occupational choices of parent workers, we need to distinguish
between wealth-unconstrained and wealth-constrained generations t + 1. The former are workers’ de-
scendants who receive from parents a bequest greater than the price of the license so to be also net
lenders on the capital markets at the lending rate RL; the latter are those who receive a bequest which
is lower than the license price and close the finance gap by raising resources in the capital market at
the borrowing rate RB.
In this setting, the general optimization problem is:
max
bi,ωr,t
ui,ωt = γ ln c
i
t + (1− γ) ln
[
Iiz,t+1 − Rr
(
p− bi,ωr,t
)]
s. t. Ωit = c
i
t + b
i,ω
r,t ,
(E.6)
where Ωit is the wealth of parent workers and b
i,ω
r,t the monetary bequest they choose to leave to their
descendants, with r = {B, L} depending on whether the optimal bequest is greater or lower than
the firms’ price such that the descendants need to resort to the capital markets to borrow or have
the possibility to lend the excess bequest they receive. Whenever parents choose an entrepreneurial
career for their descendants (i.e., Iit+1 = pi
i
t+1) they take into account the gap between the bequest they
leave and the price their descendants would pay to buy the license, considering also the difference in
the interest rates that the descendants will face on by borrowing (RB) or lending (RL).
The optimal bequest is (
bi,ωr,t
)∗
= (1− γ)Ωit −
γ
Rr
(Iiz,t+1 − Rr p) (E.7)
It depends negatively on the perspective labor incomes, and hence on the innate abilities of the de-
scendants, while it is a positive function of the license’s price, interest rates and parental wealth. This
latter is given by
Ωit = wta
i
t + RL b
i
t−1, (E.8)
where wtait is the parents’ wage income, and b
i
t−1 the bequest parents’ workers received in their
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childhood, accumulated at the lending rate RL. Substituting bit−1 in the wealth of parent workers
with the optimal bequest of their grandparents (bit−1)
∗ = (1− γ)Ωit−1 − (γ/RL)wtait, the wealth of
the parent workers can then be rewritten as
Ωit = (1− γ)
(
wtait + RL Ω
i
t−1
)
. (E.9)
Equation (E.9) indicates that the dynamics of wealth of each dynasty is governed by a first order
difference equation with a random shift, determined by the periodic draw of the innate abilities
from the support of the distribution. Since we are primarily interested in showing the consistence of
our main results to the introduction of capital markets, we focus on particular configurations of the
wealth distribution compatible with steady states with positive entry and exit from the firm market.
At this end, we simplify the analysis, restricting our attention to the invariant limiting distribution
of wealth for each dynasty. Formally, if RL < 1/(1− γ),9, the long-run wealth of parent workers is
governed only by their own innate ability
Ωˆit = ξwta
i
t, (E.10)
where ξ = [(1− γ)/(1− (1− γ)RL)]. Therefore, we assume:
Assumption E.1. ∀ t, Ωit = Ωˆit.
Using eq. (E.7), the indirect utility of parent workers is given by
υi,ωz,r,t = η − γ ln Rr + ln[Rr Ωit + Iiz,t+1 − Rr p]. (E.11)
The final occupational choices can be obtained by comparing the indirect utilities of parent workers
under the two career options (i.e., entrepreneurship or employment) conditional on the two possible
initial conditions of parental wealth, which determine the constrained and unconstrained genera-
tions. If the descendants will become workers, Iiz,t+1 = w
i
t+1, p = 0 and Rr = RL, since in this
case the descendants are net lenders of any positive bequest they receive. If the descendants will
become entrepreneurs, Iiz,t+1 = pi
i
t+1, p > 0, and Rr = {RL, RB} according to whether (bi,ωL,t )∗ ≥ p and
the descendants are net lenders on the capital markets, or (bi,ωB,t )
∗ < p and the descendants are net
borrowers.
As without capital markets, for the wealth-unconstrained generations t + 1 the occupational
choice depends only on the ability threshold aa that is implicitly defined by eq. (E.5), such that
workers’ descendants with ability ait+1 ≥ aa are directed to an entrepreneurial career, otherwise they
they are directed to a wage-earning career. For wealth-constrained generations t+ 1, parent workers
have to choose for their descendants between a career as an entrepreneur by bequeathing the amount
(bi,ωB,t )
∗ < p, and a wage-earning career by bequeathing the amount (bi,ωL,t )
∗. Formally, parent workers
choose for their descendants the entrepreneurial career if
η − γ ln RB + ln[RB Ωit + piit+1 − RB p] ≥ η − γ ln RL + ln[RLΩit + wit+1] (E.12)
Substituting Ωˆit from (E.10) for Ω
i
t and rearranging, parent workers prefer for their descendants the
9This assumption implies that in the long run the wealth of each dynasty does not converge to infinity regardless of the
ability of the first generation such that a limiting distribution exists and is a one-to-one map of ability distribution.
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entrepreneurial career as long as:
ait ≥
1
∆Rξwt
[
wt+1ait+1
RγL
− pit+1(a
i
t+1)
1/α − RB p
RγB
]
≡ F (ait+1) (E.13)
where ∆R = R
1−γ
B − R1−γL , F (0) = R1−γB p/∆Rξwt > 0, and F (.)′ R 0 for ait+1 Q [(RB/RL)γ
(α wt+1/pit+1)]α/1−α.
In order to be admissible, the optimal occupational choices must be consistent with the bequest
constraint. Hence, for unconstrained generations (bi,ωL,t )
∗ ≥ p must hold, while for the constrained
ones (bi,ωB,t )
∗ < p. Substituting Iiz,t+1 = pi
i
t+1 and Ωˆ
i
t = Ω
i
t in the optimal bequest (E.7), the locus of
parent and child abilities (ait, a
i
t+1) for which (b
i,ω
r,t )
∗ = p is given by
ait =
1
ξwt
[
p +
γ pit+1(ait+1)
1/α
(1− γ)Rr
]
≡ BR(ait+1; Rr) (E.14)
such that
(
bi,ωr,t
)∗≥ p if a
i
t ≥ BR(ait+1; Rr)
< p otherwise,
(E.15)
with BR(0) = p/ξwt < F (0) and BR(.)′ > 0.
Let BL(ait+1) ≡ BR(ait+1; RL) and BB(ait+1) ≡ BR(ait+1; RB) be the two bequest loci for uncon-
strained and constrained generations, the whole occupational choice schedule of parent workers is
the following
Proposition E.1. Under imperfect capital markets, the choices of parent workers are such that:
1. for any pair (ait, a
i
t+1) such that a
i
t+1 ≥ aa and ait ≥ BL(ait+1), workers’ descendants undertake the
entrepreneurial career by inheriting a bequest greater than the price of the business license and investing
the difference in the capital market;
2. for any pair (ait, a
i
t+1) such that F (ait+1) < ait < BB(ait+1), workers’ descendants undertake the en-
trepreneurial career by inheriting a bequest lower than the price of the business license and borrowing
the difference in the capital market;
3. otherwise, workers’ descendants undertake the wage-earning career.
Figure E.1 shows the occupational choices described in Proposition E.1. By forcing new potential
entrepreneurs who are wealth-constrained to borrow at a “penalty” rate, capital market imperfec-
tions discourage the entry of some highly talented individuals in the industry and reduce social
mobility. In particular, Proposition E.1 highlights that parent workers who never choose for their
descendants an entrepreneurial career when capital markets are either perfectly operating or not ac-
tive at all continue not to opt for the entrepreneurial sector also when these markets are incomplete
(i.e., all parents of agents with ability lower than aa). Among those who would have chosen an
entrepreneurial career, the occupational choices remain qualitatively unchanged only for the wealth-
unconstrained descendants, the unconstrained entrepreneurs (i.e. those above the curve BL(.) in the red
area). Instead, capital market imperfections block the entry into the entrepreneurial sector to some of
the workers’ descendants already constrained when capital markets were perfectly functioning, the
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Figure E.1: Occupational choices of parent workers with capital market imperfections
excluded entrepreneurs (i.e., those in the blue area in Figure E.1).10 These are the least talented descen-
dants of low-ability parent workers for whom the financing gap is so large that the wage-earning
career is preferable to an entrepreneurial career (the blue area below the F (.) and BB(.) curves). Sim-
ilarly, for descendants in the area between the BL(.) and BB(.) curves, the bequest that they receive
from parents is not sufficiently large to buy the business license, but it is sufficiently large to ensure,
once capitalized at the rate RL and added to the wage, a total income greater than what can be earned
by starting a new enterprise and borrowing the amount p− (bi,ωB,t )∗ at the rate RB.
E.2 Equilibrium and aggregate effects
The general equilibrium is characterized by the wage rate and the price of the license that clear both
the markets for labor and firms. Since the hypothesis of capital market imperfections greatly reduces
the analytic tractability of the model, we simplify the analysis by assuming that the wage rate is
always at its equilibrium level.11 In this way, we turn off the general equilibrium effects generated
by the adjustments arising in the labor market and focus only on the adjustment effects in the market
for firms.
From Proposition E.1, for any mass 1− n of parent workers, the share of workers’ descendants
excluded from the entrepreneurial sector due to capital market frictions is
ε =
1ˆ
aa
BL(ait+1)dait+1 −
1ˆ
a†
[
BB(ait+1)−F (ait+1)
]
dait+1, (E.16)
10Excluded entrepreneurs are defined as those workers’ descendants that would have joined the entrepreneurial sector
either in absence of capital markets or in the case of capital markets perfectly operating, but they are not in the case of
capital market imperfections. Specifically, in the former cases, all workers’ descendants with ability ait+1 ≥ aa would have
joined the entrepreneurial sector. Part of this mass is ‘excluded’ from the entrepreneurial sector when capital markets are
imperfectly operating.
11The proofs for the complete general equilibrium are available upon request. In particular, it can be shown that there
exists a unique combination of wage and price that clears both the markets for labor and firms and that the general equi-
librium effects produced by the labor market reinforce those arising in the market for firms.
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where a† ≡ ait+1 : BB(ait+1) = F (ait+1).12
Since capital market frictions do not directly affect the occupational choices of parent entrepreneurs,
the supply of business licenses is qualitatively unchanged with respect to the cases of no or perfect
capital markets: specifically, LS = n(aa − aφ), with aφ and aa given by thresholds in equations (E.4)
and (E.5). By contrast, capital market imperfections restrict the demand for licenses by workers’ de-
scendants, which is equal to LD = (1− n)(1− aa − ε), where aa and ε are from equations (E.5) and
(E.16). Therefore, the equilibrium in the market for firms is
aa = (1− n)(1− ε) + n aφ. (E.17)
As the threshold aa is a one-to-one function of p (see equation (E.5)), we can solve equation (E.17)
for aa and recover the equilibrium price of the business license. Maintaining the assumption that the
growth rate is defined by the fraction of firms in the population using entrepreneurial human capital,
the growth rate is given by
g = n(1− aa) + (1− n)(1− aa − ε) = 1− aa − (1− n)ε. (E.18)
Proposition E.2. A unique price p∗ exists such that the market for firms clears. For any φ < φ < 1,
the equilibrium is characterized by a positive number of business license exchanges. Moreover, there exists a
threshold φ < φ such that:
(a) for any φ ∈
(
φ, φ
)
, family firms are polarized into badly and well managed enterprises: the former are
conducted by the least talented entrepreneurs’ descendants, with an innate talent ai ≤ aφ, continuing
the family business by relying on the managerial value of the family specific human capital; the latter are
conducted by the most talented descendants, with an innate talent ai ≥ aa, by relying on entrepreneurial
human capital. A share n(aa − aφ) of family firms is sold in the market to (1− n)(1− aa − ε) workers’
descendants who start a new enterprise;
(b) for any φ ≤ φ, parent entrepreneurs with descendants of innate talent ai < aφ sell the firm in the
market, such that all the firms in the economy, both family and non-family, are well managed by using
entrepreneurial human capital.
Capital market imperfections tend to strengthen the weight of family firms, especially of those
badly managed by low talented heirs, and exacerbate the misallocation effects induced by the man-
agerial value of the family specific human capital.
Proposition E.3. The stronger the capital market imperfections (∆R), (i) the larger the share of family firms
and of those managed using family specific human capital; (ii) the lower the overall share of firms managed
by entrepreneurial human capital; (iii) the lower the number of firm sales; (iv) the lower the growth rate of
aggregate technology.
By forcing a share of highly talented descendants of workers not to join the entrepreneurial sector,
capital market imperfections have direct and indirect detrimental effects in the market for firms, and
ultimately on the growth rate of the economy. The reduction in the growth rate produces additional
general equilibrium effects. First, it heightens the productivity of the family specific human capital
12Using F (.) from (E.13) and BB(.) from (E.14), and given the assumptions RB > RL and RL < 1/(1− γ), it results that
a† ≡ ait+1 : wt+1ait+1 + RL p = pit+1(ait+1)
1
α ∆ˆR, where ∆ˆR = (RL)
γ
[
(RB)
1−γ − γ (RL)1−γ
]
/[(1− γ)RB] < 1, and a† > aa.
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and increases the share of family firms using crony management practices. Second, the adjustments
in the market for firms generate a decrease in the share of highly talented descendants managing
an enterprise, further depressing the aggregate growth rate. These two effects unambiguously in-
crease the managerial value of the family specific human capital and the share of crony family firms,
decreasing the supply of firms’ license and rebalancing the market for firms. Finally, it is worth
emphasizing the substitution role played by family firms when capital markets work imperfectly.
Indeed, in this case the share of highly talented heirs continuing the family firms becomes greater
than that of the highly talented workers’ descendants starting new enterprises, and the role of family
firms in sustaining the aggregate growth rate of the economy becomes stronger.
E.3 Market for managers
The market for managers, if not characterized itself by any further distortions (i.e., moral hazard,
asymmetric information), can mitigate and counterbalance the aggregate negative effects of capital
market imperfections. When capital markets are imperfect, wealth-constrained workers’ descen-
dants have to sustain a higher cost, equal to RB p, to obtain a firm’s license and a share of them is
forced not to join the entrepreneurial sector. If a market for managers opens up, these workers’ de-
scendants can access the entrepreneurial sector by being appointed to the helm of family companies
as professional managers. Since in equilibrium the dividend paid to entrepreneurs’ descendants is
equal to the license price, the participation constraint for the wealth-constrained generation is no
longer binding and they strictly prefer to supply their entrepreneurial human capital as professional
managers rather than buy a license at the penalty cost RB p. As a result, the existence of a market for
managers can restore the aggregate equilibrium under perfect capital markets.
E.4 Proofs for Appendix E
Proof of Proposition E.1 It derives using equations (E.4)-(E.5) and equations (E.13)-(E.14)-(E.15).
Proof of Proposition E.2 Using eqs. (E.4)-(E.5), aφ can be expressed as a function of aa as
aφ =
pi(φ(1− g)) 1α
w
−
(
pi(aa)
1
α − waa
w
)
(E.19)
Substituting eqs. (E.18) and (E.19) in eq. (E.17), the equilibrium in the market for firms is given
by the threshold aa that solves the implicit equation
P(aa) = aa − 1+ ε∗ + npi
(1− n)w
[
(aa)
1
α − φ 1α (aa + (1− n)ε∗) 1α
]
= 0 (E.20)
where ε∗ is the equilibrium share of excluded entrepreneurs on the balanced growth path, derived as
follows. At each time t, the share of excluded entrepreneurs ε in (E.16) is a function of the equilibrium
wage rate both at time t and t + 1, because the occupational choices of the workers’ descendants
(generation t + 1) depend on both their prospective wage income wt+1, and on the wealth of their
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parent workers which is a function of wt. Formally, rewrite ε from eq. (E.16) as:
ε =
1´
aa
B˜L(ai)dai −
1´
a†
[B˜B(ai)− F˜ (ai)] dai
ξwt
(E.21)
where [B˜L, B˜B , F˜ ] = ξwt[BL,BB ,F ] are the loci in (E.13) and (E.14) on the balanced growth path.
Since wt = wt+1/(1+ g) holds on the balanced growth path, using (E.18):
ε∗ =
(2− aa)ε˜
ξw + (1− n)ε˜ (E.22)
where, to simplify notation, ε˜ =
´ 1
aa B˜L(ai)dai −
´ 1
a†
[B˜B(ai)− F˜ (ai)] dai, and w is the equilibrium
wage on the balanced growth path.
The existence of a unique threshold aa, and hence a unique price p∗ that clears the market for
firms derives from equation (E.20), by noting that P(0) < 0 and that
∂P(aa)
∂aa
= 1+
∂ε∗
∂aa
+
npi
(1− n)αw
[
(aa)
1
α−1 − φ 1α (aa + (1− n)ε∗) 1α−1
(
1+ (1− n) ∂ε
∗
∂aa
)]
> 0 (E.23)
since
∂ε∗
∂aa
= −
[
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜) ε˜+ ξw(2− aa)U˜ (aa)]
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜)2 ∈ (−1, 0) (E.24)
and, whenever it exists, aa > φ(1− g) = φ (aa + (1− n)ε∗) as we are focusing on equilibria with
positive exchanges of licenses for which 0 ≤ aφ < φ(1− g) < aa < 1 must hold. Formally, we first
note that aa < 1 always holds since P(1) =
npi(1− φ 1α )
(1− n)w > 0 derives from using ε
∗(aa = 1) = 0.
Further, there exists a φ < 1 implicitly defined by φ = aa/ (aa + (1− n)ε∗), with an aa solution of
(E.20), such that for any φ < φ, aφ < φ(1− g) < aa is verified.
Finally, we can characterize the equilibrium as in the basic model depending on the productivity
of the the family specific human capital. In particular, it exists a φ < φ, with φ implicitly defined by
aφ = 0 from eq. (E.19), such that for any φ > φ the equilibrium is characterized by the polarization in
the managerial talent of family firms; otherwise, for any φ ≤ φ parent owners of least talented heirs
choose to sell also the naφ family firms in the market.
Proof of Proposition E.3 Let us start by proving that the erosion effect 1− g is increasing in the
borrowing rate RB, while keeping the lending rate RL constant such that the spread between the two
increases. Formally, from equations (E.18) and (E.22) it follows that 1− g = aa + (1− n)ε∗. Hence,
d(1− g)
dRB
=
ξw
[
daa
dRB
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜) + (1− n)(2− aa) dε˜dRB
]
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜)2 . (E.25)
Using eq. (E.20),
daa
dRB
= −∂P(a
a)/∂RB
∂P(aa)/∂aa
, (E.26)
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with ∂P(aa)/∂aa given in (E.23) and
∂P(aa)
∂RB
= − ξw(2− a
a)
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜)2
[
1− npiφ
1
α
αw
(aa + (1− n)ε∗) 1α−1
] 1ˆ
a†
∂Λ(ai)
∂RB
dai, (E.27)
where Λ(ai) = B˜B(ai)− F˜ (ai), ∂Λ(ai)/∂RB < 0 and Λ(a†) = 0 by construction.
Further, using ε˜ =
´ 1
aa B˜L(ai)dai −
´ 1
a† Λ(a
i)dai
dε˜
dRB
= −B˜L(aa) da
a
dRB
−
1ˆ
a†
∂Λ(ai)
∂RB
dai (E.28)
Finally, substituting (E.26) and (E.28) in (E.25) and rearranging using also (E.24), it results that:
d(1− g)
dRB
> 0 if 1− pi(a
a)
1
α−1
αw
< 0
which is always verified since, from the definition of aa in eq. (E.5), for any positive equilibrium price
aa > (w/pi)α/(1−α).
Clearly, since the erosion effect 1− g is increasing in the degree of capital market imperfections
(i.e., RB), the growth rate g is inversely correlated with it. Moreover, since 1− g = aa + (1− n)ε∗,
from the equilibrium condition in eq. (E.17) it follows that the threshold aφ is also increasing in RB,
which implies that the stronger the capital market imperfections the larger is the share of crony family
firms managed through family specific human capital. Observing that for any given aa the mass of
family firms managed through entrepreneurial human capital, 1− aa, is always larger than the mass
of non-family firms, 1− aa− ε∗, it also follows that the overall share of family firms ν f = aφ+ 1− aa is
increasing while that of non-family firms, νn f = ((1− n)/n)(1− aa − ε∗), is decreasing in the degree
of capital market imperfections. Formally, to prove that the share of non-family (resp., family) firms
is decreasing (resp., increasing) in RB, it suffices to check that
d(aa + ε∗)
dRB
=
daa
dRB
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜) (ξw− nε˜) + ξw(2− aa) dε˜dRB
(ξw + (1− n)ε˜)2 > 0, (E.29)
which is always verified after using eqs. (E.26) and (E.28).
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Appendix F. Data and additional empirical results
F.1 Data source
F.1.1 Firm level variables: World Management Survey (WMS)
Management and ownership data are from the World Management Survey (WMS) by Nicholas
Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen. The survey covers over 10,000 manufacturing firms,
operating in different industrial sectors, across 21 countries over the period from 2001 to 2012. For
details, see Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Management quality The quality of management practices (Management) is measured by averag-
ing the interview-based evaluations of 18 specific management practices employed by the firms,
covering three key areas of business organization: performance monitoring, targets and incentives.
Questions on monitoring try to capture “how well organizations monitor what goes on inside the
firm, and use this information for continuous improvement”. Questions on targets focus on how
“organizations set the right targets, track the right outcomes, and take appropriate action if the two
are inconsistent”. Finally, questions on incentives map whether “organizations promote and reward
employees based on performance, and try to keep their best employees”. To each managerial practice
a score is assigned from 1 (“worst practice”) to 5 (“best practice”) and Management quality is the firm
average of each individual question score.
Family firm Dummy equal to one if the firm is a family firm type. Family firms are identified
as those firms in which the descendants in the second generation or beyond from the founder are
the largest shareholders with at least 25% of equity. In the non-family-firm category, we include all
the types of private firms, while excluding government companies. The non-family firm category
includes public firms owned by the founder, firms owned by managers or private individuals, firms
with dispersed shareholders, and firms owned by private equity.
Family CEO Dummy equal to one if the family firm is managed by a family member CEO.
External CEO Dummy equal to one if the family firm is managed by a CEO external to the family.
Firm size Ln (Number of firm employees). Interviewee’s answer to question “How many people
are in the firm?”
Education (managers) Ln (1+% of managers with a college degree). Interviewee’s answer to ques-
tion “What percentage of managers have a college degree?’. This question refers to 3/4-year equiva-
lent college degrees.”
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Education (non-managers) Ln (1+% of non-managers with a college degree). Interviewee’s answer
to question “What percentage of non-managers have a college degree?’. This question refers to 3/4-
year equivalent college degrees.”
Multinational Dummy equal to one if the firm is owned by a multinational. A firm is owned by
a multinational when 1) the firm itself owns production sites in a foreign country, 2) when at least
25% of the company belongs to a multinational industrial group (i.e. a group with production sites
abroad). In this case the firm would be a subsidiary of a foreign MNE, or 3) when the firm is a joint
venture between multinationals of two or more countries.
Managers left Ln (1+ % managers who left the firm in the 12 months before the interview). Inter-
viewee’s answer to question “What percentage of managers have left in the last 12 months?”.
Noise controls Interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of
the year dummies.
F.1.2 Country variables
Individualism is the index of individualism proposed by the Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofst-
ede (Hofstede et al., 2010). Individualism combines responses to 14 questions from a survey about
work goals initially conducted between 1969 and 1971 by interviewing over 100,000 employees of
IBM International working in subsidiaries in 40 countries and then extended over the years to 40
other countries through replications and extensions of the IBM survey on different international
populations like commercial airline pilots. Individualism ranges from 0 (strongly collectivistic) to 100
(strongly individualistic) and amounts to the first factor score from the factor analysis of the countries
mean scores for the 14 survey questions. Source: Hofstede et al. (2010); data are publicly available at
http://geerthofstede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/.
Freedom of choice Freedom of choice and control measures the degree that the individual experi-
ences a freedom of choice and a sense of control of one’s life. It is computed as the country average
of the individuals’ answer to question A173 in the World Value Survey 1981-2014: “Some people feel
they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we
do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means
“none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life
you have over the way your life turns out.”
Family Ties (unimportance) measures the strength of family ties and captures beliefs regarding
the importance of the family in the respondent’s life, the duties and responsibilities of parents and
children, and the love and respect for one’s own parents (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014). It is measured
by extracting the first principal component from three variables of the 1981-2014 waves of the World
Values Survey. Higher values mean lower importance of family ties. The first question assesses how
important the family is in a person’s life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1 being very important
and 4 not at all important). The second question asks whether the respondent agrees with one of two
statements (taking the values of 1 and 2 respectively): (1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults
of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them; (2) One does not have the duty to respect
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and love parents who have not earned it. The third question prompts respondents to agree with one
of the following statements (again taking the values of 1 or 2 respectively): (1) It is the parents’ duty
to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; (2) Parents have a life
of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well being for the sake of their children.
Institutional Quality is the first principal component of the 2000-2005 average of the six measures
of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010), with higher values
indicating better functioning institutions.
Corruption is the 2000-2005 average of the Control of Corruption indicator from Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators; it measures the perception of the control of corruption and it ranges between
-2.5 and +2.5, with higher values meaning perception of stronger control of corruption and hence,
potentially, lower corruption.
Rule of Law is the 2000-2005 average of the Rule of Law indicator from Worldwide Governance
Indicators; it reflects the effectiveness of the judiciary and the quality of property rights protection,
ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values indicating better institutions.
Barrier to entry index is the first principal component of the 2004-2005 average of the following
measures: Starting business procedure (number), Ln(1+ Starting business time (days)), Ln(1+ Start-
ing business cost (% of income per capita)), Ln(1+ Enforcing contracts time (days)), Ln(1+ Enforcing
contracts cost (% claim)), Ln(1+ Paying taxes (number per year)), Ln(1+ Paying taxes time (hours per
year)), Ln(1+ Paying taxes time (total tax rate % of profit)). Source: Doing Business (World Bank).
Financial development is the 2000-2005 average of domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
Year of Industrial Transition (YIT) measures the year in which employment in industry exceeded
employment in agriculture. Source: Bentzen et al. (2013).
Not industrialized in t Dummy equal to one if the country in year t has not yet industrialized
according to the YIT measure.
No Pronoun Drop Dummy equal to one if the rule forbidding first person pronoun drop is opera-
tive and zero otherwise. Source: Tabellini (2008).
Generic diversity is “the expected heterozygosity (genetic diversity) of a country’s population,
predicted by migratory distances from East Africa (i.e., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) to the year 1500 CE
locations of the ancestral populations of the country’s component ethnic groups in 2000 CE, as well
as by pairwise migratory distances between these ancestral populations”. Source: Ashraf and Galor
(2013).
Ln (per capita GDP) is the log of the 2000-2005 average real ($PPP) GDP per capita. Source: Penn
World Table (PWT) Version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013).
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Human capital is the 2000-2005 average of the years of schooling. Source: Barro-Lee v.1.3 (Barro
and Lee, 2010).
Capital endowment is the 2000-2005 average of the capital stock per worker. Source: Penn World
Table (PWT) Version 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2013).
Trust is the fraction of individuals within a given country that, from the 1981-2014 waves of the
World Values Survey, responded with “Most people can be trusted” when answering the survey ques-
tion “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?”.
Ethnic and Linguistic Fractionalization are taken from Alesina et al. (2003) and measure the prob-
ability that two randomly-selected individuals in a country’s population belong to different ethnic or
linguistic groups.
Communitarian Family, Autoritarian Family, Egalitarian nuclear Family, Absolute nuclear Family
A set of dummy variables that identifies the structure of the families.
Absolute nuclear is a type of family based on no cohabitation of parents and adult children: chil-
dren leave their family after their adolescence, form their own family and become independent indi-
viduals. There are also no specified rules for inheritance and marriage relationships are exogamous.
Anglo-Saxon countries, Holland and Denmark belong to this group.
Egalitarian nuclear is a type of family in which we still observe no cohabitation of parents and
adult children, and exogamy, but the independence among generations is weaker than in the previ-
ous case. More precise rules on inheritance are in place, based on the principle of equality among
siblings. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Romania, Poland, Latin America (apart from Cuba)
and Ethiopia belong to this group.
Stem family or authoritarian is a type of family based on cohabitation of parents and adult children.
Sons remain in their parents’ home and are subject to a vertical hierarchical structure. Rules and
social norms are strongly transmitted from one generation to the other. The principle of equality is
not recognized in this type of family. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Czech Republic, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Scotland, Ireland, Japan, Korea and Israel belong to this group.
Communitarian is a type of family based on cohabitation, with equality among siblings. Russia,
Yugoslavia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Albania, Baltic republics, Centre of Italy, China,
Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia and India belong to this group. Source: Todd (1983).
Executive constraints The 1960-2000 mean of the index, reported annually as a 7-point categorical
variable (from 1 to 7) by the Polity IV data set, quantifying the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decision-making power of chief executives. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Legal origins A set of dummy variables that identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or
Commercial Code of a country. The five legal origin possibilities are: (i) English Common Law, (ii)
French Commercial Code, (iii) German Commercial Code, (iv) Scandinavian Commercial Code, and
(v) Socialist or Communist Laws. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).
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Absolute latitude is the value of the latitude of a country’s approximate geodesic centroid, as re-
ported by the CIA’s World Factbook. Source: Ashraf and Galor (2013).
F.1.3 Industry sector variables
All variables are classified according to the 2-digit US SIC 1987 system.
R&D intensity is the 2000-2005 average of the R&D expenditures as a percentage of production in
the United States. Source: OECD STAN ANBERD database. The original data are classified according
to the ISIC system (rev. 3). We convert them to 2-digit US SIC 1987 using the International Concor-
dance table between the Industrial Classifications of the United Nations (ISIC Rev. 3) and the US
SIC 1987 systems. The table is available at: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
regot.asp?Lg=1.
Skill intensity is the 2000-2005 average of the ratio of non-production worker to total employment
in industry sector s in the United States. Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Database available at:
http://www.nber.org/data/nberces.html.
Capital intensity is the 2000-2005 average of the ratio of total real capital stock to value added
in industry sector s in the United States. Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Database available at:
http://www.nber.org/data/nberces.html.
Contract intensity Industry sector intensity in relationship-specific investments, computed as the
fraction of intermediate inputs that is not traded in a standardized market. Source: Nunn (2007).
The original data are classified according to BEA’s 1997 I-O classification system. We convert them
in 2-digit US SIC 1987, coverting them into the NAICS97 system, using the concordance table from
BEA, and then into the 2-digit US SIC 1987 using the concordance table from NAICS97 to US SIC
1987 from North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
Intangible intensity Industry sector intensity in intangible assets in the United States. Source:
Claessens and Laeven (2003).
External dependence Industry sector dependence on external finance, defined as capital expendi-
ture minus internal funds. Source: De Serres et al. (2006).
Value added is the 2000-2005 average of total value added over total employment in industry s in
the United States. Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Database available at: http://www.nber.
org/data/nberces.html.
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F.2 Tables
F.2.1 Full specifications
Table F.1: Management Quality and Productivity of Family Specific Human Capital
Management quality
OLS IV (second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Family firm -0.048∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.843∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.056) (0.217) (0.062) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.233) (0.064) (0.269)
Family firm × Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family firm × Freedom of choice 0.051 0.092∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.034)
Family firm × Family ties (unimportance) 0.105 0.104 0.109
(0.092) (0.075) (0.071)
Family firm × Institutional quality 0.013 0.039 0.033
(0.010) (0.030) (0.032)
Family firm × Barrier to entry index -0.010 0.039 0.031
(0.009) (0.026) (0.032)
Family firm × Financial development 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.153 0.154
Hansen overidentification test (p-value) 0.413 0.544
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 36.145 82.720
Anderson-Rubin (p-value) 0.000 0.000
The table reports the full specification of Table 1 including all coefficients. The dependent variable is the quality of management practices. OLS estimates
in columns (1)-(8). Second stage results of the instrumental variable estimates in columns (9)-(10), where Family x Individualism is instrumented with Genetic
Diversity from Ashraf and Galor (2013) and No Pronoun Drop from Tabellini (2008) interacted with Family (see Table F.7 for the first stage estimates). All
regressions include firm level and noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Firm controls
are: firm size, education of managers and non-managers, dummy for whether the firm is owned by a multinational and the % of managers who left the
firm in the 12 months before the interview. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of the year
dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Freedom of choice, Family ties (unimportance), Institutional quality, Barrier to entry index and Financial
development) are captured by the country fixed effects. The Stock-Yogo (2005) 10% critical value for the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 19.93 in both columns
(9) and (10). Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.2: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital within the family
Management quality
OLS IV (second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family CEO -0.073∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.956∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.066) (0.254) (0.067) (0.300)
External CEO 0.078∗∗ 0.026 -0.340 -0.064 -0.412
(0.030) (0.065) (0.345) (0.081) (0.342)
Family CEO × Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
External CEO × Individualism 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family CEO × Freedom of choice 0.099∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.034) (0.037)
External CEO × Freedom of choice 0.055 0.063
(0.042) (0.042)
Family CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 0.056 0.062
(0.077) (0.072)
External CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 0.162∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.082) (0.077)
Family CEO × Institutional quality 0.039 0.031
(0.032) (0.036)
External CEO × Institutional quality 0.065 0.071
(0.047) (0.043)
Family CEO × Barrier to entry index 0.049 0.039
(0.029) (0.037)
External CEO × Barrier to entry index 0.013 0.019
(0.034) (0.032)
Family CEO × Financial development 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
External CEO × Financial development -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm size 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.155 0.155
Hansen overidentification test (p-value) 0.691 0.191
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 14.726 11.583
Anderson-Rubin (p-value) 0.003 0.000
The table reports the full specification of Table 2 including all coefficients. The dependent variable is
the quality of management practices. OLS estimates in columns (1)-(3). Second stage results of the in-
strumental variable estimates in columns (4)-(5), where the interactions between Family CEO, External
CEO and Individualism are instrumented with Genetic Diversity from Ashraf and Galor (2013) and No
Pronoun Drop from Tabellini (2008) interacted with Family CEO and External CEO (see Table F.7 for the
first stage estimates). All regressions include firm level and noise controls, country and industry-sector
fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Firm level controls are: firm size, educa-
tion of managers and non-managers, dummy for whether the firm is owned by a multinational and the
% of managers who left the firm in the 12 months before the interview. Noise controls are: interviewer
dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of the year dummies. Country
level variables (i.e., Individualism, Freedom of choice, Family ties (unimportance), Institutional quality, Bar-
rier to entry index and Financial development) are captured by the country fixed effects. The Stock-Yogo
(2005) 10% critical value for the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, is 7.56 in both columns (4) and (5). Robust
standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.3: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is:
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individualism -0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Freedom of choice 0.163 0.036
(0.115) (0.074)
Family ties (unimportance) -0.214 -0.001
(0.178) (0.111)
Institutional quality -0.036 0.026
(0.041) (0.032)
Barrier to entry index 0.007 0.036
(0.048) (0.033)
Financial development 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Human capital -0.018 0.022
(0.024) (0.016)
Absolute latitude 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.002)
Average firm size -0.132∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022)
Observations 290 290 290 290
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.267 0.233 0.271
The table reports the full specification of Table 3 including all coefficients. The depen-
dent variables are the percentage of family firms below the 40th (Low) and above the 60th
(High) percentile of management quality distribution. The units of analysis are country-
industry observations for 21 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). All regressions
include continent and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at country level; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.4: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms, country-industry analysis
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is: Std. Dev.
Low High Low High Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Human capital × Skill intensity -0.001 0.063 0.010
(0.095) (0.087) (0.083)
Capital endowment × Capital intensity 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial development × External dependence 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional quality × Contract intensity 0.074 -0.055 -0.034
(0.066) (0.056) (0.060)
Barrier to entry index × Intangible intensity 0.007 -0.005 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Average firm size -0.123∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗∗
(0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 290 290 290 290 240 240
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.348 0.303 0.341 0.061 0.041
The table reports the full specification of Table 4 including all coefficients. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(4) are the
percentage of family firms below the 40th (Low) and above the 60th (High) percentile of management quality distribution. The
dependent variable in columns (5)-(6) is the standard deviation of the management quality of the family firms by country-industry.
The units of analysis are country-industry observations for 21 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). All regressions include
country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-industry level; *** p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.5: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital by Industrialization Stage
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family firm -0.047∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.056) (0.027) (0.064) (0.065)
Family firm × Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family firm × Not industrialized -0.096∗∗∗ -0.049 0.155
(0.031) (0.033) (0.096)
Family firm × Not industrialized × Individualism -0.005∗∗
(0.002)
Firm size 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.257∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 7950 7950 7950 7950 7950
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.368 0.367 0.368 0.368
The table reports the full specification of Table 5 including all coefficients. The dependent variable is the
quality of management practices. Not industrialized is a dummy equal 1 if a country is not yet industrialized
by 2005 and zero otherwise, according to the YIT measure (Bentzen et al., 2013). Data on the timing of
industrialization for Singapore are missing. All regressions include firm level and noise controls, country
and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Firm controls are: firm
size, education of managers and non-managers, dummy for whether the firm is owned by a multinational
and the percentage of managers who left the firm in the 12 months before the interview. Noise controls
are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of the year dummies.
Country level variables (i.e., Individualism and Not industrialized) are captured by the country fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.6: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms by Industrialization Stage
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is:
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Not industrialized Industrialized Not industrialized Industrialized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001 0.002 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.009 0.004 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Human capital × Skill intensity -0.877 -0.018 0.026 0.056
(0.841) (0.430) (0.145) (0.132)
Capital endowment × Capital intensity 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial development × External dependence 0.005 -0.006∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional quality × Contract intensity 0.090 -0.080 0.053 -0.047
(1.121) (0.530) (0.083) (0.079)
Barrier to entry index × Intangible intensity -0.078 0.001 0.010 -0.001
(0.047) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
Average firm size -0.027 0.132 -0.130∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.033 0.235 -0.128∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.131) (0.030) (0.021) (0.378) (0.170) (0.031) (0.021)
Observations 35 35 249 249 35 35 249 249
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.257 0.296 0.331 0.050 0.185 0.284 0.321
The table reports the full specification of Table 6 including all coefficients. The dependent variables are the percentage of family firms
below the 40th (Low) and above the 60th (High) percentile of management quality distribution. The units of analysis are country-
industry observations for 20 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). Not industrialized and industrialized indicate countries not
yet and already industrialized by 2005. Data on the timing of industrialization for Singapore are missing. All regressions include
country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country × industry sector; *** p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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F.2.2 First stage estimates
Table F.7: Instrumental variable estimates – First Stage
Dependent variable is: Individualism ×
Family firm Family CEO External CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family firm × No Pronoun Drop 37.260∗∗∗ 32.407∗∗
(6.026) (13.495)
Family firm × Genetic diversity 248.706∗ 329.533∗∗
(141.843) (130.196)
Family CEO × No Pronoun Drop 37.558∗∗∗ 32.638∗∗ 0.044 -0.151
(6.012) (13.250) (0.094) (0.124)
Family CEO × Genetic diversity 245.884† 322.690∗∗ -0.028 1.270
(145.719) (129.868) (1.925) (1.728)
External CEO × No Pronoun Drop 0.554 -1.121 35.162∗∗∗ 34.647∗∗
(0.615) (1.001) (6.809) (16.509)
External CEO × Genetic diversity -0.012 -1.514 266.912∗ 374.793∗∗∗
(12.027) (16.240) (130.299) (125.791)
Family firm -135.984 -117.035
(99.481) (109.469)
Family firm × Freedom of choice -9.358
(6.737)
Family firm × Family ties (unimportance) -11.065
(8.230)
Family firm × Institutional quality -11.177∗∗∗
(2.541)
Family firm × Barrier to entry index -9.795∗∗∗
(3.314)
Family firm × Financial development 0.062
(0.065)
Family CEO -134.032 -110.408 0.061 -1.779
(102.300) (107.010) (1.329) (1.221)
External CEO 0.105 -0.065 -148.919 -161.110
(8.653) (15.422) (90.437) (118.093)
Family CEO × Freedom of choice -9.579 0.121
(6.711) (0.084)
External CEO × Freedom of choice 0.143 -7.768
(0.686) (7.928)
Family CEO × Family ties (unimportance) -11.164 0.180
(8.386) (0.140)
External CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 1.261 -15.096
(1.501) (10.841)
Family CEO × Institutional quality -11.389∗∗∗ 0.025
(2.634) (0.033)
External CEO × Institutional quality -0.138 -9.571∗∗∗
(0.434) (2.644)
Family CEO × Barrier to entry index -9.940∗∗∗ 0.023
(3.417) (0.036)
External CEO × Barrier to entry index -0.053 -8.724∗∗
(0.439) (3.625)
Family CEO × Financial development 0.063 0.001
(0.063) (0.001)
External CEO × Financial development 0.013 0.021
(0.013) (0.102)
Firm size -0.041 -0.033 -0.006 -0.035 -0.028 0.001
(0.049) (0.025) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032) (0.014)
Education (managers) 0.029 0.059 0.018 0.053 0.013 0.007
(0.071) (0.052) (0.047) (0.039) (0.034) (0.020)
Education (non-managers) 0.010 -0.040 0.027 -0.034∗ -0.018 -0.008
(0.042) (0.027) (0.032) (0.019) (0.022) (0.013)
Multinational 0.295 0.106 0.274∗ 0.145 0.028 -0.045
(0.179) (0.117) (0.143) (0.089) (0.084) (0.040)
Managers left -0.022 -0.019 -0.017 -0.024 -0.003 0.005
(0.044) (0.023) (0.049) (0.026) (0.019) (0.010)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.987 0.972 0.986 0.972 0.987
Columns (1)-(2) report the first stage results of the IV estimates in col. (9)-(10) of Table 1 (see also Table F.1), while
columns (3)-(6) those for col. (4)-(5) of Table 2 (see also Table F.2). Dependent variables are Family x Individualism
in columns (1)-(2), Family CEO x Individualism in columns (3)-(4) and External CEO x Individualism in columns (5)-(6).
All regressions include noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends, year
dummies. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of
the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Freedom of choice, Family ties (unimportance), Institutional
quality, Barrier to entry index and Financial development) are captured by the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; † p = .107.
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F.2.3 Robustness
Table F.8: Management Quality and Productivity of Family Specific Human Capital: one-by-one
specification
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family firm -0.585∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.113∗∗
(0.200) (0.021) (0.031) (0.026) (0.041)
Family firm × Freedom of choice 0.077∗∗
(0.028)
Family firm × Family ties (unimportance) 0.156∗
(0.084)
Family firm × Institutional quality 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009)
Family firm × Barrier to entry index -0.025∗∗∗
(0.008)
Family firm × Financial development 0.001∗
(0.000)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.367 0.367 0.368 0.368 0.367
The table reports the one-by-one specification of Table 1 for the base country controls. The de-
pendent variable is the quality of management practices. All regressions include noise controls,
country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Noise
controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of
the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Freedom of choice, Family ties (unim-
portance), Institutional quality, Barrier to entry index and Financial development) are captured by the
country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.9: Management Quality and Productivity of Family Specific Human Capital: other country
variables (one-by-one)
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Family firm -0.203∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.049 -0.042 0.033 -0.156∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.063) (0.047) (0.034) (0.028) (0.080) (0.027)
Family firm × Human capital 0.018∗∗∗
(0.006)
Family firm × Trust 0.283
(0.179)
Family firm × Ethnic fractionalization 0.006
(0.112)
Family firm × Language fractionalization -0.022
(0.101)
Family firm × Communitarian Family -0.168∗∗∗
(0.030)
Family firm × Authoritarian Family -0.013
(0.078)
Family firm × Egalitarian nuclear Family -0.137∗∗∗
(0.040)
Family firm × Executive constraints 0.018
(0.014)
Family firm × Legal origin (British) -0.139∗∗∗
(0.031)
Family firm × Legal origin (French) -0.233∗∗∗
(0.045)
Family firm × Legal origin (German) -0.067
(0.087)
Family firm × Legal origin (Scandinavian) -0.135∗∗∗
(0.041)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.254∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 7950 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.368 0.367 0.368
The table reports the effect of other country variables on the management gap of family and non-family firms. The
dependent variable is the quality of management practices. All regressions include noise controls, country and industry-
sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s
tenure and seniority, day of month and month of the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Human capital, Trust,
Ethnic fractionalization, Language fractionalization, Communitarian, Authoritarian and Egalitarian Family, Excecutive constraints
and Legal origins dummies) are captured by the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in
parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.10: Management Quality and Productivity of Family Specific Human Capital: Individualism
and other country variables
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Family firm -0.242∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.129∗∗ -0.039
(0.060) (0.057) (0.066) (0.063) (0.120) (0.061) (0.065)
Family firm × Individualism 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family firm × Human capital 0.007
(0.007)
Family firm × Trust -0.159
(0.163)
Family firm × Ethnic fractionalization 0.026
(0.087)
Family firm × Language fractionalization -0.025
(0.060)
Family firm × Communitarian Family -0.128∗
(0.061)
Family firm × Authoritarian Family 0.010
(0.083)
Family firm × Egalitarian nuclear Family -0.092
(0.071)
Family firm × Executive constraints -0.025
(0.016)
Family firm × Legal origin (British) -0.181∗∗∗
(0.035)
Family firm × Legal origin (French) -0.184∗∗∗
(0.053)
Family firm × Legal origin (German) -0.070
(0.073)
Family firm × Legal origin (Scandinavian) -0.162∗∗∗
(0.042)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
Managers left 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 7950 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368 0.368
The table reports the robustness of Individualism to the other country variables in Table F.9. The dependent variable is the
quality of management practices. All regressions include noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-
specific time trends and year dummies. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of
month and month of the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Human capital, Trust, Ethnic fractional-
ization, Language fractionalization, Communitarian, Authoritarian and Egalitarian Family, Excecutive constraints and Legal origins
dummies) are captured by the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; ***
p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.13: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital within the family: one-by-one
specification
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family CEO -0.611∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.024) (0.036) (0.030) (0.046)
External CEO -0.212 0.068∗∗∗ 0.006 0.053∗ 0.066
(0.462) (0.020) (0.038) (0.030) (0.065)
Family CEO × Freedom of choice 0.077∗∗
(0.030)
External CEO × Freedom of choice 0.041
(0.066)
Family CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 0.108
(0.091)
External CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 0.269∗∗∗
(0.065)
Family CEO × Institutional quality 0.027∗∗
(0.010)
External CEO × Institutional quality 0.029∗
(0.014)
Family CEO × Barrier to entry index -0.024∗∗
(0.010)
External CEO × Barrier to entry index -0.018
(0.013)
Family CEO × Financial development 0.001∗∗
(0.000)
External CEO × Financial development 0.000
(0.001)
Firm size 0.123∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.368 0.368 0.369 0.369 0.368
The table reports the one-by-one specification of Table 2 for the base country controls. The dependent
variable is the quality of management practices. All regressions include noise controls, country and
industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year dummies. Noise controls are: in-
terviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of the year dummies.
Country level variables (i.e., Freedom of choice, Family ties (unimportance), Institutional quality, Barrier to
entry index and Financial development) are captured by the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
62
Table F.14: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital within the family: two-by-two
specification
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family CEO -0.570∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.070) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
External CEO -0.199 0.053 0.046 0.102 0.025
(0.472) (0.053) (0.064) (0.059) (0.064)
Family CEO× Individualism 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
External CEO × Individualism 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family CEO× Freedom of choice 0.050
(0.032)
External CEO × Freedom of choice 0.033
(0.063)
Family CEO× Family ties (unimportance) 0.048
(0.100)
External CEO × Family ties (unimportance) 0.263∗∗∗
(0.067)
Family CEO× Institutional quality 0.007
(0.010)
External CEO × Institutional quality 0.037∗
(0.018)
Family CEO× Barrier to entry index -0.006
(0.010)
External CEO × Barrier to entry index -0.026∗
(0.014)
Family CEO× Financial development 0.000
(0.000)
External CEO × Financial development -0.000
(0.001)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Managers left 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369
The table reports the robustness of Individualism to the other base country controls in the two-by-
two specification. The dependent variable is the quality of management practices. All regressions
include noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends and year
dummies. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month
and month of the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Freedom of choice, Family
ties (unimportance), Institutional quality, Barrier to entry index and Financial development) are captured by
the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.15: Management Quality and Family Specific Human Capital within the family: Individualism and
other country variables
Management quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Family CEO -0.257∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.162∗∗ -0.070
(0.066) (0.068) (0.075) (0.076) (0.123) (0.076) (0.063)
External CEO -0.093 0.019 0.083 0.067 0.145 0.060 0.107
(0.119) (0.062) (0.074) (0.056) (0.108) (0.089) (0.104)
Family CEO × Individualism 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
External CEO × Individualism -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Family CEO × Human capital 0.003
(0.007)
External CEO × Human capital 0.023
(0.015)
Family CEO × Trust -0.205
(0.195)
External CEO × Trust 0.074
(0.241)
Family CEO × Ethnic fractionalization 0.071
(0.093)
External CEO × Ethnic fractionalization -0.189
(0.131)
Family CEO × Language fractionalization 0.007
(0.065)
External CEO × Language fractionalization -0.194∗∗∗
(0.065)
Family CEO × Communitarian family -0.123∗
(0.064)
External CEO × Communitarian family -0.206∗∗∗
(0.059)
Family CEO × Authoritarian family -0.023
(0.085)
External CEO × Authoritarian family 0.119∗
(0.062)
Family CEO × Egalitarian nuclear family -0.111
(0.071)
External CEO × Egalitarian nuclear family -0.052
(0.074)
Family CEO × Executive constraints -0.025
(0.018)
External CEO × Executive constraints -0.011
(0.034)
Family CEO × Legal origin (British) -0.158∗∗∗
(0.026)
External CEO × Legal origin (British) -0.177∗∗
(0.076)
Family CEO × Legal origin (French) -0.178∗∗∗
(0.053)
External CEO × Legal origin (French) -0.122
(0.074)
Family CEO × Legal origin (German) -0.077
(0.060)
External CEO × Legal origin (German) 0.033
(0.076)
Family CEO × Legal origin (Scandinavian) -0.165∗∗∗
(0.036)
External CEO × Legal origin (Scandinavian) -0.114
(0.075)
Firm size 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (managers) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (non-managers) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Multinational 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Managers left 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 2.286∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.331∗∗∗ 2.293∗∗∗ 4.041∗∗∗ 2.324∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.447) (0.442) (0.443) (0.302) (0.445) (0.445)
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214 7950 8214 8214
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369 0.369
The table reports the robustness of Individualism to other country variables. The dependent variable is the quality of manage-
ment practices. All regressions include noise controls, country and industry-sector fixed effects, country-specific time trends
and year dummies. Noise controls are: interviewer dummies, manager’s tenure and seniority, day of month and month of
the year dummies. Country level variables (i.e., Individualism, Human capital, Trust, Ethnic fractionalization, Language fraction-
alization, Communitarian, Authoritarian and Egalitarian Family, Excecutive constraints and Legal origins dummies) are captured by
the country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.19: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms. Country robustness. Other de-
pendent variable: 50th percentile (median) of management quality
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is below the median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Freedom of choice 0.019 0.010
(0.089) (0.115)
Family ties (unimportance) -0.238∗ -0.134
(0.123) (0.185)
Institutional quality -0.019 -0.044
(0.019) (0.049)
Barrier to entry index 0.006 -0.045
(0.014) (0.055)
Financial development -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Human capital -0.034∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.011) (0.025)
Absolute latitude -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Average firm size -0.117∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019)
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.270 0.250 0.245 0.249 0.278 0.253 0.283
The table reports the robustness of Individualism in the cross-country specification (see also Tables 3 and F.3) when
using as dependent variable the percentage of family firms below the 50th percentile (median) of management quality
distribution. The units of analysis are country-industry observations for 21 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC).
All regressions include continent and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
country level; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.24: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms. Country-industry robustness.
Other dependent variable: 50th percentile (median) of management quality
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is below the median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Human capital × Skill intensity 0.016 0.011
(0.085) (0.088)
Capital endowment × Capital intensity 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Financial development × External dependence 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Institutional quality × Contract intensity -0.028 -0.003
(0.054) (0.062)
Barrier to entry index × Intangible intensity 0.007 0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
Average firm size -0.112∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 290
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.372 0.371 0.371 0.373 0.364
The table reports the robustness of Individualism × R&D intensity in the country-industry specification (see also Tables 4 and
F.4) when using as dependent variable the percentage of family firms below the 50th percentile (median) of management quality
distribution. The units of analysis are country-industry observations for 21 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). All
regressions include country and industry sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-
industry level; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table F.25: Determinants of Management Quality of Family Firms by Industrialization Stage.
Country-industry robustness: other benchmark years
Percentage of family firms whose management quality is:
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Not industrialized Industrialized Not industrialized Industrialized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: benchmark year 1986
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.001 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001 -0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Human capital × Skill intensity -0.062 0.050 -0.017 0.103
(0.226) (0.114) (0.190) (0.176)
Capital endowment × Capital intensity -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial development × External dependence 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional quality × Contract intensity 0.061 -0.066 0.040 -0.026
(0.154) (0.068) (0.094) (0.094)
Barrier to entry index × Intangible intensity 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.009
(0.029) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Average firm size -0.115∗∗ 0.045 -0.139∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ -0.115∗ 0.045 -0.137∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.058) (0.032) (0.033) (0.025)
Observations 87 87 197 197 87 87 197 197
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.414 0.250 0.286 0.256 0.386 0.229 0.273
Panel B: benchmark year 1987
Individualism × R&D intensity -0.000 0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.003 0.002 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Human capital × Skill intensity -0.334 0.140 -0.060 0.118
(0.291) (0.153) (0.183) (0.164)
Capital endowment × Capital intensity 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial development × External dependence 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional quality × Contract intensity 0.073 -0.071 0.045 -0.018
(0.217) (0.094) (0.089) (0.093)
Barrier to entry index × Intangible intensity -0.040∗∗ 0.009 0.002 0.007
(0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Average firm size -0.106∗ 0.030 -0.125∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ -0.096 0.026 -0.124∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.053) (0.032) (0.022) (0.060) (0.060) (0.033) (0.023)
Constant 1.372∗∗∗ -0.229 1.228∗∗∗ -0.315 2.374∗∗ -0.625 1.353∗ -0.454
(0.418) (0.316) (0.268) (0.223) (0.991) (0.597) (0.770) (0.633)
Observations 69 69 215 215 69 69 215 215
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.406 0.270 0.318 0.449 0.349 0.250 0.309
The table reports the robustness of Individualism× R&D intensity in the country-industry specification when using different benchmark
years for distinguishing between industrialized and not industrialized countries (see also Table 6). The dependent variables are the
percentage of family firms below the 40th (Low) and above the 60th (High) percentile of management quality distribution. The units
of analysis are country-industry observations for 20 countries and 20 industries (2-digit US SIC). Not industrialized and industrialized
indicate countries not yet and already industrialized by year 1986 (Panel A) or 1987 (Panel B). Data on the timing of industrialization for
Singapore are missing. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at country × industry sector; *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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F.2.4 Summary Statistics
Table F.26: Summary statistics: Firm level sample
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Firm variables (WMS)
Management quality 8214 2.937 0.678 1.000 4.889
Family firm 8214 0.180 0.385 0.000 1.000
Family CEO 8214 0.151 0.359 0.000 1.000
External CEO 8214 0.029 0.168 0.000 1.000
Firm size 8214 5.844 1.155 0.000 12.078
Education (managers) 8214 3.725 1.146 0.000 4.615
Education (non-managers) 8214 1.600 1.355 0.000 4.615
Multinational 8214 0.465 0.499 0.000 1.000
Managers left 8214 0.995 1.258 0.000 4.615
Country variables
Individualism 8214 59.871 25.604 20 91
Freedom of choice 8214 7.066 0.493 5.776 7.869
Family ties (unimportance) 8214 0.011 0.256 -0.392 0.638
Institutional quality 8214 2.267 1.901 -1.239 4.376
Barrier to entry index 8214 -1.389 2.239 -4.910 2.362
Financial development 8214 94.485 49.142 15.896 200.732
Year of industrial transition (YIT) 7950 1940.037 64.223 1801 2005
Genetic diversity 8214 0.718 0.017 0.667 0.742
No Pronoun Drop 8214 0.505 0.493 0.000 1.000
Ln (per capita GDP) 8214 9.774 0.881 7.841 10.632
Human capital 8214 9.068 2.684 3.781 13.096
Capital endowment 8214 132041.005 76529.407 10360.698 249579.063
Trust 8214 0.343 0.139 0.077 0.648
Ethnic fractionalization 8214 0.269 0.194 0.012 0.712
Language fractionalization 8214 0.223 0.230 0.018 0.807
Communitarian family 7950 0.173 0.378 0.000 1.000
Authoritarian family 7950 0.137 0.344 0.000 1.000
Egalitarian nuclear family 7950 0.334 0.472 0.000 1.000
Absolute nuclear family 7950 0.355 0.479 0.000 1.000
Executive constraints 8214 5.685 1.678 2.537 7.000
Legal origin (British) 8214 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (French) 8214 0.287 0.453 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (Socialist) 8214 0.108 0.310 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (German) 8214 0.069 0.253 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (Scandinavian) 8214 0.045 0.208 0.000 1.000
Absolute latitude 8214 37.614 15.593 1.367 62
Corruption 8214 1.090 1.022 -0.499 2.353
Rule of law 8214 0.959 0.838 -0.649 1.837
Starting business procedure (number) 8214 8.736 4.188 2.000 17.000
Ln(1+Starting business time (days)) 8214 3.264 1.097 1.386 5.056
Ln(1+Starting business cost (% of income per capita)) 8214 1.894 1.231 0.182 3.960
Ln(1+Enforcing contracts time (days)) 8214 6.224 0.539 4.796 7.259
Ln(1+Enforcing contracts cost (% of claim)) 8214 3.101 0.373 2.493 3.704
Ln(1+Paying taxes (# per year)) 8214 2.750 0.694 1.792 4.143
Ln(1+Paying taxes time (hours per year)) 8214 5.556 0.906 3.912 7.864
Ln(1+Paying taxes (total tax rate % of profit)) 8214 3.934 0.340 3.270 4.685
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Table F.27: Summary statistics: country-sector sample
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
WMS variables
Family qualityLow (40th) 290 0.513 0.345 0.000 1.000
Family qualityHigh (60th) 290 0.255 0.277 0.000 1.000
Family qualityLow (25th) 290 0.373 0.333 0.000 1.000
Family qualityHigh (75th) 290 0.120 0.174 0.000 0.667
Family quality (50th) 290 0.624 0.329 0.000 1.000
Std. Deviation Management Quality 240 0.543 0.239 0.039 1.650
Average firm size 290 5.813 0.801 3.912 8.076
Country variables
Individualism 290 58.034 23.004 20.000 91.000
Freedom of choice 290 7.003 0.560 5.776 7.869
Family ties (unimportance) 290 -0.002 0.247 -0.392 0.638
Institutional quality 290 2.377 1.689 -1.239 4.376
Barrier to entry index 290 -1.257 2.078 -4.910 2.362
Financial development 290 86.393 48.979 15.896 200.732
Ln (per capita GDP) 290 9.854 0.750 7.841 10.632
Human capital 290 9.258 2.370 3.781 13.096
Capital endowment 290 140777.783 69701.071 10360.698 249579.063
Year of industrial transition (YIT) 284 1950.106 50.902 1801.000 2005.000
Not yet industrialized by 2005 284 0.123 0.329 0.000 1.000
Not yet industrialized by 1986 284 0.306 0.462 0.000 1.000
Not yet industrialized by 1987 284 0.243 0.430 0.000 1.000
Trust 290 0.314 0.131 0.077 0.648
Ethnic fractionalization 290 0.255 0.197 0.012 0.712
Language fractionalization 290 0.195 0.214 0.018 0.807
Communitarian family 284 0.077 0.268 0.000 1.000
Authoritarian family 284 0.173 0.379 0.000 1.000
Egalitarian nuclear family 284 0.493 0.501 0.000 1.000
Absolute nuclear family 284 0.257 0.438 0.000 1.000
Executive constraints 290 5.694 1.520 2.537 7.000
Legal origin (British) 290 0.376 0.485 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (French) 290 0.448 0.498 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (Socialist) 290 0.041 0.200 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (German) 290 0.097 0.296 0.000 1.000
Legal origin (Scandinavian) 290 0.038 0.191 0.000 1.000
Absolute latitude 290 38.048 14.606 1.367 62.000
Corruption 290 1.072 0.937 -0.499 2.353
Rule of law 290 0.967 0.801 -0.649 1.837
Starting business procedure (number) 290 8.771 4.197 2.000 17.000
Ln(1+Starting business time (days)) 290 3.327 1.015 1.386 5.056
Ln(1+Starting business cost (% of income per capita)) 290 2.060 1.179 0.182 3.960
Ln(1+Enforcing contracts time (days)) 290 6.286 0.525 4.796 7.259
Ln(1+Enforcing contracts cost (% of claim)) 290 3.131 0.329 2.493 3.704
Ln(1+Paying taxes (# per year)) 290 2.741 0.656 1.792 4.143
Ln(1+Paying taxes time (hours per year)) 290 5.542 0.831 3.912 7.864
Ln(1+Paying taxes (total tax rate % of profit)) 290 3.940 0.354 3.270 4.685
Sector variables
R&D intensity 290 2.341 2.461 0.352 11.322
Skill intensity 290 0.278 0.074 0.174 0.484
Capital intensity 290 0.864 0.248 0.481 1.326
External dependence 290 0.711 1.315 -0.322 5.416
Contract intensity 290 0.494 0.180 0.036 0.781
Intangible intensity 290 0.751 1.002 0.020 4.540
Valued added 290 138.375 90.530 62.568 839.952
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